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ABSTRACT
This thesis tests the efficiency of the U.K. financial futures
market, using data over the period from September 1982 to March
1985. In examining the efficiency of the U.K. financial futures
market a number of significant contributions are made to the
existing literature.
First, efficiency is examined on a data set that has not been
rigorously examined. Second, more comprehensive tests of efficiency
are proposed within this thesis than are reported elsewhere in
the literature.
chapter one provides a summary and review of the issues examined
in the thesis. A detailed explanation of what constitutes a
financial futures contract is given in chapter two, which covers
the operational and institutional aspects of financial futures
markets.
A comprehensive survey of the literature is presented in chapters
three and four. Chapter three looks in detail at the early theory
and discusses the theoretical issues that are relevant in terms of
financial futures. Chapter four examines the empirical literature
and issues involved in testing efficiency.
Five hypotheses are proposed that a financial futures market
should possess. These hypotheses are then used to test efficiency
on the U.K. financial futures market in chapters five to eight.
First, arbitrage opportunities should not exist between the
futures market and the underlying cash or the corresponding
forward market. Second, it should not be possible to develop
profitable pricing rules on the basis of past prices. Third,
assuming risk neutrality, futures rates should be unbiased
predictions of the futures rate at the maturity day of the contract.
Fourth, news effects should explain any forecast errors that arise.
Fifth, futures rates should incorporate all relevant information
and hence exhibit variance.
The rigorous examination of these different hypotheses finds that
the U.K. financial futures market is efficient.
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1CHAPTER ONE
A SLM4ARY AND REVIEW OF THE TESTING OF EFFICIENCY OF THE
U.K. FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS
In recent years the world has seen a phenomenal growth in
financial markets. This spectacular rise has been due in
many respects to the increased sophistication and techniques
used by agents in these markets, and the growth in
telecommunications and computer related technology, thus
allowing instantaneous transmission of information around
the world. (si) Information regarding the use of these
markets is now more readily available whilst search and
transactions costs have simultaneously been reduced. Agents
consequently find it easier and cheaper to trade on these
financial markets. The ease of communication has also meant
that agents find it more convenient to engage in
transactions on a global, basis, in worldwide locations,
rather than just on a domestic level. Financial markets can
thus said to have become truly linked in terms of time and
location.
Coinciding with this growth in, and increased
interelationship between, financial markets the world of
economics has seen massive advances in certain key areas of
the subject. Two such important growth topics are of prime
importance in the area of financial markets. These concern
the subjects of expectation formation and the efficient use
of available information. The former topic has advanced
considerably in terms of the concept of rational
expectations and is, in terms of testing efficiency,
directly related to the information set under consideration.
In financial markets the correct use of all current
available information is of extreme importance. Both these
areas will be an integral part of the following discussion.
It is the intention of this thesis to combine the recent
2advances in economic analysis with the rapidly expanding
area of financial markets. 	 These two distinct fields are
united here in an analysis of the new,	 exciting area
of financial futures markets.
A detailed explanation of what constitutes a financial
futures contract is given in chapter two, which covers the
operational and institutional aspects of financial futures
markets. A financial futures contract is an agreement to
buy or sell a standard quantity of a specific financial
instrument at a future date and at a price agreed at the
financial futures exchange. Such financial instruments
started trading on the London International Financial
Futures Exchange (LIFFE) in September 1982. The number of
contracts traded has increased to ten (*2) and the market
has grown in volume and importance. However 1 as to date,
only one other piece of research has been carried out on the
testing of efficiency of this market.
This thesis fills the gap in the literature. The intention
is thus to use current important concepts in economics in an
area that is of direct relevance to the working of the
economy. With increased knowledge, financial futures
markets will probably become as important and fundamental to
the operation of the economy as the forward markets in
foreign exchange. As will be explained in chapter two they
offer a service that is more effective than the foreign
exchange markets in meeting the needs of agents, without
necessatating increased costs. They also totally
encompass the operations of the foreign exchange markets by
allowing agents not only to deal in currencies but also
interest rates, stock indices, Treasury bonds and options.
Hence such financial futures markets could be of direct use
and relevance to corporations, fund managers, firms and
agents in a variety of circumstances.
What exactly is meant by efficiency will be outlined below.
3This fundamental issue, which is the focus of attention in
this thesis, needs to be considered for the future
development of these markets. The efficient markets'
hypothesis(EMH) provides the benchmark against which
efficiency is examined. It states that agents will use all
available information in a rational and efficient manner.
It is, however, very difficult to examine as it incorporates
a joint hypothesis: one with respect to the market's
equilibrium price; the other on whether agents can
efficiently set actual prices or returns to conform to their
equilibrium values. In terms of financial futures contracts
there often exists no agreement on what constitues an
equilibrium price or return. What it does imply, however,
is that agents set futures prices such that they adequately
reflect all currently available information. Hence, they
should generate maximum returns for the agents, having
regard for risk and transaction costs.
One must be careful in assesing the results from tests of
efficiency. If the outcome satisfies the EMH then there is
no evidence against efficiency. However, a re j ection of the
hypothesis could either be due to an inefficiency within the
market or due to risk and transaction costs. Whilst the EMH
in terms of prices implies that no-one in the market earns
excess returns it is harder, in many respects, to consider
the EMH with respect to returns. One needs to specify a
model of price formation in terms of expected returns.
Then, making full, efficient and rational use of the
information set it should not be possible to earn excess
returns from any one of a group of similar risk securities.
Consequently the expected return, under the Evil, should be
zero. This is referred to as a fair game, and will be
discussed further in chapter four. Thus, in an efficient
market, on the basis of the current information set, the
returns available should conform to a fair game
4As will be explained in chapter four taking account of risk
and transaction costs allows the constuction of a neutral
band around the equilibrium return, within which excess
profits cannot be obtained. Ouantifying explicitly what this
band would be is not covered here but would provide an
interesting area for future research. If it was possible to
take account of the actual risk element within a market then
it would be possible to conclude whether any rejection of
the hypothesis is due to the risk element, in which case
there is no evidence against the EMH, or caused by a pricing
inefficiency within the market, in which case the EM-I would
be rejected.
In terms of financial futures markets, as explained in
chapter two, speculators assume the risks of hedgers. If
the risk being assumed by speculators exactly offsets that
of hedgers there is no risk premium in the market. Thus any
rejection of the EI41 in this instance would be totally due
to an inefficiency within the market. It is not, however,
always possible to quantify the overall, risk within a
market.	 Therefore, in assessing the results within this
thesis one should bear in mind whether any profitable
opportunities	 that arise are offsetting any	 risk
considerations, or whether they are providing profits having
taken account of risk.	 In	 the latter case the market
would be inefficient as it would not be	 satisfying
the notion of a fair game.
Within this thesis a small number of profitable
opportunities were found in terms of one step ahead
forecasts, covered in chapter five. The number of such
opportunities was extremely small and, given the variablity
of futures prices, did not appear to compensate for the
inherent risks in the positions undertaken. Risk,
therefore, is an important area for further research, both
in financial futures and foreign exchange markets. Taking
account of such risk factors would allow more weight to be
5attached to any rejections of the EMH. A further way of
adequately assesing the EF4-1 is to redefine it in terms of
more specific hypotheses, which focus on particular areas
of the available information set. In this way, therefore,
as explained below, any rejection of efficiency could be
explicitly recognised and acted upon.
This thesis consequently looks at an extremely important
area of economics. In examining the efficiency of the UK
financial futures markets a number of significant
contributions are made to the existing literature.
First, efficiency is examined on a data set that has not
been rigorously examined. Edwards(1985) provides the only
other paper that has considered efficiency on the UK
financial futures markets.
Second, more comprehensive tests of efficiency are proposed
within this thesis than are reported elsewhere in the
literature.
Five hypotheses are proposed that an efficient financial
futures market should satisfy. Within the following
analysis certain new techniques are used that overcome
criticisms of the existing literature and establish that, in
terms 0f these hypotheses, the UK financial futures markets
are efficient. The fifth hypothesis is not examined within
this thesis but provides an interesting area for future
research.
In addition, a comprehensive survey of the literature is
presented. Chapter three looks in detail at the early
theory relating to commodity futures, from which the current
financial futures markets evolved. Theoretical issues
relating to commodity futures are still important in terms
of financial futures. Following this discussion of the
early literature chapter four presents a survey of the state
6of existing work, with particular reference to the empirical
literature.
Following the discussion of the operational aspects of
futures markets in chapter two, and the theoretical and
empirical literature on futures markets and testing
efficiency in chapters three and four, the thesis proceeds
to investigate the 1K financial futures markets. It is
proposed that an efficient financial futures market should
satisfy the following hypotheses.
First, arbitrage possibilities should not exist between the
futures market and the underlying cash market, or the
corresponding forward market. Second, it should not be
possible to develop profitable pricing rules on the basis of
past prices. Third, assuming risk neutrality, futures rates
should be unbiased predictors of the futures rate at the
maturity day of the contract. 	 Fourth, news effects should
explain any forecast errors that arise. Fifth, futures
rates should incorporate all relevant information and hence
exhibit minimum variance.
The question of efficiency is a very broad area to
consisder. Although these tests are not entirely mutually
exclusive, they enable efficiency to be examined from a
number of different angles and hence allow a comprehensive
examination of the topic. Testing these hypotheses
therefore allows more comprehensive information and evidence
to be accumulated as to how the 1K financial futures markets
perform. With such different possible tests of a market's
efficiency it is quite possible for the different approaches
to provide varied results. Here, however, ALL the tests
indicate the SAME result, namely that the 11< financial
futures market IS efficient.
As will be seen in chapter four the majority of the
empirical work on examining the efficiency of financial
7futures markets has focussed on arbitrage opportunities and
hedging effectiveness. The former relates to the
possibility of purchasing one contract and selling another
in order to make a sure profit without assuming any
unnecessary risk.	 The latter, meanwhile, examines the
correlation between the change in the futures price and that
in the underlying cash price. Given that financial futures
markets are essentially used for hedging purposes, the
higher this correlation then the more effective is the
futures market as a hedging instrument.
Chapter five finds that the UK financial futures market is
efficient in terms of the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. The theory of the term structure of interest
rates is used to find that no arbitrage opportunities exist
between the three month sterling interest rate contract and
the underlying spot market. 	 In addition, no arbitrage
opportunities exist between the four currency futures
contracts and the corresponding forward markets. The
hedging effectiveness of these currency futures is also
examined and found to be quite high, indicating that they
are useful hedging instruments.
Efficiency in terms of dependencies in past prices is then
examined in chapter six. One step ahead forecasts derived
from autoregressive price schemes are examined for a total
of forty-six futures contracts over their last six months to
delivery. These one step ahead forecasts provide a correct
way of examining efficiency by taking account of the updated
information set at each period. Adopting this procedure it
was found that there was only a significant correlation
between the actual and the expected prices for five out of
the forty-six futures contracts under consideration.
Fu#&ermore, due to the variability of futures prices, and
taking into account margin requirements, it was found that
profits would only be generated from following these
forecasts for three out of these five futures contracts. On
8the basis of this test, the financial futures market was
found to be efficient with stop-loss orders proving to be
the most effective means of trading in the market.
Day-of-the-week effects (DOvE) and unbiasedness of futures
rates are examined in chapter seven. The DOVE relates to a
phenomenon that has been found in asset markets. It
examines the daily return in a market in order to see if
there exists a systematic rule to the return that could be
achieved on a particular day-of-the-week, throughout time.
If a DOWE is found it not only implies an inefficiency in
the market but it also has important implications for the
examination of unbiasedness. For instance, if a significant
return was found on the same day throughout time then the
use of data from this day could give biased results. As
tests of unbiasedness, based on a weekly time frame, are
carried out using data from the same day-of-the-week the
consideration of DOWE is an important first step in
examining unbiasedness.
In chapter sre.r it is shown that no DOWE exists for any of
the financial futures currency contracts. In addition,
unbiasedness of futures rates was found f or the majority of
currency contracts. Only at thirteen and fourteen weeks
from maturity were the rates for the yen:dollar contract
found to be different from their hypothesised values.
Strong correlation across different currency futures was
found, thus implying that systems estimation, by taking
account of covariances across currencies, would provide a
more powerful test of unbiasedness. However, due to the
lack of enough data, which would imply a degrees of freedom
problem, systems estimation was only carried out across two
currencies at any one time. It was found that these
financial futures contracts were unbiased predictors, as one
would expect in an efficient market.
9Chapter 2.i31&. provides the fourth chapter of empirical
research, and the final chapter of the thesis. News effects
are examined within this chapter. Such news effects help
to explain any forecast errors that occur between the
futures rates at any time to maturity and the rates at
maturity. First, a correct way of examining news effects in
a systems estimation is proposed and examined. As there was
insufficient data in which to carry out this systems
estimation on the financial futures market, data from the
foreign exchange market was used to examine this important
approach. News effects, in a systems estimation using
cross-equation parameter restrictions, were examined for six
currencies using data from 1978-1983. These markets were
found to be efficient.
The second half of this chapter examined news effects
surrounding money supply announcements with respect to three
sterling related futures contracts. These were the twenty
year gilt contract, the sterling:dollar currency contract
and the three month sterling interest rate contract. Using
data ref ering to the market's expected monthly outcome of 1K
broad money, sterling M3, and the actual values that
occured, the speed of reaction of the futures prices to any
differential between actual and expected money is examined.
As would be expected in an efficient market, any deviations
between actual and the expected money supply are found to
be quickly incorporated into the futures price.
This rigorous examination of the efficiency of the UK
financial futures markets therefore makes an important
contribution to the literature. It does not claim, however,
to cover all the the issues involved in testing efficiency
or in the area of financial futures markets. There are a
number of areas where further research would benefit the
existing literature.
As explained above, explicit recognition and measurement of
10
potential risk factors would aid significantly research into
efficiency. Extending this further, such risks arise
because of the variability of prices within the market.
Another area for further research would therefore be to
adopt the recent research applied to the stock and foreign
exchange markets and analyse it in terms of financial
futures markets. Namely, the assessment of whether financial
futures prices are too variable, or whether their movement
adequately reflects variability in the underlying economic
fundamentals. Hedging effectiveness measures whether
futures price movements adequately offset variability in
cash prices but it does not ascertain whether the actual
size of these futures price movements is justified on
economic and theoretical grounds.
Hypothesis five, outlined in this thesis, states that
efficient futures prices should adequately incorporate all
available information and hence exhibit minimum variance.
It would thus be necessary to determine the important
variables to which the futures price under consideration
depends upon, and then test whether the price fully relects
information contained within these variables. It might be
possible to extend this to actually construct models within
which one attempted to forecast futures price movements. If
these models provided unbiased forecasts, with minimum mean
squared errors, then one might be able to construct
forecasts that are better than those reflected in futures
prices
Other areas for further research could also develop further
some of the concepts outlined in this thesis. In chapter
four, for example, arbitrage opportunities are found not to
exist within terms of LIFFE's currency contracts or short
term interest rate contract. It would be interesting to
extend this to see if arbitrage opportunities exist between
similar contracts traded on LIFFE and the Chicago
11
International Monetary Market (11+1). The sophisticated
communications available should mean that arbitrage
opportunities are not available between these markets. High
frequency data is necessary to test this as the opening
times of these markets only coincide for certain hours of
the day. Such high frequency data could also be employed to
see whether it is possible to observe profitable
opportunities throughout certain times of the day. In terms
of the EMH, market prices should continually reflect all
available information throughout the day.
Another area for future research would be to analyse the
relationship between volume and open interest on futures
prices. Volume refers to the opening and closing of a
position, whilst open interest relates to opening a position
and not closing it during that day. Would a thick market,
in which many trades occur, prove to be a better predictor
of prices than a thin market, in which few trades occur?
Or, would a thick market provide more price discrepencies,
and hence allow profitable opportunities to occur at
certain periods troughout the day?
It would also be interesting to obtain data in order to see
if inside information was a valid area of concern in tests
of efficiency. I am not sure as to how feasible it would be
to obtain such data.
As can be seen the area of efficiency testing is very broad.
In this thesis efficiency is defined in a more rigorous way
than encountered elsewhere in the literature. The work of
previous researchers is encompassed within the hypotheses
outlined here. Econometric techniques are used to examine
four of these hypotheses on a previously unresearched data
set. Chapters five to eight empirically examine efficiency
on the UK financial futures markets. The examination of
these different hypotheses provides the same results. The
UK financial futures markets are found to be efficient.
12
FOOTNOTES:
• 1: See chapter eight for an explanation of the growth of
the U.S. market since 1978. Or, consult Bass(1981).
*2: See table 2.1.
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CHAPTER TWO:
FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS: HC1 ThEY OPERATE
2.1 INTROOUCTION
A financial, futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell
a standard quantity of a specific financial instrument at a
future date and at a price agreed at the financial futures
exchange. An exchange commenced trading in such financial
instruments in the UK in September 1982. Known as the
London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIIFE) it
deals in a whole variety of financial instruments from
exchange rates to stock indices (see Table 2.1 for a
complete list). This chapter describes the development and
operations of financial futures markets (FFM).
The agents that form the market fulfil different roles.
Chapter five looks at how effectively a FFM fulfills its
arbitrage and hedging roles. Knowledge of the individual
contracts is obviously important for agents, in order for
them to use the market efficiently. Investing in FFM
requires a clear and complete understanding of each contract
market and its	 idiosyncratic features, including the
relationship between futures prices and spot prices.
FFM evolved out of commodity futures markets with LIFFE
opening after the growth of financial futures trading in
the USA.
The Chicago Board of Trade (COOT) and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) both dealt in farm futures since 1848 and
1898, respectively. However, it was not until 1972 that the
first financial futures contract was launched on the cME.
Following the floating of exchange rates in the previous
year the ME launched currency futures. These were traded
on the OlE's subsidiary, the International Monetary Market
(11+1).	 Interest rate futures soon followed, with the
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subsequent volatility of interest rates providing the
perfect environment for these contracts.
When LIFFE opened in September 1982 the intention was for
this Exchange to bridge the gap between Europe and the U.S.
by establishing financial futures trading. However, a
'catch 22' situation exists in establishing such markets.
To attract sufficient volume of trades the market needs to
be liquid whilst to be liquid there must be enough trade on
the exchange. Thus, given the ease of worldwide
communications it is very difficult for a market outside
Chicago to develop sufficient liquidity in order to create a
viable market. Because of the time difference LIFFE has an
advantage over other American exchanges that have failed to
establish themselves. For instance, the American Stock
Exchange's financial futures operation had to be absorbed
into cOMEX, which was already a small market. The New York
Futures Exchange (NYFE), which opened in August 1980, could
not establish any significant volume of trading and so
signed an agreement with the B0T that the two markets be
electronically linked.
Ten contracts are now traded on LIFFE. This number has
grown steadily since the Exchange started, with contracts
now covering a whole range of instruments. (See Table 2.1).
Each contract has its own individual features as well as
satisfying the general condition of FFM. Consider now these
general conditions.
3 MONTH
	
£500,000 0.01
STERLING
	
£12.50
INTEREST RATE
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Table 2.1:	 S1.RIMARY OF ThE TEN CONTRACTS TRADED ON THE LOtCON
INTERNATIONAL F INANCIAL FUTURES EXCHANGE
CONTRACT	 UNIT OF
TRADING
20 YEAR	 £50,000
GILT
INTEREST RATE
TICK VALUE MARGIN CONTRACT
AND SIZE	 STANDARD
£1/32	 £1,500	 Any gilt stock with
£15. 625	 a life 15-25 years and
must be delivered in
multiples of £50,000.
£1,000	 3 mth sterling deposit
facility arranged by seller
at designated London banks,
or, at the buyer's option, a
cash settlement based on EDSP.
US
	 $100,000 $1/32	 $2,000 US TBond with a life of at
TREASURY
	 $31.25	 least 15 years.
BOND
STERLING!	 £25,000	 0.01 cents $1,000 Deliverable in the principal
DOLLAR	 per £.	 financial in the country of
$2.50	 issue.
DEUTSCHE	 OM 125,000 0.01 cents $1,000 Deliverable in the principal
MARK/DOLLAR	 per CM	 financial in the country of
$12.50	 issue.
YEN!	 Yen 12.5m 0.01 cents $1,000 Deliverable in the principal
DOLLAR	 per 100 Yen	 financial in the country of
$12.50	 issue.
SWISS	 SFr 125,000 0.01 cents $1,000 	 Deliverable in the principal
FRANC/DOLLAR	 per SEr	 financial in the country of
$12.50	 issue.
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FTSE 100	 Value of	 FTSE 100
(Footsie)	 £25 per full Index+10
STOCK INDEX index point
3 MONTh	 81,000,000 0.01
EURODOLLAR	 $25.00
INTEREST RATE
£1,500 Cash settlement at EOSP
$1,000 3 month eurodollar interest
rate, based on the the deposit
rates being quoted to a random
sample of designated banks on
the last trading day
SHORT	 £100,000	 £ 1/32	 £1,000 £100,000 nominal value notional
GILT	 gilt with 10 per cent coupon.
ALL CONTRACTS ARE DELIVERED IN THE SAME MONTHS: MARCH, JUNE,
SEPTEMBER AND DECEMBER.
TRADING HOURS: Gilt: 09.30 - 16.15
TBond: 08.15 - 16.10
£I$:	 08.32 - 16.02
Y/$:	 08.30 - 16.00
FTSE: 09.35 - 15.30
ST3:	 08.20 - 16.02
ED3: 08.30 - 16.00
SwF/$: 08.38 - 16.06
DM/$: 08.34 - 16.04
Short Gilt: 09.35 - 16.20
DELIVERY DAYS: Currencies: Third Wednesday of delivery month
ST3, ED3, FTSE-100: First business day after the
last trading day.
Gilt, Short Gilt, TBond: Any business day in delivery
month, at seller's choice
LAST TRADING DAYS: Currencies: Two business days prior to delivery.
Gilt, Short Gilt: Two business days prior to
last business day in delivery month.
FTSE-100: Last business day in delivery month.
513: Third Wednesday of delivery month.
ED3: Two business days prior to third Wednesday of
delivery month.
US T.Bond: Seven business days prior to last
business day in delivery month.
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2.2 FUTURES MARKETS' CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS(FFM) FORWARD MARKETS
AND OPTION MARKETS
FFM have certain characteristics that distinguishes them
from forward markets and option markets. In terms of
financial instruments FFM are more encompassing than forward
markets. Forward markets deal. mainly with currencies whilst
FFM include not only foreign exchange instruments but also
short, medium and long term debt instruments as well as
stock indices. The characteristics of FFM will be outlined
below, including the main differences between them and
forward contracts.
FFM are located in a central location (The Exchange) with
deals being carried out in an auction atmosphere. Forward
markets, by comparison, are decentralised. These
over-the-counter (OTC) markets tend to be doniinated by
banks. Whereas on FFM the small customer needs only have
direct access to the Exchange, on forward markets he must
have, in theory, access to one of the major banks that make
the market.
TABLE 2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF FORWARD AND FUTURES CONTRACTS
FORWARD CONTRACTS
	
FUTURES CONTRACTS
Bilateral agreement,	 Standardised contracts,
Odd sizes,	 Set unit sizes,
Fixed time to maturity,	 Fixed maturity date,
Set price throughout contract,	 Price changes throughout contract,
Daily marking to market,
Over-the-counter.	 Central market location,
Open outcry trading.
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Trading is highly organised in FFM. A central location,
known as the pit, exists for the trading of the various
instruments. Different trading pits exist in the Exchange
for each specific instrument, with an open outcry method of
trading being used. This ensures that all orders are made
public at the same moment in time to all members who are
present on the floor.
This procedure not only prevents inside information but also
allows all the trades to be completed at the most
competitive rate that is quoted. Regulation of the market
by the Clearing House, which oversees all trades, prevents
any manipuion of this procedure. In doing so, the
customer is protected. Open-outcry also minimises search
and transaction costs, and hence brokerage fees.
There may exist a trade off between the competitiveness of
the futures market and the trading of standardised
contracts. Open-outcry will prove competitive as long as
the number of contracts dealt in does not grow too large.
With hand and mouth signals being used in the pit it is
quite feasible that, when trading volume is high, this
method of conducting deals can be quite chaotic. The broken
month trading that takes place in the forward market would
prove too complex for hand trading and open-outcry in the
futures markets.
Futures contracts are STAICAROISED with agents dealing in
SET TRADING UNITS. For instance, the trading for U.S.
Treasury Bonds is in units of $100,000. This standardisation
of contracts makes it easy to close a futures market
position after it has been opened. This helps maintain
liquidity in the market. Forward contracts are, by
comparison, very illiquid agreements, being a bilaterial
agreement between parties.
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This standardisation of futures contracts, where one
specifies contract multiplies in terms of given dates,
rather than multiplies of a month or so, from the present
date, creates a liquid secondary market for contract
trading.
Contracts in FFM are specified not only in terms of set
trading units but also have FIXED MATI.ITY DATES. Thus, in
FFM it is the maturity date that is fixed whilst in futures
markets it is the time to maturity that is fixed. This has
an important implication for the policing of positions in
either market, as will be seen in the examination of
arbitrage possibilities in chapter five.
One disadvantage of FFM arises from having set trading units
and fixed maturity dates. That is, the market cannot handle
transactions for odd sizes and odd dates. Meanwhile, in the
forward market, the banks are active in the spot market and
so find it easier to fulfil such specific orders.
Consider an agent who wanted to safeguard a future sterling
loan against a rise in interest rates. He would use the
three month sterling interest rate futures contract. Like
the three month eurodollar contract that is traded on LIFFE
it is quoted on an index basis, as 100 minus the implied
interest rate. That is, if the annual interest rate
currently available on the futures instrument is 14%, then
the price of the futures contract would be 100 - 14 - OS.
Consequently an inverse relationship exists between interest
rates and the pricing of interest futures contracts. This
agent would therefore sell sterling interest rate contracts.
After selling the necessary number of,say, sterling December
futures contracts it may be the case that the agent may not
wish to hold this position to maturity and would therefore
want to close it out. He would do this by buying an
equivalent number of sterling December futures. 	 If this
December contract was sufficiently liquid then the position
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could easily be closed at a competitive price. However, as
forward contracts are not standardised it would be extremely
hard to close out such a position on a forward market. Once
the agent has entered into the contract he is in a locked-in
position and will not be as able to close the contract as
easily as is possible in the futures market. Certain
problems would arise in attempting to do so. For instance,
there would be an odd dealing date with a larger bid-ask
spread. A less competitive quote would thus be obtained by
comparison with FFM.
In FFM the Clearing House thus fulfils an important role by
ensuring that no constraint on competition exists in closing
out positions. It oversees all trades and thus safeguards
all agents from any default on the other side of their
position. Thus the Clearing House absorbs any possible risk
of default in futures trading. In the forward market there
is a risk of dealing with an individual organisation or
dealer rather than with an organised exchange, as in the
futures market. On LIFFE the Clearing House is the
International Commodities Clearing House Limited (IccH). It
is an independent Clearing House owned by leading U.K.
banks which, because of its substantial resources, absorbs
the market's risk. By monitoring transactions and ensuring
that deals are concluded it assumes the default risk that
would fall on single institutions in forward markets.
To ensure effective monitoring of positions FFM are
characterised by a procedure known as MARKING-TO-MARKET.
The price at which exchange occurs in the forward market is
fixed for the duration of the contract whereas in futures
markets daily price changes exist. These price changes are
in response to new information, which affects agents'
expectations of contract prices at maturity. These changes
ensure that the price at which the contract was struck
differs frois the price of the contract at maturity, the
Exchange Delivery Settlement Price (EDSP). Such price
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changes are feasible in FFM as they are traded in highly
organised markets. These price changes result in MARGIN
REQUIREMENTS on futures contracts.
These margin requirements are necessary as they provide a
cushion against any adverse price movements of futures
contracts as well as safeguarding against contract defaults.
Each contract has an INITIAL MINII&Il MARGIN that both the
buyer and the seller deposit with the Exchange. They pay
the ICH in the form of cash or collateral. Margins range
in size from, for instance, 0.2% of the nominal value of the
short term interest rate contracts to a fixed $1,000 for
each currency contract. Whilst risky agents may be required
to pay higher margins, the typical margin requirement is
still a small proportion of the face value of the contract.
High leverage is thus possible in FFM. Whilst the
volatility of the market means that variation margin calls
can sometimes be quite large the fact that high leverage is
available	 makes these markets a good 	 speculative
proposition.
At the end of each day the profits and losses incurred on
any position are calculated. Those people whose open
positions have incurred losses deposit further amounts to
maintain their initial margin; this is paid to those whose
positions have made profits. This is the VARIATION MARGIN.
It is the necessary change that is needed to maintain the
initial margin.
The initial margin is greater than any likely price
movements of the underlying cash instrument. Consequently
losses on any given day will not exceed the amount in a
customer's margin account.
These margins only apply to Clearing Members of LIFFE. For
non-clearing members the minimum margin requirements must
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not be less, but can be more. Also lower initial margins
are required for straddle positions. That is, when one is
simultaneously long and short in different months of the
same LIFFE futures instrument. That is, for instance, when
one buys a December 1985 sterling contract whilst also
selling a September 1985 sterling contract.
Futures contracts will thus be a binding legal agreement
with no possibility of default. Apart from margins the
other important regulator feature is the existence of daily
price limits.
Each contract has a specific price change limit. If this
limit is reached the market closes for an hour and then
reopens without price limits for the rest of the day. This
is a more flexible system to the one employed in the U.S.A.
There, no contracts may be traded if the price limit is
breached. If a contract continues to go limit up or
limit down on successive days then the price limits may be
widened. Margin requirements can temporalily increase
during such periods. However, such limits are rarely
breached.
Expectations play an important role in determining the
positions that agents take in the market. A long futures
position entails buying a contract in expectation of a price
rise whilst a short postion means selling the contract in
expectation of a price fall. If a contract was held until
delivery the full price of the contract, which substantially
exceeds the initial margin, must be paid and the quantity
specified by the contract must be delivered. Unlike trading
in bond and stock markets futures trading does not involve
securities but trading contracts on securities. Such
certificateless trading means that an actual security is not
being traded but just a book-keeping entry which states a
particular futures position.	 Hence, in FFM, the number of
contracts actually delivered is very low. 	 For instance,
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table 2.3 shows the extremely small number of contracts
delivered throughout 1983.
TABLE 2.3
CONTRACTS DELIVERED AS A PERCENTAGE OF VOLIJIE TRADED: 1983.
DELIVERY
MONTh	 £:S SFr:$ DM:S	 Y:$	 ED3	 ST3 GILT
MAR 83	 0.88% 2.34% 1.16% 3.42% 0.19% 0.29% 0.14%
JI.J1 83	 0.20% 2.77% 2.37% 0.89% 0.49% 0.23% 0.27%
SEP 83	 0.69% 6.18% 1.51% 0.95% 0.15% 0.26% 0.88%
DEC 83	 1.24% 0.67% 1.51% 0.77% 0.22% 0.75% 0.30%
Source: 'LIFFE Trading Statistics' (6.1.84)
If commodity futures contracts were held until maturity this
would entail the actual delivery of the underlying
commodity.	 Thus transportation and storage would be
important considerations. Also, if enough long commodity
futures contracts were held until maturity there would exist
the risk of a potential supply shortage of the underlying
commodity.
Options on futures have also recently started trading on
futures markets. These do not require actual fulfillment of
the delivery as they allow the agent to let the agreement
expire. Options convey the right, but not the obligation,
to buy or sell a given amount of a commodity or instrument
at a fixed price until some specified date when the option
expires. Payment of a premium allows one to take such a
position. This is an insurance against a particular event
occuring.	 If one does not take up the option then this
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premium is forfeited.	 The loss is thus limited to the
premium on options. In the futures market losses are
limited to the contract price on long positions, but are
unlimited on short positions.
Each contract has a minimum price movement called a TICK,
which has a specific monetary value. This helps efficient
trading as each time a contract's price moves the owner
gains or loses a specific amount of money. Each tick has a
specific value,
tick value • tick size . face value of contract
contract's length
Consequently each time there is a price change, this tick
value can be multiplied by the number of ticks to obtain the
value implied by the price change. This value will be the
variation margin. If the price of a contract has risen the
seller receives the variation margin whilst if it has fallen
the buyer benefits.
As shown in table 2.1 the various contracts have different
face values as well as varying price quotation techniques.
For instance the four currency contracts are quoted in terms
of the underlying exchange rate against the US dollar. By
comparison, the long term interest rate futures contract is
the 20 year 12% coupon notional. gilt. This is not priced on
an index basis like LIFFE's short term interest rate
contracts but in the same way as gUts in the cash market.
That is, per £100 nominal value. It has a face value of
£50,000 and the tick size is measured as 1/32 of 1%. A tick
thus equals 1/32 per £100 nominal value, with its value
being equal to (1/32 x 0.01) . £50,000 - £15.625. Meanwhile,
its margin requirement is £1,500, which is 3% of the nominal
amount of the contract.
The standardisation of futures contracts is reflected in the
fact that contracts are DELIVERED IN ThE SAME FOUR MONTHS of
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any year: March, June, September and December. One trades
in futures for up to five of these deliverable months ahead.
Thus, one can trade in futures contracts up to fifteen
months ahead. For instance, if it was April 1984 then one
could trade in futures for June, September, and December
1984 as well as March and June 1985. In addition within
each contract there are specific last trading days and days
on which the contract is deliverable. 	 These are shown in
table 2.1.
The volume of trading within a day indicates the number of
exchanges of contracts that have taken place during that
day. Open interest, meanwhile, is the number of open
positions held by agents in the market .t the end of each
day. Each open position will have a long and a short agent.
Thus open interest is half of this joint total. That is, it
is equilivant to the stock of long positions which is the
same as the number of short positions at a day's end.
Liquidity is highest in nearby futures, with volume and open
interest falling as one moves to more distant futures. With
the liquid markets much of the exchange takes place within
the same day. In distant markets positions are held
overnight. Thus volume is greater than open interest in
nearby futures but less in the distant ones.
A large amount of market activity, particularly in the
liquid markets, involves open and closing a position in the
same day. This increases volume but does not affect open
interest. If one closes an existing position this increases
volume but leads to a fall in open interest.
Theoretical issues regarding futures contracts are dealt
with in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) (1981), Black (1976),
and Jarrow and Oldfield (1981). Parallel to this literature
is that on options markets. Whilst this latter area is not
of direct relevance in this thesis it will be of future
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importance given the recent inception of option futures on
LIFFE. Important papers to be consulted in this area are
Black and Scholes(1972)(1973), Smithtl976) and Merton(1973).
One of the main issues arising from the theoretical
literature surrounds the means of payment in respect of the
contracts undertaken. In terms of the forward contract the
agent agrees to buy or sell the asset on a specific future
date for the forward price that was quoted at the time when
the contract was initiated. Payment is made at that future
date. On any interim day if an agent was to take out a
forward contract then the price of that contract should have
continuously changed over time such that the contract would
have zero initial value. The payment of margins in futures
markets means that these futures prices also change
continuosly over the length of the contract such that the
remaining futures payments stream has zero value.
One consequence of the latter is outlined in CIR in terms of
their proposition numbers one and two. That is the
distinction between forward contracts and futures contracts
is like, respectively, going long and rolling over shorts in
the bond market. Indeed, with constant interest rates Black
(1976) shows that the different types of contract are, in
essence, equivalent. Given the analogy of CIA then future
prices will depend ultimately on how interest rates change
and on the eventual price at maturity.
Whilst stochastic interest rates are claimed to provide the
major differential between interest rate contracts it should
be said that this is not the real difference. The means of
payment due to the description of the way the contracts are
written provides the important differential.
There are a number of recent introductory texts on financial
futures markets. Chapter one of Goss and Yamey (1978)
provides a good introduction, as does Brown and Geisst
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(1983).	 Schwager (1964) and Rottistein and Littl. (1983),
which has a collection	 of articles by	 leading
exponents on these markets, both provide comprehensive
introductions.	 The former has a large section on chart
analysis. Yamey(1983)(1985) gives a good short account
of these markets. Gay and Koib (1982) focus in more detail
on interest rate futures, as do shorter articles by Arak and
McCurdy (1980), Belongia and Santoni (1984) and Bacon and
Williams (1976). Melton and Pukula (1983) have a good
introduction to options in chapter 7, whilst Giddy (1983),
Chrystal (1984) on foreign exchange options, Wolf (1982) and
Belongia and Thomas	 (1984)	 also provide interesting
material. In terms of the U.K. markets the publications
listed under LIFFE in the bibliography cover the market's
institutional aspects in more detail.
2.3 THE MAIRKET'S AGENTS.
Three categories of agents operate in a FFM. These are
hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs. Each type of agent
satisfies their needs by fulfilling different roles within
the market.	 Hedgers are necessary for the long term
viability of the market, with their role being that of
transferring risk. They protect current or future cash
market positions by assuming offsetting positions in futures
markets. Chapter three gives a theoretical explanation of
what sort of futures market position this will be. It will
NOT necessarily be an equal and opposite position to that in
the cash market.
Speculators assume the risks that hedgers are trying to
offset. Sometimes their name may be interchanged with that
of traders. Open positions are taken within the market
which means that these agents assume the market's risk. As
positions are taken on the basis of expectations of future
price movements different types of trading can exist. OPEN
POSITION TRADING, for instance, implies taking a view on the
28
overall level of rates. SPREAD TRADING, alternatively,
means taking a position on the basis of the likely change in
the relationship between two different futures prices.
Traders not only take different views of the market but also
specialise over different lengths of time. Scalpers, for
instance, specialise over very short time intervals. They
are continuously in and out of the market, and tend not to
hold overnight positions. Hence, they are referred to as
day-traders. Whilst hedgers are essential for the long term
viability of the FFM these scalpers help provide liquidity,
which is necessary for the efficient operation of a market.
Arbitrageurs aim for riskless profit by exploiting any price
discrepancies between related instruments in the futures and
corresponding cash and forward markets.
Hedging is essentially a risk reducing exercise. A futures
market position is assumed as a consequence of a position
having ALREADY been established within the underlying cash
market.	 It is thus a	 secondary decision.	 Different
theories underlie a hedge (see chapter three). In a
classical hedge an equal and opposite position will be taken
in the futures market with respect to that in the cash
market. This is, however, misleading. 	 Hedgers will not
always take a 1:1 position between cash and futures.
The success of a hedge depends on a high correlation between
cash price movements and futures price movements. With cash
and futures prices moving together, gains (losses) in the
cash market will be offset by losses (gains) in the futures
markets.
Working(1953a) classified hedging as having a speculative
element with positions being established on the grounds of
expected basis movements. On these grounds, however, all
positions in a FFM could be classed as speculative as they
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would all be influenced, to some degree, by agents'
expectations. The important distinguishing feature of
hedging, however, is that it is a secondary role. That is,
the position in the futures markets is a consequence of a
cash market position. Speculation entails an open position
in the futures market, and is not dependant on any necessary
cash market position.
According to the CFTC Act,
'....No transactions or positions shall be classified
as bona fide hedging......unless their purpose is to
offset price risks incidental to commercial case or
spot operations.'
CFTC Act 'What is Hedging'
p 172 of 'Inside Futures Markets.'
Hedging will not necessarily be a 1:1 relationship and so
will entail a management of	 risk, rather than pure
insurance. Examples 2.1 and 2.2 give two examples of
perfect hedges. Here, exactly the same amount that is held
in the cash market is bought or sold in the futures market.
The variation margin leverage factor,which takes account of
the payment of variation margin, will however mean that this
is not necessarily so. Also, taking into account agents'
expectations of future basis movements this assumption will
not prove to be correct. Even if the amount hedged exactly
offsets the cash amount the hedge may NOT work out
perfectly. Example 2.3 shows that because of basis risk a
completely hedged position can STILL result in a loss.
By taking up this respective position in the market the
hedger has transferred the risk. It has either been passed
onto another hedger, with an opposite requirement, or passed
onto a trader, who has accepted the risk in the expectation
of making a profit by accurately forecasting futures prices.
One of the important stages in undertaking a hedge is that
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EXAMPLE 2.1 Short hedge in interest rates
Problem: Suppose it is June 1985 and a company needs to
borrow £1 million from December 1985 until March 1988.
There is the possibility of a rise in interest rates. To
cover this the company sells ST3 contracts, thus locking
into the currently quoted interest rate.
Suppose that the price of a June ST3 1985 86.00, thus
implying an interest rate of 14%. In addition, borrowing
rate equals the base rate plus IS.
Therefore the company wants to Jock into a borrowing rate of
15%.
As one 813 contract - £250000 per 3 months and the company
wants to hedge £1,000,000 it sells 4 December 85 513
contracts 8 86.00
Suppose December 1985 Base Rate - 16%, implying S13 price -
B4 .00
Close Out hedge by buying 4 contracts: £ (I) Interest COST
of Borrowing L1M 8 17% (B.Rate + 1%) for three months 42,500
(II) PROFIT on futures contracts
	
sold 8	 86.00
	
buy 8
	 84.00
2.00
Profit in ticks 200
Tick Value £6.25
Number of contracts 4
Profit - 4 x 200 x £6.25
	 5,000
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(III) NET COST	 £37,500
aa - - a -
(IV) Effective Annual Interest Rate 	 15%
EXAMPLE 2.2 Long hedge in interest rates.
Problem: Suppose in March 1984 a company expects to receive
LIM in September 1984 which it then intends to invest for 6
months in a fixed interest Sterling deposit.
Suppose the company wants to fix now the income from the
forthcoming investment and therefore limit the effect of any
future variations in interest rates. It will hedge using
ST3 contracts.
Suppose in March 1984 June ST3 - 88.00
implying a 12% interest rate in June.
and Sept ST3 a 89.50
implying a 11.5% interest rate in Sept.
Lock into 11.5% interest rate by: Buying 8 £ 3 month
interest rate contracts for September delivery at 88.00.
1 contract - £250000 for 3 months,
therefore buy 8 contracts a £2M for 3 months
i.e. L1M for 3 months.
5uppose interest rate £ 3 month deposits FELL to 10% in
September 1984, i.e. 9.5% for 6 month Rates CLOSE HEDGE by
selling B contracts in the market:
mv a L1M
1) Interest Income of Invoice
	 £
8 9.5% for 6 months	 47500
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2) Profit on futures market:
Sold 8 90.00
Bought 8 88.00
Profit	 2.00
	
No of ticks	 200
	
Tick value	 £5.25
Number of contracts	 8
Profit - 200 x £6.25 x 8 	 10000
3) Net Income	 £57500
ann
4) Effective interest rate p.a 	 11.5%
Suppose interest rate had RISEN to 14% in September
i.e. 13.5% on 6 month rates.
1) Interest Income of Invoice	 £
8 13.5% for S months	 67500
2) Loss on Futures Market:
Sold 8 86.00
Bought 8 88.00
Loss	 2.00
Number of ticks 200
Tick value £6.25
Number of contracts 8
Loss - 200 x £6.25 x 8 	 10000
3) Net Income	 57500
a_ace
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4) Effective interest rate p.a.
	 11.5%
i.e. has locked into interest rate predicted by the futures
market at the time the hedge was set, irregardless of any
future interest rate movements.
Sometimes the hedge will not work out perfectly. Consider a
SHORT HEDGE by portfolio manager.
Suppose he holds 20 year Guts, maturity value of £10
million. Worried that interest rate will rise, security
prices falling. Offset risk, sell. Gilt futures contracts.
Cash Market
Current price 91 - 24
-, £9175000
interest rates
s.t. price 76 - 16
£7650000
Loss £1525000
sells 200 of £50000
20 year 12% guts 90 - 26
buys 200 guts 0
76 - 2
Ga in
472 ticks 8 £15625
on 200 contracts
- £1475000
V
Loss of Guts ) Gain on Futures
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the futures contract should be related to the underlying
cash instrument. A perfect hedge results when there is
perfect correlation between these futures price changes and
cash price changes.
The difference between the cash price and the futures price
is called the BASIS. As this is equivalent to the futures
interest rate minus the cash market interest rate it
indicates the difference in yield between the two markets.
A stable basis is the result of a perfect hedge. However,
as indicated in example 2.3, there exists the possibility of
a basis risk, and hence a loss, in undertaking a hedge.
This basis risk results from an imperfect correlation
between the cash and the futures market.
Example 2.3 is an imperfect hedge because the cash price
fell more than the futures price. The cash price fell 488
ticks whilst the futures price fell 472 ticks.
This imperfect correlation between the cash instrument being
hedged and the futures instrument is a BASIS RISK. Here it
results in a windfall loss. A stable basis, meanwhile,
means that changes in cash prices are perfectly matched by
changes in futures prices.
Hedging will thus prove not to be a simple case of exactly
offsetting cash market with futures market positions.
Multiple month hedges may sometimes prove the most effective
means of covering risk. Examples of such hedges, which
involve contracts from different months, are strips,
straddles and rolls. A strip involves a sequence of futures
contracts whilst a roll involves holding a futures contract
to the end of the period before undertaking another futures
contract. Examples of these hedges are given in the example
below. Which of these hedges proves most effective depends
on the shape of the yield curve.
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Problem: On 1.1.85 a company has to borrow L1M on 1.4.85 and
on 1.7.85.	 There exists the risk of a rise in interest
rates.	 To cover this, the company will, sell ST3 contracts.
Consider the best hedge that could be possible here.
Scenario (I).
Spot June Sept
	
1.1.85	 10%	 11%	 12%
	
1.4.85	 12%	 13%	 14%
	
1.7.85	 15%	 17%
Scenario (11)
Spot June Sept
10%	 14%	 12%
14%	 15%	 16%
15%	 14%
A number of choices face the company here. They could
either not hedge or, enter into a strip hedge, a simple
rolling hedge or a piled up rolling hedge. A strip hedge
would involve selling L1M June ST3 contracts and also L1M
September ST3 contracts. A simple roll would mean selling
L1M June 5T3 contracts and rolling these into September ST3
contracts in April. A piled up roll would be, for example,
selling £2M June ST3 contracts and rolling L1M into
September in April.
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In scenario I the strip provides the perfect hedge. The 7%
total gain from the piled up roll also offsets the no hedge.
The strip would be preferred here. Less contracts are
bought in a strip compared to the piled-up roll and thus
commissions will also be lower. The strip, however, is less
sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve whilst
the piled-up roll means always using the nearest contract,
in which liquidity is highest.
In scenario II it can be seen that the outcomes are
different. Although it does not give a perfect hedge the
strip will still be preferred here. The simple roll and the
piled up roll indicate that in selling September ST3
contracts the hedges would have actually entailed a loss.
This indicates that hedges actually have an intrinsic risk,
as futures prices may actually move in the opposite
direction than expected it can be the case that the no hedge
scenario would have been the most profitable.
On occasions it may be the case that the underlying
deliverable instrument for the futures contract differs from
the cash market instrument being hedged. Cross hedges
would thus be used. An example of such an imperfect match
between the futures contract and the cash instrument would
be to use a eurodollar futures contract to hedge a
commitment in another money market instrument. Economic
conditions will impinge differently on the cash and the
futures market and hence there will exist basis instability.
However, the cost of such basis instability will probably be
less than the cost of not being hedged.
The above could be combined to derive at the number of
futures contracts needed for the hedge.
Number of Contracts a Face Value - Maturity Mismatch
Regression Coefficient
Conversion Factor
SCENARIO I
	
:	 SCENARIO II
NO	 : SPOT	 : SPOT
HEDGE	 1O_.1 - LOSS c 2%	 :	 1O_ -, LOSS - 4%
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(	
14(.1
15 ( 1 LOSS - 5%	 15	 LOSS - 5%
	 :
STRIP	 :	 SPOT	 JLJ'IE	 SEPT	 : SPOT	 JUNE	 SEPT :
HEDGE	 C1	 :	 i;:	
'2	 •
2% GAIN 5% GAIN :	 1% GAIN 2% GAIN
SIMPLE	 SPOT	 JUNE	 SEPT	 SPOT	 JUNE	 SEPT
ROLLED :	
-	
-	 :	
-	 r14	 -
HEDGE	 :	 -	 1)13 r'4
	
: -
	
1)15 r16
-	 1)17	 -	 1)14
2% GAIN 3% GAIN	 1% GAIN 2% LOSS
PILED UP :	 SPOT	 JUNE	 SEPT	 : SPOT	 JLJ4E	 SEPT
ROLLED	 :	
-	
-	 :	
-	 -
HEDGE	 :	 - x2 1313	
r'4	 :	 - x2 1915	 .r-16
-	 1317	 -	 1)14
4% GAIN 3% GAIN :	 2% GAIN 2% LOSS
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An open position occurs when the trader expects the futures'
price to move in a particular direction. Such a view could
be based on inside information or even on the fact that the
trader thinks that the expectation that is reflected in the
current level of futures prices does not fully, or
correctly, discount likely events. Thus a trader would
expect to make a profit when rates move in the way
predicted.	 That is, the trader Is implicitly assuming that
the market is inefficient. An implication of this is that
open position traders should not make a profit on a
systematic basis if the market is efficient.
Taking an open position can be very risky due to the fact
that future announcements can quite often have a significant
effect on the market's prices. So, the consideration of a
risk factor is important for trading effects, and in
determining efficiency. If possible, the gains and losses
of open position traders should be examined such that ene
can determine whether the same traders systematically profit
from the market. If one particular model used by traders
systematically makes profits then this could seem to suggest
that the market is inefficient.
A spread is a simultaneous purchase and sale of different,
but related, futures contracts. A spread position may tflus
expose the spread trader to less risk than open positions.
It is a view on the relationship between two futures prices.
Spreads tend to be more common in the U.S.A. where there is
a large amount of liquidity in distant months.
The size of the spread is the nearby futures price minus the
deferred futures price. If the spread strengthens in price
then it is becoming more positive, or less negative, and one
should buy it. One should sell a spread when it weakens in
price, becoming less positive or more negative. If one
bought the nearby future and sold the more distant one then
this is called buying the spread. One has put on a bull
39
spread, which will, become more positive when the spread
strengthens.
Successful spreading is the ability to recognise the
differential between two futures contracts has got out of
line and to predict correctly their likely relative price
changes. Laborde(1982) looks in more detail at the gains
and losses over the two legs of a spread rather than just at
the net gain or loss. Double effects could exist in that if
the spread expectation holds a gain could be obtained on
both legs of the spread.
A straddle is a different form of a spread. 	 Essentially,
spread refers to	 inter-contract	 spreading, whereas a
straddle is intra-contract spreading.
A spread is the simultaneous purchase and sale of futures
contracts written on DIFFERENT underlying financial
instruments on the same, or different, futures exchange.
A straddle, meanwhile, refers to the SAME futures
instrument. One considers the change in the relationship
between two futures prices. If one takes a straddle
position then one is not interested in overall movements but
in relative changes. Thus, if a spread trader makes a
correct prediction, he can make a profit regardless of what
happens to overall prices or rates.
With spreading, in order to avoid the riskiness associated
with open position trading, one should try to buy and sell
both contracts simultaneously. If one does not open and
close both ends of the spread simultaneously then one is
leaving oneself open to possible adverse price movements.
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2.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to financial
futures markets.	 It should thus be of use in the
understanding of the subsequent chapters. 	 Whilst these
markets share many of the characteristics of other financial
markets they also have some fundamental differences. Two
major distinquishing features of thes markets are the daily
marking to market and the fact that in these markets the
maturity date is fixed.
Three different categories of agents who use these markets
exist. It is not strictly possible to examine the market
from the role of speculators whilst arbitrage forms the
basis of the discussion in chapter five. Examples of hedges
have been provided in this chapter and some results from
hedging effectiveness are also presented in chapter five.
As will be seen in the next chapter, hedging was an
extremely important issue in the early theory surrounding
futures	 markets.
CHAPTER THREE
FUTURES MARKETS: A SURVEY OF THE
THEORETICAL ISSUES	 INVOLVED
3.1 INTROOUCTION
The previous chapter on the institutional aspects of
financial futures markets(FFM) has dealt with the roles and
the aspirations of the dealers in the market. Attention is
now focussed on the theory surrounding hedging and
speculation. This is important to understand when one goes
on to consider the work carried out on testing efficiency in
these markets.
This section provides an analysis of work conducted on
commodity futures markets. Consequently early research
which formed the basis of the theory will be assessed. As
financial futures markets have developed from these early
futures markets in commodities it is important to understand
the theory surrounding these markets and how it has evolved
through time. One can then see how FFM differ and what this
implies about the analysis of these new futures markets.
The theory surrounding the roles of the various
participants, and in particular the development of the
theory of normal backwardation and the cost of storage will
be assessed. Early empirical work will be incorporated into
this analysis. Attention will then focus on the issues
raised for testing efficiency in FFM and how best these
areas of interest proposed here might be incorporated into
the econometric work, proposed in the literature, on testing
the efficient markets hypothesis(E?41) with respect to LIFFE.
In essence one is trying to combine a historical sequence of
theory, which was implemented by early economists and
expanded upon by finance and market participants, with
specific economic and econometric analysis. Some areas of
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analysis will overlap, others will not. However, both sets
of work, which approach the problem of testing efficiency
from different angles, should be able to feed on one
another. Thus a broad, wide-ranging programme of research
into the efficiency of FFM which will fully encompass
previous research, theoretical and empirical, should result.
There exists a range of survey articles which attempt to be
comprehensive in the area in which they deal. However,
given the vast amount of papers in this area, this is a very
difficult task. This chapter will attempt to cover this and
so bridge the different islands of thought. Essentially
this chapter considers all ma j or early articles including
theoretical survey papers. Chapter four extends the analysis
developed in this chapter by looking at recent empirical
research.
3.2 NORMAL BACKWAROATION AND INTERTEMPORAL PRICE
RELATIONSHIPS
The theory of intertemporal. price relations, like the supply
of storage, is important in the futures market. In this
theory the relationship between the spot and the futures
price is examined in the coninodity markets.
Underlying this theory is the question of normal
backwardation. BACKWARDATION (a British term) implies that
the forward price is below the spot price. Thus a premium
would be paid by a seller to a buyer to allow the buyer to
defer delivery of the stock. In the USA any such excess of
the cash price over the futures price is called an inverse
carrying charge.
A ONTANGO results when the futures price exceeds the spot
price. The premium would thus be paid by the buyer allowing
him to accept and pay for the contracts later. In the USA
such a situation of the futures price being greater than the
spot price is called a carrying charge.
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Backwardation developed with Keynes' assertion that one
did not need any forecasting ability to profit as one
could simply hold long futures positions throughout the
cotton crop year. 	 Backwardation would be paid to the buyer
f or carrying the stocks. Hardy(1)	 and Working (1931)
disagreed with Keynes' contention. In terms of wheat
futures they claimed that speculators have carried the cost
of price changes on hedged wheat and received no reward for
the	 service,	 but paid heavily for	 the	 privilege.
According to this theory of normal backwardation, hedgers
would pay a risk premium to relieve themselves of price risk
whilst speculators would only willingly enter the futures
market if they can expect to collect a premium.
Hedgers were thought to be mainly short in futures and
speculators predominantly long. Thus the current futures
price must be below the futures price expected to prevail at
any later time by an amount equal to this risk premium.
where,q c q
q - q + RP
If q" p
then q ( p
-, qp+RP
p - current spot price,
q - current futures price,
q- expected futures price
RP - risk premium.
Indeed Keynes(1930) stated that in organised markets for
seasonal crops 10 per cent per annum was a modest estimate
of the amount of this backwardation. Working(1931) meanwhile
claimed that Keynes only obtained such a high figure by
analysing data for short and unrepresentative periods.
Essentially this risk premium provides some bias into the
futures price with respect to the corresponding spot price.
On this basis any deviation between spot and previous future
rates indicates a risk premium.
	 If such a premium exists
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does it provide some sort of equilibrium band - as with
transaction costs - around the futures price.
The theory of normal backwardation provided the first step
in the theory of hedging (see below), as it implied that
hedgers were in essence risk averse individuals who sought
to transfer their risk tG speculators. It was also
important in the theory of speculation (see below), for it
was, as Rockwell (1967) states, one of two theories to
explain speculators' returns in commodity futures markets.
The other theory being that speculators benefit from their
expectations.
Under normal backwardation it would be necessary for futures
prices to increase on average. Two assumptions underlying
this would be that speculators are net long and they also
assume risk. Keynes thought that any forecasting ability on
behalf of speculators was a dubious proposition 1
 and thus
j ust by assuming risk they would profit. However, if they
did not have any forecasting skill then they would not be
able to have certain expectations about prices rising, which
would give them their return under normal backwardation.
Hicks(1976), whose name is also associated with the theory
of normal backwardation, modified it slightly such that
speculators could now be assumed actually to forecast
prices. However, now, any profits of speculators could be
divided between the forecasting skill of speculators and the
returns for bearing risk. Hence if one found that these
latter returns were less than, or equal to zero, one could
reject normal backwardation as a valid market description.
Keynes and Hicks had always assumed that hedgers were net
short. This is not necessarily true, as hedgers could well
be net long. However, whilst this may imply that the theory
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is not so applicable nowadays, it may well, have been the
case that hedgers were always net short in the 1920s and 30s
in the international industrial commodities they considered.
A number of people thus suggested a broadening of the
concept of normal backwardation to incorporate an overall
price fall if hedgers were net long. Dow (1939 - 40) was
not sure that normal backwardation needed to be positive.
Risks were both positive and negative, such that,
q	 -RP' (qcq+RP'
where RP' is the marginal risk premium. Whilst explicitly
considering negative risks, he did not question the fact
that the transfer of risk was considered the main reason for
futures trading. He did note a forecasting motive on behalf
of speculators for he claimed that speculators may have a
higher elasticity of expectations than hedgers, especially
when prices rose. However, such speculators tended to be
over optimistic, as the average risk premium that resulted
may well be negative.
Bodie and Rosansky (1980) found the annual return from long
positions in US commodity futures to be about 14%, over the
period 1950 to 1976, whilst the return on Treasury Bills was
only 4%. Thus the implied premium was about 10%. Dusak
(1973), however, found no such risk premium, over the period
1952 to 1967, for US wheat, corn and soyabean futures. If
such a positive premium did exist then a buy-and-hold
strategy would make the contracts look favourable
investments.
Kaldor (1939 - 40)(a) accepted the negative risk proposed by
Dow. He divided speculators into bears, who would sell
futures at the supply price (q + RP'), and bulls, who would
buy futures at the demand price of (q + RP'). Such
concepts were incorporated by Blau (1944 - 45). His
proposed buying limits were: for speculators q - q - RP',
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and for hedgers q - p + C - RP'. Where c - net carrying
costs (see below). The selling limits were, for speculators
and hedgers, respectively q - q + RP' and q - p + C - RP'.
Whilst the theory appeared to point to futures prices being
downward biased estimates of subsequent cash prices the
empirical evidence was not so conclusive in its support.
Stone's (1901)(*2) early work predated the theory but, in
looking at cash and futures prices on a monthly average over
the period 1881 - 1899 on the Liverpool, New York, and New
Orleans cotton exchanges his work would have re j ected the
theory. Futures prices seem to depend on supply and demand
fundamentals expected to prevail when the future contract
matures.
Emery l s(1896)(*3) analysis states that whether futures
prices are determined by the cash price plus carrying
charges, or are determined solely by expected future
conditions one can interpret the futures price as an
estimate of the actual cash price in the future. Thus he
claims that a test on how these prices agree is an adequate
test of speculative expectations.
But such a test of speculators' expectations is only valid
if normal backwardation is zero or, if non-zero, is known
exactly. Rockwell (1976) tries to determine how much of
speculators' profit can be divided between a risk premium
and a reward for correct forecasting. As he claims, p 156,
1n sunmiary, the evidence presented here indicates that it
is the forecasting ability and not the bearing of risk that
determines the profits of speculators. While the theory of
normal backwardation may be valid for particular markets
under special conditions, it is not adequate as a general
explanation of the flow of profits in commodity markets.
He finds that normal backwardation is not characteristic of
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22 small markets but is so for 3 large markets when hedgers
are net short. Norma]. backwardation was negative for 11 out
of 25 markets and only 1 of the remaining markets with
positive normal backwardation had returns in the region of
10% as Keynes claimed.
Working (1949a) also raised the question of how much of the
futures price can be explained by the risk premium. If this
premium was small then there might exist, he claims, a
positive bias in the futures markets. In particular he
looks at individualistic versus aggregative expectations.
His description of conservative bias could be considered as
adaptive expectations(AE). Market expectations, in the
aggregate, tend not to fully adjust to new information. He
finds against such adaptive expectations;
'There has been no demonstration that such a
tendency to conservative bias exists in prices
of any comodity which has a prominent futures
markets.' (1949a, p.154).
Consequently if AE are not relevant to such markets then
surely, as one would expect in an efficient market, rational
expectations (RE) are. Given this, one would expect any
differentials between relevant spot and futures prices to
depend on the information set available to agents. This can
also be related to Working's(1949) analysis, p155,
'Bias in market expectations arising from
inadequacy of information is probably the main
source of reliable profits for speculators.
Such imperfect information, rather than a risk premium, also
accounted for the bias according to Gray (1951). He found
little evidence of bias except in thinly traded markets.
Lack of perfect information here would result in a lack of
balance between hedgers and speculators and hence lead to a
bias. Gray & Nielsen (1963) found this, thus supporting
Houthakker (1961).
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Telser (1958) in looking at wheat and cotton futures found
against a risk premium. The seasonal pattern of stocks
determined the price spreads thus making the futures price
an unbiased estimate of the futures spot price.
The imperfect information and different expectations
mentioned above, rather than normal backwardation, would
seem to explain the relationships between the futures price
and the spot price. This relationship between the futures
price and the underlying spot price is called the basis.
When the futures contract matures this basis should equal
zero if the futures price is an unbiased estimate. Goss
Yamey (1978), however, distinguish between three different
types of basis.
The maturity basis is the difference between the futures
price in its delivery month and the price of the commodity
for immediate delivery (the spot price). These two prices
should be approximately equal, otherwise arbitrage would be
possible. Equality should arise, due to the fact that the
seller can deliver the commodity and the buyer can keep operi
his position until he receives delivery. However, if the
case of a sellers' option existed - in which he could
stipulate the specific grade, place or time of delivery of
the contract - then some uncertainty could cause a negative
maturity basis. However the existence of an abrbitrage
band, due to transaction costs, could cause the maturity
basis to be either positive or negative, lying within this
range.
The basis is, they claim, the difference between the futures
contract price, stipulating delivery in a future month, and
the spot price of the commodity in the actuals market. This
is the normal definition of basis. Any excess of the
futures price over the spot price, a positive basis, would
be related to the marginal cost of carrying the commodity,
and hence to carrying costs (see below). This would impose
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an upper bound to any excess, above which profitable
arbitrage would be possible. A negative basis would be
related to the theory of normal backwardation mentioned
above.
The third type of basis they consider is essentially the
relationship between futures and forward contracts. That
is, it is the difference between the futures contract price
for a future month and the price in the actuals market of
the commodity for forward delivery in the same month.
Arbitrage should ensure that such forward futures prices and
forward actuals prices are in equilibrium. However Yamey
(197) claims that because this forward actuals market is
not as active as the spot supplies market one would expect
larger deviations in this basis than for the maturity basis.
A number of issues have been raised. Either one considers
the transfer of risk, in terms of normal backwardation, or
looks at expectations, in terms of different information
sets and anticipations, as an explanation of the basis. The
change in emphasis from the former to the latter has seen
the importance of futures markets shift from the idea that
the markets were mainly insurance markets to one in which
the markets possess a price discovery function.
If one focussed on the risk transfer model then one needs to
consider the distribution of profits and losses in, what is,
a zero-sum game. Alternatively, if one accepts that hedgers
do not just try to shift risk (see below) and actually
incorporate expectations into the formation of their
expectations, one needs to distinguish in more detail
between market participants.
Price formation is examined in the theory of intertemporal
price relations. It helps to explain the allocation of a
given supply of a commodity over time between present
consumption and storage. Peston and Yamey (1960) (PY) and
Stein (1961)	 examine	 intertemporal	 price	 relations.
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Different solutions are found, depending on the definitions
of agents in the market they use and the assumptions about
their price expectations.
Given that there exists a group of agents who hold hedged
and unhedged positions, and that there exists some overlap
between the hedging and speculative roles a finer
distinction between the agents in the futures market could
exist.
PY, for example, classify agents in the commodity markets
into five categories: hedgers, merchants, speculators, mixed
hedgers and mixed speculators. Each group assumes a
different position in the futures and actuals market and
thus responds to a different price variable. Hedgers, who
still minimise risk by assuming opposite risks in the
futures market, carry stocks of the commodity. They avoid
price risk by selling futures contracts and are hence
concerned with the basis. However, this implicitly assumes
that hedgers are short, as underlies the theory of normal
backwardation, which is not necessarily the case.
Merchants also carry stocks but do not hedge and hence are
concerned with price changes in the spot market.
Speculators assume risk by buying futures contracts whilst
not possessing any stocks of the commodity. They thus act
on the basis.
Mixed hedgers are a combination of the hedgers and merchants
categories. They carry both hedged and unhedged stocks.
Their concern is both spot and futures prices.
Mixed speculators combine the roles of merchants and
speculators. Unhedged stocks and futures contracts are
possessed in varying amounts. They thus respond to present
and futures prices. Thus, in essence, PY's five categories
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are three interrelated ones, possessed of speculators,
hedgers and merchants.
Working (1953b) claims hedging is a sort of arbitrage.
Perhaps this is best represented here by the mixed trader
class. The concept of those who hedge being governed by
their current information does mean that people may have
both hedged and unhedged stocks. If these agents were risk
averse then one may think that all stocks were hedged. This
is not so. Consequently risk loving and risk aversion
concepts do not appear relevant. Thus one can consider
hedging on the basis of relevant information and not on the
risk avoidance potential of markets. PY do capture this
idea that agents hold both hedged and unhedged stocks, which
would seem to imply that agents acted on information and
expectations and not risk concepts.
Goss (1972) attempts to deal with futures markets at the
level of the individual, using the models of Stein (1961),
who did not determine explicitly the amount of stocks an
individual held, and of PY who did not look at individual
equilibrium. This is an area that needs to be considered
as, if it is possible to test efficiency at the level of the
individual one could, through using disaggregated data,
reach different	 conclusions	 regarding the market's
efficiency. This is, in many respects, related to the
microeconomic literature of Grossman and Stiglitz and will
be examined in chapter four.
One's conclusions can not necessarily be absolute as
individual efficiency can depend on individual resources,
tax arrangements and risk attitudes.
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3.3 THEORY OF STORAGE
Consider now the theory of storage. This originated with
the Hicksian/Keynesian theory of normal. backwardation, and
received major contributions from Kaldor, Working and
Brennan. Compared with other theoretical developments in
futures markets there appears to be less disagreement in
this area. However, any that does exist surrounds the
question of normal backwardation and how to account for
inverse carrying charges.
The theory of storage of comodity stocks deals with the
problem of price determination for storage service. One
carries inventories forward, over the period, on the basis
of supply and demand for the commodity. Here storage supply
refers to inventories themselves, in that if one carries
forward a commodity one is a supplier of it. Storage demand
relates to consumers who want stocks of the commodity to be
carried forward over the period.
Whilst such storage problems will not exist in FFM they are
important to know about as they were extremely important in
the development of much of the early literature. However,
they are important in, for example, agricultural coawnodities
where there is a high seasonal factor in production with
consumption being relatively stable. This theory will thus
be important in the determination of futures prices.
Indeed, Working essentially claims that the link between
futures and spot prices is the cost of storage.
Consequently it is an important area to be considered.
However, before discussing the theoretical developments,
consider the following remarks by Dale(1982),p134. 'We will
get the same thing in FFM in terms of storage costs. You
have people who have looked at fed funds rates or interest
rates, or whatever, and they ask the same kind of question:
what is the interest rate? A lot of the work that has been
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done says that the cost of storage is significant in the
relation between futures and cash. For currencies: we have
the same thing; it is interest rate parity.
Whilst there may exist some cost of carrying certain futures
instruments, in terms of opportunity cost, the interest
parity condition is essentially an equilibrium condition
preventing profitable arbitrage opportunities. It is thus
important to consider the relevance of such costs in
financial futures. After considering the theory one will
see that it is not really possible to extrapolate from
these comrodity futures to financial futures.
The theory of storage of commodity stocks deals with the
problem of determining the price of carrying inventories
forward over periods. Thus it essentially deals with the
problem of intertempora]. price behaviour, namely the
relationships between simultaneously quoted prices which
relate to two different time periods.
The analysis discusses what return the holder of the
inventories receives. If the future price is greater than
the currently quoted spot price this should represent the
cost of carrying the commodity forward. This contango
situation, where the future price exceeds the spot price,
represents the reward to suppliers, or the cost of carry to
the demander. However, if the current spot price exceeds
the current future price then a inverse carrying charge
situation exists and one has backwardation. This seems to
suggest that there is some additional, reward, in excess of
financial renumeration, to the person who carries forward
the stock of commodity.
Thus, as Brennan (1958, p51) emphasises, the net storage
costs will equal total storage costs minus the yield to
the holder of the stocks.
54
1n equilibrium, the spread between a futures and
a spot price is equal to the marginal expenditure
on rent for storage space, interest, handling charges,
etc., minus the marginal convenience yield of stocks.
To determine the basis one must therefore consider more than
future expectations. 	 This point was mentioned by Working
(1949). Rather than referring to events occurring between
the two dates the relation between these prices will depend
on the cost of carrying stocks between the dates.
The demand for storage arises from consumption demand, as
explained by Brennan. If present day consumption depends on
this period's price then, with stacks being carried forward
over periods,
c(t) - x(t) + S(t-1) - S(t)	 .. .(3.i)
where
C(t)	 consumption in period t,
X(t)	 production,
S(t-1) - stocks carried from (t-1) to (t),
Sit) - stocks carried forward from period (t)
and,
P(t) - f(Ct), with (dP(t)/dC(t)) 	 0;
demand being a negative function of current price.
Therefore P(t+1) - P(t) is a decreasing function of the
stocks carried forward from period t. For example, if P(t)
rose, C(t) would fall which would, with S(t-1) and X(t)
fixed, lead to an increase in S(t), stocks carried forward.
The effect would thus appear in the subsequent period where,
with X(t+1) fixed, P(t+1) would fall. Similarly, a decrease
in S(t) would cause P(t+1) to rise.
Therefore
P(t+1) - P(t)
- f(C(t+1)) - f(C(t))
- f(5(t)+X(t+1)-S(t+1)) - fCS(t-1)+X(t)-S(t)) . . .(3.2)
-P()
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Figure 3.1
A shift in DO to O'D', resulting from a rise in
demand, occurs following either an increase in
X(t) or 5(t) or a fall, in X(t+1).
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Thus,	 d(P(t+1)-P(t)] / dS(t)	 0.	 .. .(3.3)
However, it is not a strict cost theory of return. Whilst
large supplies must be carried over from one period to the
next, and consequently the price relation between these two
different dates depends on the cost of carrying the stocks,
this is not necessarily the case with low stocks. Here, the
many suppliers prepared to store inventories undercut one
another in order to store the stocks, thus bidding down the
return available. This seems strange. Rather the
information structure available in a futures market will
ensure that a competitive necessary return for storage is
obtained.
Thus, a problem arises. The difference between prices will
indicate the price of storage, which is equivalent to the
known return for storage. So when the far futures price is
less than the near futures price or, the futures price is
below the current spot price a negative storage price
exists. But, even with moderate stocks and such inverse
carrying charges, suppliers still provide storage (*4)•
Kaldor(1939a) reconciles this situation by claiming that for
all potential suppliers there exists a critical, level of
inventories below which, regardless of the return, they
carry a convenience yield. 1 In a sense they are paying for
holding these stocks.
The supply of storage is thus such that the marginal, net
carrying costs in holding the stocks will equal the expected
change in their price during the time they are held. But as
Working points out there exists no general agreement as to a
theory of inverse carrying charge as a negative price of
storage. One would not, expect any stocks to be carried if
no return existed. But, this does not require a positive
storage cost. Kaldor's convenience yield helps to explain
the holding of stocks when carrying costs are negative.
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Now this marginal convenience yield is a decreasing function
of stocks. Consequently, when stocks are small, it may
increase sufficiently to exceed the marginal costs of
storage. Hence the spot price could exceed the futures
price by the same amount as the marginal convenience yield
exceeds the marginal storage cost.
Thus Kaldor's idea of convenience yield can help provide the
explanation of inverse carrying charge that Working seeked.
But it can also be subsumed into the more general analysis
of Brennan (1958). Here he generalised the previous theory
in terms of supply and demand for storage, even for those
stocks where no futures market existed. His model also
included the notion of risk premium. This has been
considered in the theory of hedging, but it does help
provide another, independant, explanation of the inverse
carrying charge.
Brennan's general model thus encompasses Kaldor's and
Hicks'/Keynes' ideas of convenience yield and risk premium,
respectively, into explaining the theory of storage. The
relationship between the net total storage costs and its
various components is represented thus,
m(5(t)) - w(S(t)) - c(S(t)) + r (S(t))
	 .. .(3.4)
where,
m(S(t)) - net total storage cost,
(or cost of carry);
w(S(t)) - storage cost (total outlay on
physical storage);
c(S(t)) - convenience yield;
r(S(t)) - risk premium;
S(t) - stocks available in period t.
The expected revenue depends on the change in price, the
stocks held and the above carrying cost:
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(P(t+1) - P(t)) 5(t) - m (5(t))
one maximises this, with respect to 8(t), such that,
P(t+1)- P(t) • m'(S)
	 .. .(3.5)
that is, the marginal revenue of stocks carried out of
period t is equal to the marginal net carrying cost.
This necessary condition thus asserts that the expected
price change must equal this marginal cost.
	 However,
individual firms should not be able to influence
	 this.
Consequently
d/dS(t) ( p (ts1) - P(t)] - 0
	 . . .(3.6)
which implies the sufficient condition that
m"(S) , 0,
that is,
w' ' (S(t) ) - c' '(5(t)) + r' ' (S(t) )
	 ,o.
That is satisfied since:
w'(S(t)) is greater than 0
w''(S(t)) is greater than or equal to 0,
c'(S(t)) is greater than or equal to 0,
c''(S(t)) is less than 0,
r'(S(t)) is greater than 0,
and	 r''(S(t)) is greater than or equal to 0.
But, as mentioned above, if c'(S(t)) is large with respect
to w'(S(t)) and r'(S(t)), m'(S(t)) will be negative. See
figure 3.2.
59
Figure 3.2
S
r
60
Working (1949) uses this supply of storage to emphasis. the
importance of futures markets.
'ihe known relation between prices of the two
futures gives the hedger a basis for anticipating
his return for storage which is far superior to
any estimate which could be made in the absence
of a good hedge in a futures market or of any
outright forward sale of the actual wheat.' p.1257.
Thus, he goes on, by giving a direct measure of the expected
return from storage and also by allowing one to achieve that
return, via hedging, futures markets gives its major
contribution to the economic distributioin of intertesnporal
commodity supplies.
The importance of futures markets of the supply of storage
cannot be doubted, but there does appear to be doubt with
respect to FFM. The interest rate parity theory suggested by
Dale(above) is not a cost of carry but rather an arbitrage
bound. It does not provide a return for holding the
currency but ensures that the same return can be obtained
in terms of different currencies after allowing for the
respective interest rates.
Working (1949),
'Only some direct explanation of the price
relation in terms of the existing conditions
can account for the fact that expectations
regarding future events, which are directly
pertinent to a distant forward price, have
approximately the same effect on spot and
forward prices as on a distant forward price.' (p.1262).
This can be explained in terms of RE in the FFM. No cost of
storage is needed. Any difference between the futures price
and the spot price is dependent on the currently discounted
expectations of future events, based on current information.
Any new information will affect this relationship.
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Consequently the theory of storage cost does not apply to
FFM. Rather there exists RE to explain the relationship and
the transaction costs to provide some equilibrium band for
arbitrage possibilities around the two prices.
3.4 SPECULATION
Initially it was recognised that futures markets were spec-
ulative markets(*5). Irwin(1935), on the basis of collected
evidence on open contracts from the grain futures market,
changed this concept. This work was important for two
reasons. First, it promoted hedging to the major activity
in futures markets and second, it refuted one of the
two pillars of the traditional theory of speculation through
his description of movement trading.
In favour of hedging, he found that the number of open
contracts seasonally varied in accordance with seasonal
changes in the volume of connercial stocks. This he
attributed to hedging as he did not accept the fact that
speculators would enter and leave a market in direct
response to a variance in the amount of hedging.
His discovery of movement trading meant that this type of
speculation was destabilising. It tended to drive prices
away from the levels warranted by existing conditions, and
hence increased the variance in prices. Hence these
speculators would not fulfil their classical role of price
stabilisation thus refuting half of the traditional theory
of speculation.
This traditional theory was based on two premises. One,
that speculators tended to even out price fluctuations due
to changes in supply and demand. Second, speculators
possessed above average foresight. The two are closely
correlated according to this theory. If speculators did not
stabilise prices then this would imply that their
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expectations were worse than average and hence they would
lose and be eliminated from the market.
Kaldor (1939a) in looking at speculation, provides a
definition that fits in well with Vorking's(1953b) analysis
of hedging. Hedgers gain through a change in basis but
their position already fulfils a role, whereas speculators
do not fulfil a role but just try to profit through price
prediction. Thus speculators' motives would be based on
expectations of changes in the ruling market price. On the
basis of his definition Kaldor goes on to look at the
effects of speculation on economic stability, where
speculation is the:
'Purchase (sale) of goods with a view to re-sale
(re-purchase) at a later date, where the motive
behind such action is the expectation of a change
in the relative prices .... and 	 not	 a gain
accruing through their use. 	 Kaldor(1976,plll)
This is an excellent definition. It clears up Working's
assertion (1953) that hedgers take up positions and try and
profit from changes in the basis. As Working noted, hedgers
do gain through changes in the basis but, as Kaldor's
definition implicitly states, their position already fulfils
a role. It cannot be counted as speculation. In
speculation one is trying to profit from one's predictions.
The sole motive governing one's actions is an expected
change in the ruling market price.	 Scalping is thus
incorporated into the analysis. Here agents are just
assuming a position for a few minutes. Whilst they are
performing an essential role in the market, that of market
making, they themselves only benefit from the beneficial
effects of any price changes.
Consequently, speculative stocks can be defined as those
that are actually held minus those that would be held if
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there existed no expected price change. The percentage of
these stocks in relation to total demand or supply in the
market is an important point in the consideration of whether
speculators actually stabilise or destabilise prices.
As the traditional theory is based on speculators having
better than average foresight their positions should even
out price fluctuations. This implies that, in a world of
perfect foresight and policy announcements, speculative
profits would tend to zero (*6). Such a condition would
imply that the market satisfied semi-strong form efficiency.
The idea that speculators would actually destabilise prices,
by increasing price fluctuations, was not incorporated in
the theory. This would imply that their predictions
were worse than average and, consequently, they would lose
money. Given that their sole role for taking up positions
in the market is to profit they would not remain in the
market. However, as Kaldor (1939a) points out, this would
depend on speculative stocks being a small proportion of
total demand or supply. Consequently the larger the amount
of stock that the speculator possesses then the bigger his
share of the market and hence the greater his monopoly
power. The greater this power then the more likely it is
that the speculator would be able to influence the market
price and hence make excess profits.
If this proportion was 1.0w, then speculation would influence
the magnitude of the price change but not its direction.
Consequently, according to Kaldor, a low proportion of
speculative stocks is a necessary condition for
destabilising speculation not to exist. It would be
sufficient	 for speculators to correctly forecast
	 the
foresight of other speculators (*7)
This work of Kaldor's does tie in with that of Irwin (1937).
He distinguished between classical speculation, which was
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based on market fundamentals, and movement trading which was
based on following price movements caused by other trader's
activities. His analysis of movement trading is very much
related to the attention that speculators must pay to the
larger band of opinion, and hence to mob psychology(*B).
Irwin's description of movement trading is that traders are
not so much concerned over what levels are justified by the
prevailing situation but rather their attention is focussed
on how far other traders will push the movements in prices
which they are following at the time. He claimed that They
could have considerable influence upon short term movements,
because they constitute a compact group and are therefore,
in his opinion, susceptible to mass psychology. According
to Keynes (1936) the market would have reached the 'third
degree', in which more attention would be focussed on
anticipating what average opinion expects average opinion to
be. If this were true then one might expect price trends
and patterns to emerge.
The low elasticity of supply and demand that led to the
frequent price fluctuations in agricultural and raw material
futures was focussed upon by Smith (1922) who realised that
there was a large group of uninformed or unskillful
speculators.
... .It cannot be denied that there is great evil
in the participation in the market by a large
outside public, who assume unnecessary risks and
simply bet on fluctuations. These amateurs,
who have neither capital nor the mental equipment
to form a real opinion concerning the course
of prices in the market, are attracted by the
possibilities of making great and speedy gains
from the fluctuations in prices. Their action is,
in fact, the merest gambling and leads to unsteadiness
of the market in times of excitement.'
Taken from Gray and Rutledge (1971 p86).
65
This concern with the influence of unsophisticated
speculators is important for, as Venkataramanan (1965) has
pointed out, the debate on speculation has focussed on
testing the two assertions of the traditional, theory.
First, can speculators actually forecast prices and make
profits on the average of their transactions? Second, does
profitable speculation (and according to the traditional
theory all speculation is profitable) extend a stable
influence on the market, causing price variability to fall?
The Hick-Keynes assertion that there exists a risk premium
component in the futures price is central to this debate,
just as it is a cornerstone to the work on hedging and the
supply of storage. According to this, speculators receive a
reward, in the form of the risk premium, for bearing risk.
Consequently, with hedgers net short and speculators net
long, a risk premium will be paid from the speculators
causing the futures price (q) to fall below the expected
spot price (p). Speculators will thus receive p - q as
their risk renumeration.
Telser(1958) rejects the Hicks-Keynes hypothesis 1
 claiming
that under competitive conditions this will not exist.
Speculative profits would be driven to zero.
Let 1.1(i) be the excess demand, X(D), of the i th speculator,
U(i) - F(i) (q-p). Speculators, are net long if the sum of
U(iho and net short if the sum of U(i)cO. The larger the
number of speculators, then the slope of the X(D) schedule
of speculators tends to zero. Meanwhile the excess supply,
X(S), schedule of hedgers will be a positive function of the
futures price (if p, p).
This excess supply will be equal to the amount of futures
contracts offered by short hedgers minus long hedgers'
demand for futures contracts. Consequently as the futures
price increases, the quantity supplied increases. Combining
LI
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the two schedules, excess supply and demand, if the expected
future spot price (p) exceeds the futures price then long
speculators profit and short speculators lose; vice versa if
p ( q. However, Telser's claim of a highly elastic excess
demand curve here is criticised by Cootner(1960). He
explicitly incorporates time into his analysis, and
rationalises the speculators' motives by the fact that they
require a certain return over the period before they are
induced to buy, or sell, a futures contract.
In figure 3.3, O6-p. If p'q then long speculators profit,
short speculators lose and vice versa if pq.
	 However,
Telser's argument goes on; speculators are not
systematically long or short as both types of speculators
are present in the market. It is the prospect of systematic
profits that prompts speculators to enter the market driving
p equal to q which, with infinite elasticity of demand for
futures contracts by speculators, drives profits to zero.
However, as Kaldor (1939-40a) noted on a different point,
speculation in a market is self-perpetuating. The
unsuccessful speculators pay the gains of the profitable
speculators and it is the existence of these profitable
speculators that will, always attract new unsuccessful
speculators. Thus profits here will not be zero and the
differential information of the various speculators will
ensure that profits will continue.
If the speculator wants a return over the period of r; he
would require q to fall to p(i)C1'+r(i))' , where i is
the ith speculator, before being induced into buying the
futures contract.	 Similarly, it would have to rise to
p(i)(1+r(i)) "p'	 before the futures contract would be
sold. See figure 3.4.
Time's introduction into the analysis allows the futures
price q to assume a range of values p(i)"(1+r(i))1 and it
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also reduces the elasticity of speculators' demand by
increasing transaction costs.
Houthakker (1957) distinguishes between the general and
specific skills possessed by speculators. The former results
from them sticking to the long side of the market, and thus
receiving the risk premium paid by hedgers in accordance
with the Keynesian/Hicksian theory of normal backwardation.
Their specific skill comes from their ability to forecast
short term price movements. In terms of efficient markets
this would imply that the returns speculators receive from
their general skills are justified.	 Risk-adjusted returns
that is. However, their specific skills would appear to
come from their forecasting ability, based on trading rules.
Hence this would imply that the markets were inefficient.
Houthakker finds that the major share of speculators'
profits derive from their specific skill and that, in terms
of the US cotton and corn markets this returns is about 8%
per annum. As with considering expectations based on panel
data it would be interesting to consider the actual trading
records of market participants(*9). Houthakker meanwhile
does try to analyse actual observed data on such
commitments. His work, later criticised by Telser(1958) and
Gray(1961), was based on estimating the total profits and
losses for various groups on US commodity markets.
Telser's criticism was that transaction costs were not
deducted from the speculators' income and that only nine
years were studied. He also thought that the idea of
estimating gains and losses monthly would neglect the
changes in commitments and prices that happened within
each month. It could be said, however, that this last point
could be applied to any low frequency data.
Gray's comments are more fundamental. Houthakker only uses
price data for one contract in association with open
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contract data for seven markets. Price movements between
the markets were not similar and so the results are
consequently affected. Hence, according to Gray,
Houthakker's implicit assumption of identical price
movements would only be of neglible importance only in the
case of corn.
His other criticism is that in attempting to measure hedging
costs directly. Houthakker has applied the method wrongly.
He showed that large hedgers profited , at other traders
expense, in the first sub-period, so Gray concentrates on
the second sub period. The futures price gained 52 cents on
spot price over this period, which gave a strong presumption
of bias according to Gray. The gain Gray found came about
from the elimination of inverse carrying charges that
prevailed at the beginning of the period and which were the
largest in history. Hence they would be soon eliminated
with the harvest of the new crop. Consequently Gray finds
that )-Iouthakker's results are therefore attributed to rising
corn prices and that his results alleging the existence of
general bias rest on a unique two month period and do not
cover his sample of nine years.
It must be said that basing analysis on reported trading
records is a very dubious evidence, particularly if it is a
one-off experiment giving sparse evidence. It is based on
many assumptions about traders' commitments. For a start,
in Houthakker's work, a group of speculators did not report
their commitments - perhaps they lost, or even gained more
(tax purposes preventing their evidence). He also looked at
the monthly average price statistics - any commitments were
assumed to have opened at the average price for that month
and closed at the average price for the subsequent month.
Such summary statistics are misleading. Changes in
commitments and in prices are ignored (*10).
Working's attempt at this analysis was to consider only one
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professional trader's record in cotton futures. This trader
scalped large dips and bulges as opposed to trend or news
trading. As such a technique is common to many floor traders
one could thus reconcile their profits to the absence of
trends in futures price. It also helps explain why the
speculation in futures tends to correspond closely with the
amount of hedging.
The fact that such price trends may not emerge in futures
trading could well be due to such profit seeking. When
there is a tendency for price changes to constantly reverse
direction this is called technical reaction. Floor traders
could cause this or, alternatively, there may be barriers
around the current price. For example, agents could place
limit orders, such that one sells/buys at a certain amount
below/above the most recent price. These orders can limit
the within-day price changes.
Kroll and Shishko (1973) propose a model, that distinguishes
traders into day traders and position traders. Day traders
continuously reformulate demand in response to current
prices whilst position traders reformulate their daily
demand with respect to the previous day's closing price.
Hence a cobweb model evolves to explain futures price
oscillations. Some traders adapt quicker than others.
Allingham (1976) proposes a similar theoretical contract.
The result is that day traders are more important, and hence
provide the stability condition, than position traders. Thus
as he states, p170, 'Oscillatory movement may be seen as a
means of ensuring a sufficient reward to day traders for
maintaining liquidity in the market. Such an analogy with
speculators would seem to suggest that they, because of
their frequent trading in markets, would stabilise policies.
Rockwell (1967), as with Houthakker, looked at the
commitments of reporting speculators. His work was an
analysis of the theory of normal backwardation using 7,900
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semi-monthly observations on 25 futures markets over the
period 1947 - 65. As mentioned above he found against the
theory of normal backwardation. Thus as the returns to
backwardation were zero, all the returns would appear to be
attributable to forecasting skill, which he divides into
basic forecasting skill (BFS) and special forecasting skill
(SF5). These two definitions are actually quite similar to
the day traders and position traders in Allingham's paper.
SF5 being like changing positions daily in reaction to
events.
Working(1949a) claims that exaggerative bias' in futures
prices is the main criticism against speculative markets.
Hence, there would be many price fluctuations as
expectations over reacted to new information and rumours.
Such psychological aspirations of market participants are
unquantifiable.
Baumol (1957) presents evidence that refutes the traditional
theory's assertion that profitable speculation is price
stabilising. He shows that it makes prices unstable by
increasing the frequency and amplitude of price
fluctuations. However, as he explains, this depends on the
forecasting ability of speculators. If speculators buy after
the price trough, when prices are j ust about to rise, and
sell after the subsequent price peak, that is when prices
are just falling, they will profit but contribute to price
destabilising. If this were true then speculators would
have trading rules that recognised turning points, which
would imply that either they were acting on inside
information or that, on the basis of currently available
information, the futures market was inefficient.
Telser(1959) develops a similar mode to Baumo]. to show that
speculators stabilise prices. The difference arises from
different assumptions about the speculators' timing of
purchases and sales. Telser's speculators appear to be more
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sophisticated than Baumol's for they buy and sell before,
rather than after, the turning points. He ob jects to
Baumol's idea that speculators will contradict their own
positions by accumulating inventories even when prices are
falling, because they increase the expected price, and
getting rid of inventories when the price is rising.
Hedging has, following the work of Irwin and Working come to
be recognized as the major activity of futures markets.
However, this was not always the case.
The theory of hedging can broadly be divided into two, with
different motives governing the undertaking of a hedge.
Risk reduction provided the main rationale for assuming a
hedge, whilst following the work by Irwin and Working,
hedging theory became more sophisticated and recognised a
profit motive and hence looked at risk and return.
The theory of normal backwardation of Keynes and Hicks was
initially very important with respect to hedging theory.
Risk aversion was seen as the basic hedging motive and these
hedgers tried to shift their risk to speculators, who
received a risk premium in return, for assuming this risk.
The risk averse nature of hedgers would mean that they were
mainly concerned with the risk of a price fall in the
commodities that they held. Thus they would take up, and
maintain, an opposite position in the futures market, by
going short. By taking up such positions, the theory of
normal backwardation claims that they would be paying a risk
premium to speculators, who held long positions. This
premium would represent a payment in respect of the
different attitudes of the two sets of agents towards risk;
the risk loving of speculators, the risk aversion of
hedgers.
This risk elimination view of hedging, in which hedgers
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tried to cancel out the risks associated with price
fluctuations, was, in essence, a naive approach to the
subject. However it did remain in importance for a long
time period as the following two quotes illustrate. Hoffman
(1932): 'Hedging is shifting of risk.' p. 382. Kaldor
(1939a): 'It is the speculators who assume risks and the
hedgers who get rid of them. p.197.
Blau(1944), meanwhile, emphasised the analogy that
many used to draw between hedging and insurance. He
regarded futures exchanges as being specially developed for
facilitating the shifting of risks which were due to unknown
future changes in commodity prices and hence could not be
covered by means of ordinary insurance. The risk premium
resembled the insurance premium that one paid insurance
people (speculators).
The hedger was pictured here as a dealer in the actual
commodity who took up an opposite position in the futures
market as an insurance measure. For example, if he bought
a unit of the commodity at a spot price and there existed
a price fall before the commodity was sold then this price
change would impose a capital loss on the overall market
position of this individual. However, he could protect his
inventory from such price risk by simultaneously selling
a sufficient amount of futures contracts to cover the
delivery of an equal number of the commodities. In closing
the hedge one would simultaneously sell the inventory and
buy the same number of futures contracts as before. If
there are parallel movements in the spot and futures markets
then the agent would receive his normal merchandising
profit. Otherwise a residual capital gain or loss exists.
Irwin's (1935) work found that the number of open contracts
seasonally varied in accordance with seasonal changes in the
volume of commercial stocks (*11). This he attributed to
hedging as he did not accept the fact that speculators would
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enter and leave a market in direct respons, to a variance in
the amount of hedging. This work, which credited the
existence of futures markets on their hedging concept, led
to Working's paper (1953) (*12) regarding futures markets
as primarily hedging markets.
As futures markets had come to complement the existing
forward trading they were thus better suited to hedging than
to direct merchandising use, as evidenced by the small
number of contracts actually delivered. It was this hedging
usefulness of futures that gave rise to the concept of
carrying charges. Merchant_warehousemen(*13) would buy
large inventories if the futures price was higher than the
cash price. Inventories thus became highly correlated with
the carrying charge relationship of stocks in relation to
the spot and futures price.
If one accepted hedging as a risk reducer then these risks
associated with price fluctuations would only be completely
eliminated if the basis was zero, throughout the lifetime of
the futures contract. However, given that there is strong,
but not complete correlation, between cash and futures
prices then this may indicate that futures markets are
useful for such reductions (but not elimination) of risk.
Indeed, if one found that basis risk was smaller than price
risk then such hedging would reduce risks. However, as Gray
& Rutledge (1971) point out the concept of risk that is
implicit in the literature's discussion on basis stability
is restrictive with no one formalising the decision rules
under which hedgers operated.
The question then arises, not of stability in the basis
itself, but rather can one predict any such changes in the
basis relationship? Working (1953a,p78), in fact defines
hedging as the •• .Purchase or sale of futures in conjunction
with another coninitment, usually in the expectation of a
favourable change in the relation between spot and futures
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prices. Hedgers were thus not only concerned with risk but
also with the return they could obtain on such a position.
There is an opportunity cost to hedging. 	 It is the fact
that prices may not move in an adverse way at all to one's
position in the cash market.	 If this is so then the
position established in the futures market will render a
loss. Consequently, the motive behind their need to
establish a hedging position is not based on their desire to
insure against adverse movements with respect to their cash
market position but rather, it is based on their current
expectations of the future. If their available information
set indicates a different set of futures prices then the
agents will act on these in the futures market if they are
contrary to what they desire in the cash market. If one is
holding stocks, and one expects the futures price to fall,
then this would imply selling futures. The cash market and
futures market positions are entered into seperately. f
one assumed that both were taken up simultaneously then this
would imply that the same expectations applied to the two
markets but the price movements would be expected to be in
two different directions, which seems to be an odd set of
expectations. Rather, it implies that the expectations that
apply to the two markets are different
Thus to explain hedging and futures markets positions one
needs to look at information sets available to agents and
the expectations they form. Storage out of need, and hence
establishing positions out of requirement, is not
applicable.
The question can than arise as to whether hedging has a
risk reducing role or is a multi-purpose concept. If one's
expectations points to a future price reduction and one has
bought cash, then this would suggest selling futures. Thus
one is offsetting price loss in the cash market and the
establishment of such a position means that one will benefit
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from futures price movements. But these gains will offset
cash market positions and fulfil a motive.	 (Kaldor's
definition).	 Thu. it	 iS	 not	 strictly correct, nor
necessary, to distinguish between hedging concepts.
Hedgers thus establish their positions to fulfil a motive.
The position they take is based on their expectations and
information. They will not simply take up the opposite
position in the futures market.
Working did claim that by taking postions in the futures
markets, hedgers are performing an arbitrage between the
spot and the futures prices. Anticipating basis movements
would help them perform this task, and, consequently, the
question of carrying charges (see above) would be of
importance.	 However, Working may be going too far in his
criticism of traditional theory if he assumes this arbitrage
role. As Yamey (1983) notes, . .Income tends to be
transferred systematically from hedgers to speculators runs
directly counter to the notion that short hedgers tend to
profit on their hedging by taking advantage of arbitrage
opportunities. (p.30). All of which seems to reemphasise
Kaldor's point that there are two categories of hedgers:
those who hold the stocks and those who arbitrage, whereby
the latter derive no convenience yield from their stocks.
Whilst	 this arbitrage concept appears 	 too critical,
Working(1962) is correct in calling hedging a multi-purpose
concept. Hedging is done for a variety of different
purposes and must be defined as the use of futures contracts
as a temporary substitute for a merchandising contract,
without specifying the purpose. p.432. Therefore,
different categories of hedging can be listed. See Working
(1962) and Kamara (1982)for details.
There were five categories. Carrying charge hedging was
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done simultaneously with the holding of commodity stocks for
direct profit from storage. The hedger would thus
speculate' on the basis. Its success would depend on
predicting such changes. Second, there was operational.
hedging. This would be to help merchandising or processing
operations in which one would plaoe and lift a hedge in
quick succession in order to benefit from changes in the
basis over very short intervals.
	 A small risk reduction
would obtain. Third, was selective hedging. Consequently
this analysis would seem to imply that, based on current
expectations and information, a hedger's optimal decision
would be a combination of hedging and speculation.
Danthine	 (1978), Holthausen (1979) and Feder, Just &
Schemitz (1980) all consider the case of a producer with a
certain production but facing price uncertainty. The
optimal behaviour for the producer would be to determine the
production on the basis of current input prices and current
futures prices of the commodity. Them, one should react to
any changes in the expected price @f the commodity by
varying the speculative component of tthe futures position.
Anderson & Danthine (1980) go further and consider a
producer with both price and quantity uncertainty. The
hedger's optimal decision would depend now on the expected
output, a hedge adjustment, which suould depend on the
correlation between revenues and Vhe spot price of the
intermediate good, and a speculative term, which is a
function of the relationship between spot and futures
prices. If this basis was zero then no speculation would
result.
Hedging would thus have a component of speculation. But,
unlike speculators, hedgers would not aim to assume unending
risk related to their position.
	 Thus, they would not
maximise profits. Working(1939,p440) defined it as,
	 The
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hedging of commodity stocks under a practice of hedging or
not hedging according to price expectations.
Fourth, there was anticipatory hedging in which price
expectations were again important. One tries to take
advantage of the current futures price without establishing
a merchandising contract. Fifth, he defined pure risk
avoidance hedging, which was claimed to be almost non
existent in modern markets.
Whilst it may be correct to emphasise arbitrage hedging it
is wrong to claim that the above fifth type of hedging was
nonexistent. Arbitrage hedging had tended to be ignored
because it was assumed that people entered the futures
market with respect to their established spot market
position.
Portfolio theory has subsequently been incorporated into the
debate. Linking the traditional approach and Working's
analysis it emphasises risk and return with respect to
hedging. This has given rise to the idea of the optimal
hedging strategy.
Johnson's (1960) mean-variance approach was based on hedging
activities reducing risk and the levels of inventories
depending on the expected hedging profit. He defined a pure
hedge as one combining a spot position, taken only on the
basis of expected merchandising profit, and a futures
position, which one assumed to minimise the price risk of
holding the spot position. Any change resulting from a
change in one's expected future price would represent a
speculative element.
The above discussion has attempted to introduce one to the
main, early, theoretical points in futures markets, without
going into all the details of various models. The main
points have been touched upon and one should consult the
relevant papers for a fuller discussion.
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What one sees is that futures markets not only have evolved
in their character but also in the roles that various agents
are assumed to hold. Hedging and speculation, whilst both
feeding upon each other, do overlap. Also, it was shown,
the distinction between agents goes further than this
twofold one. These concepts and roles are all, important for
financial futures markets.
Storage and intertemporal relations rest more on one's
expectations in terms of FFM. The basis relationship should
be arbitraged such that it only takes account of transaction
costs. Risk adjusted returns between cash and futures
markets should be zero.
One will now go on to discuss the various work on futures
prices. Their variability, their relationship with previous
price movements and whether they are predictable. Hence the
following discussion will draw on the previous tests for
efficiency of financial futures markets and commodity
markets. This ensuing work is based on the theory above.
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APPENDIX
s - Stocks held.
w'(s) - Marginal storage cost.
c'(s) • Marginal convenience yield.
r'(s) - Marginal risk premium.
p - Current spot price.
p - Expected spot price.
q - Futures price.
m'(s) - Marginal net carrying cost.
Certain expectations -	 m'(s) - w'(s) - c'(s).
Uncertain expectations -
m'(s) - w'(s) - c'(s) + r'(s).
Under certain expectations (perfect foresight) there exists
no risk premium. Therefore q p
Producers hold stocks such that p - p • m'(s). If p - p >
m'(s) then one could sell futures, carry stocks to delivery
date, and make a profit.
- p	 m'(s)
p - p - w'(s) - c'(s)
q - p a w'(s) - c'(s).
When the expected return from holding stocks is zero, then
- p - 0 •) w'(s) - c'(s).
Look at risk premium under three scenarios:
(a) Normal stocks.	 p - p.
q - p - w'(s) - c'(s)
- p - w'(s) - c'(s) + r'(s)
therefore q a
 p + w'(s) - c'(s)
q a p - r'(s)
q - p - r'(s), normal backwardation.
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(b) Stock shortage.	 p , p.
m'(s) has increased such that
m'Cs) , w'(s) + r'(s)
q - p - w'(s) - c'(s)
p - p - w'(s) - c'(s) + r'(s)
therefore q -
	
- r'(s)
-> q p - r'(s), abnormal backwardation.
Also,p-p0
therefore w'(s) - c'(s) + r'(s) 	 0
c'(s) , w'(s) + r'(s).
(c) Surplus stocks.	 q	 p.
there exists no backwardation.
Get cantango	 w'(s) - c'(s).
As c'(s) -) 0 when surplus stocks -) there exists upper bound
to contango • w'(s).
Contango does not mean that the producer can hedge without
paying a risk premium. Surplus stocks increase uncertainty
and hence the fear of a large capital loss.
Now, q - p. but, it should be that q 	 pe + NB where NB -
normal backwardation. - p	 p by ) NB.
Soqp, p	 'q-) pp
q - p - w'(s) - c'(s)
p - p - w'(s) - c'(s) + r'(s).
q - p - r'(s)
therefore p	 p - r'(s).
Contango, q - p - w'(s) - c'(s), means that q falls below p
by more than normal backwardation.
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FOOTNOTES
*1: Hardy is refered to in a number of papers. The original
is Hardy,C.,(1923),Risk and Risk Bearing.
*2: Stone(1901) is contained in the U.S. 56th Congress, US
Industrial Commission Report,(1900-1901),House Document 94.
*3: Emery,H.,(1896),Speculation on the Stock and Produce
Exchanges of the United Statesu,in Columbia University:
Studies in History and Economics'.
*4: Costs of storage could be interpreted as costs of
transport with respect to FFM. Thus whilst the underlying
instruments need not be stored there is a transaction
cost in buying and selling them. Consequently one can
transpose the cost of storage theory into providing
arbitrage bounds around which one can test weak form
efficiency.
*5: Working(1949) noted that a large supply of storage
existed even when the price was zero. His reasons were that
either the storage of grain has mostly fixed costs or that
suppliers maintained their storage facilities to complement
their other (merchandising or processing) business.
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*5: Irwin (1954) p.59 pointed out that futures trading in
grain dated from 1850 in Chicago but the CBOT regarded the
markets as speculative and so would not allow transactions
in grain until 1865.
*7: Hawtrey disagreed with Kaldor's concept of generalised
expected price. He stated that when there exists little
difference of opinion among dealers as to price changes then
there be little speculation.
*5. Stein (1984a) looks at individuals in the market and
finds that if the variance of the forecast error of amateur
speculators is less than six times that of professionals
then the existence of futures markets will lower both the
variance and the expectation of price.
In terms of commodity markets, primary commodity prices are
volatile and uncertain due to shifts in supply and demand.
The futures market would perform a stabilising role here as
it guides inventories, and stabilises prices and incomes.
Kofi(1973), in looking at commodity futures tests Tomek and
Gray's(1970) assertion that the allocation and pricing
function of futures markets is more reliable for continuous,
than for discontinuous inventory markets. This is found to
be true when the Chicago wheat futures outperform the Maine
potato futures. A discontinuous inventory market would have
more pronounced demand and supply uncertainties.
*9: Attention is often focused on Keynes' third degree
speculation when discussion on mob psychology arises. There
is no distinction.
*10: Hoffman(1941), too, found evidence in the close
seasonal and yearly correspondence between grain stocks and
open futures contracts, to suggest that futures markets were
hedging markets. If FM were speculative markets then open
contracts would reach a seaonal peak prior to harvest when
uncertainty is greatest.
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*11: Apparantly Stewart (1949), •An Analysis of Speculative
Trading in Grain Futures', looked at the distribution of
profits and losses from futures trading. Over the period
1924-32 he considered the trading results of 8922 traders
and found that speculators tended to lose in all, markets
considered.
*12: Working(1953) did	 not	 credit Irwin in his initial
work.	 He rectified his omission in his (1962) paper, in
which he then referred to 'Irwin's Law'.
*13: Peston and Yamey (1961) define this group as mixed
traders. They are assumed to carry hedged and unhedged
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EFFICIENT MARKETS' HYPOTHESIS ANG EFFICIENCY TESTING
4.1 ThE EFFICIENT MARKETS' HYPOTHESIS
The efficient markets' hypothesis(EMH) states that agents
will, fully utilise all, currently available information in a
rational and efficient manner. Whilst an efficient market
should satisfy this condition it should be remembered that
the EMH is a very broad concept. Much new information comes
available in a market and many different types of agent
exist. Thus it is possible to examine the hypothesis in
more detail and look specifically at certain aspects of it.
Indeed, the existence of daily data from LIFFE means that
one is able to test a richer set of hypotheses.
There exists a lot of work directed towards developing and
testing the EMH. Much of the work has sought to identify
dependencies in prices themselves by either applying a
series of tests to one data set or one particular test to
many data sets. Due to these differences in approach,
observation period, data set and methods used these weak
form tests and their conclusions lack a consistent analysis.
The E41 could be analysed in terms of prices or returns. In
terms of prices one can consider unbiasedness, and hence
forecast errors, to see if the market is efficient. Whilst
the EMH in terms of prices implies that no-one in the market
earns excess returns it is harder, in many respects, to
consider the EP41 with respect to returns. One needs to
specify a model of price formation in terms of expected
returns. Then, making full, efficient and rational use of
the information set it should not be possible for one to
earn excess returns from any one of a group of similar risk
securities. Consequently the following condition needs to
be satisfied:
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Et p(t+l):X(t) 3 - ( 1 + E( r(t+1):I(t)] 3 p(t)	 . .. ( 4.1)
where:
p(t) - security price at time Ct);
and	 r(t+1)- one period return from Ct) to (t+l).
Thus:
E( rCt) - E( r(t):I(t)]:I(t) 3 - 0	 . . .(4.2)
the expected return, under the EF4-I, should be zero. This is
referred to as a fair game. Thus, in an efficient market,
on the basis of the current information set, the returns
available should conform to a fair game. Sharpe(1964),
Lintner(1965) and Praetz(1975) are a number of the people
who have considered this. Whatever model underlies one's
analysis, the information set should be fully used in
determining equilibrium returns.
The EMH is difficult to test as it incorporates a joint
hypothesis: one with respect to the market's equilibrium
price; the other on whether agents can efficiently set
actual prices, or returns, to conform to their equilibrium
values. Efficiency tests can focus on, in general, either
holding period returns or security prices. In terms of
returns available, a re j ection can be due to an incorrect
specification. One could thus test for different
equilibria. However, in terms of the contracts traded on
FFM there exists no general agreement on equilibrium prices
or on equilibrium rates of return.
Suppose, for instance, that one is testing the EP4-I with
respect to returns. Let yCt) equal the return available in
period (t). The EM-I requires that:
E t y(t) - E( y(t):I(t-1) ):I(t-i) ] - 0
	 .
where I(t-l) is the information set available in period
(t-1) and Et y(t):I(t-1) 3 is the market's subjective
expectation (*1). However, this is too general a
relationship to test. One can take a smaller information
set, S(t-1), where this is
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some subset of past information, such that S(t-1) is
contained in I(t-1). This will be an easier information set
to handle and will allow one to focus on the important
exogenous variables.
One then needs to specify a model of market equilibrium that
relates the market's expected return with respect to S(t-1).
So,
E( y(t):I(t-1) ] • f( S(t-1) ) - g(t)
	 . . . (4.4)
an equilibrium return. For efficiency one requires that
there exists no unexploited profit opportunities, that is,
E( y(t) - g(t):I(t-1) ] - 0 . ..(4.5)
This arbitrage condition states that , at today's price, one
cannot expect to make any higher than normal profits by
investing in that contract. Any perceived profit
opportunities would be exploited, until, through sales and
purchases of that contract, the price obtains such that this
condition holds.
Sometimes, however, one should allow for a wedge around the
equilibriuni return, in order to take account of transaction
and other costs. One should let the righthand side in
equation (4.5) change from 0 to some value d, thus allowing
y(t) to fluctuate around 9(t) by a value + or - d. Although
such a condition may seem to be too general , it is a useful
approximation, even though it may not hold exactly.
Such an arbitrage condition brings out an important point.
As the micro-economic literature has shown, efficiency is a
relative concept. Not all agents need to be rational.
Thus, if efficiency was tested using disaggregated data then
it may prove easier to reject the efficiency hypothesis. It
may be possible for only a few individuals, given access to
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an infinite amount	 of	 funds,	 to eliminate profit
opportunities.
One can specify the theory to determine the equilibrium
return. Incorporating this into the joint hypothesis one
sees that only when there exists some new information will
y(t) differ from g(t). Consider, for example, information
regarding some variable x, where x(t) is the actual value
obtained in period t, and x'(t)-E(x(t):I(t-l)], is the one
period ahead forecast of x(t). Thus
y(t)	 g(t) + b( x(t) - x'(t) ] + e(t)
and this equation satisfies the arbitrage condition, since
E( y(t):I(t-1) 3 - Et g(t):I(t-1) ]
+ b( x(t) - x'(t):I(t-l) ]
+ E( e(t):I(t-1) I
	 . ..(4.7)
and therefore E( y(t):I(t-1) I - 9(t) since x(t)-x'(t) if
there exists no news, and E( e(t):I(t-1) I - 0. So , by
considering returns available to agents in the market, one
sees that the consideration of news effects is extremely
important for testing the EF+I.
Consequently, if one wanted to look at the EMI in terms of
returns, then one must first determine what these should be.
In terms of currencies, for example, it is usually taken to
be that the (s(t),f(t-.1)) relationship should not move out
of line with the interest rate parity condition.
Brenner (1982) looks at the conclusions of empirical studies
of efficiency when different market models are used. In
terms of stock splits a particular model is employed to
estimate the relevant parameters; the estimated parameters
are used for prediction with the prediction errors
presenting the test of efficiency. The same problem of the
correct
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underlying model can be extended to most of the instruments
traded on financial futures markets. Model selection can
thus present a first step in the analysis of efficiency.
If more than one model exists, one can either use the
general to specific approach to test the parametric
restrictions for the nested models or, for non-nested
models, non-nested tests can be used to see which model is
the best representation of the data generation process. See
Lyons (1984a).
The point is made by Brenner that if the same result is
found with respect to efficiency when different models are
chosen then it could be stated that the analysis does not
depend on the model. useJ. This, however ignores the
possibility that the correct model could be absent from the
investigation.
Risk-neutrality along with market efficiency would imply
that f(t-1) Et s(t):I(t-1) ]. Indeed, in most tests of
the EMIl, f(t-1) is regarded as the directly observable
expectation of the subsequent period's spot rate.
'The forward rate can be interpreted as a
direct measure of expectations from a set
of consistent and high quality data.'
Baillie & McMahon (1984,May,p13)
Thus, if one is wrong to assume risk-neutrality then, in the
regression equation used to test the EM-i, number (4.10)
below, one may find that in testing for (a0,ba 1) there is
some doubt over whether the true point estimate of b should
equal one. In fact, it may always be less than unity -
Theref ore, greater analysis of the risk-premium could prove
an alternative to news effects in analysing deviations
between relevant rates at maturity and current futures
rates.
go
To be informative the econometric procedure employed should
provide some indication of why the hypothesis being tested
is not true, why previous researchers achieved the results
they did, and should encompass this to point the researcher
in the appropriate direction. Unfortunately this has not
been the case in the tests of efficiency, particularly with
regards to the FEM. A risk premium is an explanation of
rejection of the EMH. Yet those who argue for a risk
premium do not seem to be able to provide evidence as to its
nature.
Fama(1970) popularised three different types of efficiency.
These are weak-f orm(WF), semi-strong form(SSF) and strong
form(SF) efficiency. Tests of each rely on different
information sets. WF tests incorporate only past prices and
thus market efficiency in this sense would only fully
reflect past price movements. Such tests are based upon
Samuelson's(1985) proof that the sequence of prices which
fully reflect available information possesses the property
that the expected value of the future price is the current
price. This is a martingale process, where
E ( p(t+1):I(t) ] - p(t)
	
(4.8)
and p(t) is the price this period, p(t+1) is the price next
period and 1(t) is the current information set. Allowing
for a risk-premium would modify this to a sub-martingale,
where
E C p(t+1):I(t) ] è p (t)	 .. .(4.g)
This information set is similar to that of a Chartist, who
would use price patterns to predict future movements.
Indeed, descriptive analysis of the raw futures price data
is commonly used by agents in the market. Such adaptive
expectations (AE), however weighted, would lead to
correlated price changes and mean that there were no sudden
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jumps in the market price. One can discriminate between AE
and rational expectations (RE), which is essential for the
Eli-I, by considering the size of the information set and the
optimality of expectations with respect to that set(*2). If
one adopted a trading rule based on the past history of
prices then, net of transaction costs, this should not be
able to produce higher expected profits than a naive buy
-and-hold strategy.
It will be in an agent's interests to increase the size of
his information set. If the marginal benefit exceeds the
marginal, cost of obtaining a piece of information then it
will be in an agent's interest to include that information
in his decision making process. Indeed agents should
increase their information set until their expectations
resemble the predictions of the relevant economic theory.
Semi-strong form tests additionally take into account new,
widely available information. A fundamental analyst would
be one to use this information set. Information regarding
the fundamental variables that determine the exchange rate,
for instance, would be of importance. An example of
information that has been examined include announcements of
money supply statistics (Cornell, 1980) whilst, in terms of
the stock market, an example is the announcement of pending
share splits studied by Fischer et al (1969). Share prices
were found to grow between the announcement and the actual
split. As expected in an efficient market the relevant
information is soon included in the actual price.
With strong-form tests there exists subsets of information
that do not allow information to be immediately transmitted.
Here the information set could be related to the role of
specialists. They are able to profit from their knowledge
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as the futures prices now takes into account unpublished,
privately available information.
Given a new piece of information that affects the market one
can view the resulting change in the futures price as taking
the market from one current, static, equilibrium point to a
new equilibrium point given the change in supply and demand.
The importance of the three different types of tests
outlined above is that they can alter the timing of this
price change. Consider some piece of information that would
affect the equilibrium price. Inside information could
possibly result in a price change before the piece of
information	 is announced.	 Semi-strong form tests,
meanwhile, could initiate price changes after the
announcement, but before the actual event to which the
announcement refers takes place, whereas all the price
change would follow the event in terms of weak form
efficeincy.
These tests are interdependent. As the information set is
progressively enlarged, efficiency in the weaker sense is
implied by that in the stronger. All efficiency tests are
conditional on some information set and so the role of the
information set that one is considering to test the E*I is
vital. It is quite possible to obtain different results in
testing the EMH by working with different information sets.
More specific tests for an examination of efficiency are
outlined here. In an efficient financial futures market the
following hypotheses should be satisfied:
(a) Arbitrage opportunities should not exist between the
futures contract and the underlying cash market, or the
corresponding forward market. Also, such arbitrage
possibilities should not be present when one establishes
positions in more than one futures market.
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(b) If dependencies in past prices exist then they should
not be profitably exploitable. Hence filter and trading
rules should not be profitable.
(c) Assuming risk-neutrality, futures prices should be
unbiased predictors of the futures rate at maturity.
(d) News effects should help to explain any forecast errrors
that arise.
(e) Futures prices should incorporate all relevant
information and hence exhibit minimum variance.
Hypothesis (a) relates specifically to arbitrage
opportunities. As was explained in chapter two the agents
who use financial futures markets can be classified into
arbitrageurs, speculators and hedgers. Within these classes
can be incorporated day traders or scalpers. These are the
market-makers who meet the other side of a contract when a
hedger, for instance, enters the market. They thus provide
much needed liquidity in the market. Their operations will.
involve arbitrage activities and open positions, which could
be classed as speculative. As arbitrage activities can be
explicitly tested so too can hedging effectiveness.
Speculative action remains a difficult question to quantify.
The five hypotheses here fully encompass previous
definitions of efficiency. Stein, Rzepcynski and
Selvaggio(1982) claim that there exist four assumptions
underlying the EM-I : (I) the asset's price equals the
discounted expectation of the future cash flow.; (ii) news
is immediately reflected in the correct way in the asset's
price; (iii) news is random and (iv) the market's
anticipations are unbiased expectations of the subsequent
realised prices. Numbers (1) and (iv) are encompassed
within hypothesis (c) above, whilst Stein et al's (ii) and
(iii) constitute hypothesis (d) in this thesis.
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Levich( 1983) in his analysis of FEM looks at three specific
hypotheses: unusual profit opportunities in covered interest
arbitrage are quickly eliminated; prices of particular
financial claims imply accurate end consistent forecasts of
future spot rates; and speculative profits should not exist
on the basis of currently available information. In essence
he is concentrating on WF tests, which are completely
encompassed within hypotheses (a) to (e) above.
Most of the tests conducted on FEM concentrated on
hypothesis (c) above. Researchers have regressed the
current spot rate (s(t)) on previous period forward rates
f(t-i) to see if f(t-i) represented an unbiased predictor.
Thus, in terms of (1.10) (a,b) - (0,1) and e(t) should be
white noise.
in S(t)	 a + b ln f(t-i) + e(t) 	 .. .(4.1O)
For instance Kaserman (1973), Kohihagen (1974), Bilson
(1976) and Frenkel(1980) indicate the forward rate is
unbiased. Recently, news effects have been analysed, see in
particular, Edwards(1984) and Murf in and Ormerod (1984a).
Thus the theoretical underpinnings of the Eli-I are used in
formulating these hypotheses to be tested.
Descriptive analysis of the data is an important
consideration in tests of efficiency and so analysis of it
could supplement these tests. One of the most common
techniques used by participants in the market - and probably
by some of the successful ones - to forecast future price
movements is Chartist Analysis. Whilst this appears to be
a naive approach to use in a highly sophisticated, fast
moving market it is one that cannot be ignored. If one is
attempting to test the efficiency of a market it is very
important to look at the aspects of the market that the
participants themselves would consider. Consequently
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descriptive analysis of the raw futures price data can be of
use in the analysis of futures prices.
Chartist Analysis essentially relies on plotting each day's
price movements on a chart. Updating the chart in this way
provides a pattern of price movements in that contract.
There exists a whole series of established patterns and it
is the aim of the Chartist to identify these patterns and
act accordingly. The sooner a correct pattern is recognised
then the greater is the potential profit.
An important implication of the fact that there exists
established and well known chart formations is that, with
enough agents in the market acting upon them, these chart
formations could become self-fulfilling expectations.
Agents may not only act in response to such chart formations
becoming identifiable but others may act in expectation of
them being fulfilled. As is evident, the information set
that agents act upon is of vital importance in testing
efficiency.
It will therefore not be possible to use currently available
information to beat the market. That is, it would not be
possible to formulate a rule at this moment in time which,
if followed, could guarantee an economic rent in the market.
Thus in testing for efficiency it is essential to ensure
that no current information is being left unexploited. A
question may be raised, perhaps by participants in the
market, as to the validity of examining the EMH.	 For
instance, it may be claimed that it is surely adequate
enough to look at the profits earned in the market. 	 These
profits earned, however, need not be the result of
specialised skill or a predetermined price rule but could
also be the result of luck or inside information. Hence
looking at the absolute profits earned by agents need not
imply anything about the market's efficiency. If, however,
one could actually break down the contribution of any of
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these three components then a useful starting point in the
analysis would have been found. In addition, if it was
found that the same agents continued to profit then this
could imply that they knew how to 'beat the market' and that
there was an inefficiency in the market that they were
exploiting.
4.2 INFORMATION SETS
Two classical premises can be said to hold within financial
futures	 markets.	 First, markets clear at all times.
Second, agents act in their own self interest. 	 If a
financial future market was efficient then it should
correctly reflect all available information about the future
contract's price. Agents who are taking positions in a
financial futures market should act in their own self
interest. They should seek to obtain as much information
that is both relevant and useful. It should be relevant in
helping them to form their expectations in order to
establish a position on the market whilst its usefulness
should be measured by how much the gain obtained from using
that piece of information exceeds the cost of obtaining it.
How agents obtain their information will be an important
part of the following discussion. Possible ways of
obtaining imformation are by personal knowledge, general
publicly available information sources such as newspapers or
by obtaining the services of specialists. Sometimes it may
be costly to obtain imformation, whilst on other occasions
it will be free.
Efficiency is tested by looking at how agents form their
expectations at a certain period of time. 	 In tests of
efficiency,	 expectations are assumed to be formed
conditional on the complete information set available at
time t, 1(t). However, as explained in equation (4.4)
above, this is an unrealistic assumption to make. There are
so many factors that can impinge upon a contract's price
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that it is impossible to expect even one, or any number of
agents to know the complete imformation set, [Ct). It is
impossible for any one agent always consistently and
accurately to predict the many factors which will interact
in determining a contract's price at the Exchange. See
VJardrep (1982).
As discussed in (4.3) above, it is assuming too much on
behalf of agents to know 1(t). Hence tests of efficiency
are then conducted on 8(t), where 5(t) is a subset of 1(t)
and includes the important exogenous variables. A number of
extremely important issues are thus raised regarding the
information sets employed in tests of efficiency. The first
regards the idea that agents form different opinions from
the same information set and hence their actions are also
diverse. One explanation is that these agents have based
their actions on different models. Some agents, for
instance, might correctly anticipate the future behaviour of
the government, whilst other agents might not. Second, is
the notion that there is information specialisation and
hence certain agents have bigger information sets than
others. This could be due to inside information, as in the
strong form tests of efficiency (Fama (1970)) or due to
information specialisation (Phelps and Taylor (1977)) as in
the concept of islands of information. In addition, all.
agents could have equal access to information but some
agents would respond immediately to this whilst others would
react with a lag. This micro-economic idea of efficiency
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Grossman(1981)), means that
if data was available it might be possible to use
disaggregated data to test efficiency with respect to agents
themselves. The concept of partial information provides the
third main issue.
One aspect of any trading in financial futures markets or,
indeed, in any asset markets is that people only trade if
they have different beliefs about how prices should react,
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or about what levels prices should currently be at.
Begg(19B2) points out that if all agents had the same
expectations then prices would jump to their new level
without transactions taking place. The fact that trades do
actually take place can thus be the result of a number of
outcomes mentioned above, plus the possibility that these
agents are not identical. in tastes or endowments.
As Brannen and Ulveling (1983) state, the assumption that
all traders are equally endowed with knowledge and the
ability to analyse it appears to rule out opinion as a
reason for trading. This is unrealistic. With the same
information available it is quite reasonable for agents to
have heterogenous expectations about the outcome. One
example being, for instance, that different agents have
different expectations about the future policy reaction
function of the government. Indeed, the two sides to a
trade must have expectations that differ from each other.
These divergent beliefs explain much of the trading that
actually takes place. It is also quite feasible for
differing opinions to be rational. For example, if the
growth in the money supply was greater than anticipated then
there could be expected to be two possible effects on the
exchange rate. First, people might expect a subsequent
tightening of monetary policy, a rise in interest rates and
hence an exchange rate appreciation. This would be a policy
anticipations effect. Second, inflationary expectations
might be aroused, leading to an exchange rate depreciation.
Both outcomes are quite different. They are, however, both
explained on theoretical grounds. The correct outcome is
dependent on a subsequent policy decision of whether to
tighten monetary policy or not. See 000dhart and Smith
(1983), or Murfin (1984).
With differing views being held by agents the contract's
price will not jump to its equilibrium level. In terms of
RE the price should move immediately to its stable path, the
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saddlepoint, in order to approach the equilibrium price. If
it does not then this could be interpreted as as indication
of inefficiency. There should be no FUTLE jumps in price
on the basis of cLJRRENT information. Much new information
will, however, impinge on the market. This is as yet
unexpected and so will cause jumps in the contract's price.
As Strait (1983) states, 'During the period before the
maturity of a contract, trading at 'false' prices determined
by divergent beliefs or expectations is the rule. Only at
the maturity of a contract is a transient consensus imposed
upon traders by the facts of the spot market.' p.7.
This, however, gives a misleading interpretation. Whilst
the transversality condition in a financial futures market
is that, at maturity date, the futures price should equal
the spot price this cannot determine a unique path for the
futures contract's price. Market expectations are formed on
the basis of currently available information. New
information will continuously be coming available to agents
within the market and hence prices will be constantly
changing. News variables should thus help to explain
subsequent jumps in the contract's price. However, the news
variables that are incorporated into the analysis are
unlikely to be good proxies for true news variables. Thus,
in a regression like equation (4.10) above, the addition of
a news term will lead to only a small decrease in error
variance. See Bean (1983).
Information specialisation is also an important concept in
tests of efficiency.	 'Without departing from rational
expectations, one might also introduce information
specialisation. If the 'state' of the economy encompasses a
great many variables, it becomes implausible that every
agent effectively shares and processes the identical
information set; each firm will likely know more about its
own situation and its industry's then will generally be
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known. Then the decisions in an industry or sector may be
interpreted as signals from which the rest of the economy
draws inferences (correct or not) as to the new information
causing those decisions.' Phelps and Taylor (1977) p 186.
With different agents having access to varied information
this means that this dispersion of information across a
multitude of agents will cause the price to be different
from what it would otherwise be in a situation of agents
having the same information. Some agents will thus receive
a greater renumeration for their superior information. The
micro-economic literature on information specialisation is
important in this context. (Grossman and Stiglitz (198Q)).
Informed agents will observe some variable, A, wbilst
uninformed agents will not. In addition, the price will
depend on some global information B. Therefore p - p(AB),
where p is the futures price. To observe variable A agents
will have to invest in terms of money, time or effort.
Observing A will allow the informed agents to gain from
doing so. Agents will invest in observing A as long as the
gain from doing so exceeds the cost. Alternatively the
uninformed agents will try to ascertain what A is by
observing the price. Prices would thus reveal information.
See Grossman (1981).
In a world of uncertainty and asymmetric information
informed agents would use their superior information to earn
a profit. A speculative market could thus prevail in tich
information would ultimately, through prices, get
transmitted across agents.
Whenever agents have such heterogenous information there
exists the incentive to open speculative markets, which
allow such beliefs to become homogenous.
10I
Traders thus have different price
expectations as of t-1 and this creates an incentive for the
opening of a futures market at time t-1, where they can bet
against each other. The futures price at t-1 will transmit
information across traders at t-1.
Grossman(1981) p546.
In this context
	 the	 informed agents, by acting in
conjunction,	 should always,	 through their superior
information sets, be able to heavily influence the market's
price.	 One example of informed agents manipulating the
market is that of speculative bubbles. Informed agents
should observe what the correct price should be on the basis
of fundamentals. Uninformed agents, who form a significant
proportion of the market, would not know what this correct
price was. The speculative bubble would arise when informed
agents allow the market price to deviate from its correct
price, jumping of f the bandwagon before rea].ising that
uninformed agents have reached the same conclusion.
	 See
Blanchard( 1979).
There would exist a probability (p) that the speculative
bubble would continue whilst (1-p) would indicate the
probability of it not continuing. There exists an expected
capital gain for speculators if the bubble continues and an
expected capital loss if it bursts. Ex ante, a large gain
is required for the bubble to continue as it must compensate
for the possibility of the bubble bursting, thus resulting
in a loss. The expected gain, and the possible loss, will
grow the longer the bubble continues.
Thus the price could differ from what it should otherwise
be. Also, if enough people have the same belief then this
belief about the future price could become self fulfilling.
The level of the futures price could thus vary. In
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addition, in a stochastic environment, some agents will try
to acquire information about any possible realisation of
future shocks. As agents will vary in their knowledge of
information the price will be different from what it would
otherwise be, in the situation of complete information being
known by all. The variance of prices will thus be affected.
As Cornell (1981) explains, this differential information
across agents allows the establishment of futures markets.
Uncertainty would allow individuals to trade to transfer
risk. In addition, different information allows individuals
with a different probability assessment of the futures price
both to increase their utility, ex ante, by entering into a
futures contract. Consequently, expected prices will thus
differ across agents and hence the forecast errors will thus
be different.
The above discussion has given an indication of why
expectations may differ so much across agents. It implies
that, using disaggregated data, it may be possible to get a
greater insight into the notion of effiency.
The concept of partial information is, in addition, of vital
importance. The EM-I appears to be based on agents having
access to ALL information, 1(t). This will not , however,
be the case. Above it was indicated that information is
likely to be distributed throughout the economy. In
addition, it is unlikely that agents will be able to have
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access to all information.	 They will only be able to
observe some partial information set.
All current available variables that are relevant for the
formation of an expectation of the futures price should be
known by agents in the economy. The majority of information
will, however, not be observed and hence agents will not
have full, current information. Instead, agents may be aware
of key, fundamental pieces of information. These may well.
be asset market variables. However, these do not usually
give an indication of other economic variables. Such
partial global information will give some indication, but
not a comprehensive analysis, as to what the futures price
should be.
It may well, be the case that agents take positions in the
market on the basis of partial information. Having formed
their expectations some OThER information will impinge on
the market price. Agents will either be able to infer from
the market price what the effect of this variable was, or
they will be able to observe some global indicator, possibly
a financial variable, that will reflect the impact of a
whole series of other variables. In Barro's (1980) example,
agents know one local commodity price and an economy wide
nominal interest rate will help them to infer expectations
about the contemporaneously unobserved money stock. Kofi
(1973) touches on the notion of trying to isolate the effect
of a policy or a variable. However, with Lots of events
occurring this may not be possible. The idea would be to
isolate the effects of a certain event on the market's
price, and then see how the contract reacted if this event
happened again. Whilst the circumstances are unlikely to be
similar it may be possible to classify some equilibrium
change for the second time given what happened initially.
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As Karni(1977) notes, (p 1231). A11 agents have free
access to current prices of assets which are traded in
economy-wide markets and that these prices reflect current
accurate disturbances more accurately than other prices.'
Indeed, to infer complete information would imply that
agents knew all current disturbances, whilst partial
information means that agents do not have global information
of all the system's shocks.
Minford and Peel(1984) show that partial information may
result in a moving average error term in tests of efficiency
based on regression of the EDSP on futures rate. In addition
to the forecast horizon forecast errors will also reflect
the lag on the publication of information. This relates to
the idea of partial information discussed above, and again
raises the problem of what information set one should assume
when conducting tests of efficiency.
In terms of islands of information, a global variable will
retransmit to agents all the island pieces of information.
If agents had instant access to market data then it might be
possible to observe the information that caused the price
change and which was, consequently, reflected in the global
price. Although there exists an infinite amount of
information partial information is, in some sense, short run
as agents will increase their information set to take
account of other variables. If they can find out what
variable impinges on the price then they will incorporate it
into their information sets. They would thus aim for full.
information.
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4.3 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Work on testing the efficiency of financial markets has a
long history, with the first tests being reported by
Bachelier(1900) on commodity markets. Much of the initial
work was conducted in terms of the stock and security
markets, with a subsequent expansion to the foreign exchange
markets (FEM) and, more recently, to the financial. fwtures
markets (FFM).
Since the return to floating exchange rates in 1973 a fl.ot of
attention focussed on the efficiency of the FEM. More
recently the volatility in interest rates and exchange
rates, that led to the growth of FEM, has initiatedi the
examination of efficiency in these markets. labiLe 4.1
summarises some of the recent reseach on testing efficiency.
The majority of work in the foreign exchange markets has
examined the unbiasedness of forward rates and, more
recently, the analysis of news effects. Meanwhile, the work
in futures markets, whilst still considering this,, has
focussed in more detail on arbitrage techniques.
Following Bachelier's conclusion that commodity prices
followed a random walk it was not until the late 1950's that
research really took of f in terms of the financial markets,
following papers by Roberts(1959) and Osborne (11959).
Roberts found that cumulative random numbers produced the
same appearance as a time series of stock prices 4'iilst
Osborne found low serial correlation coefficients between
successive price changes of individual stocks. Whilst both
results were consistent these tests are not conclusive.
Indeed, correlation coefficients can be dominated by a
number of extreme and unusual observations.
Fama (1965) went on to consider runs tests. By considiering
the signs of successive price changes, a run constitutes the
number of successive changes with the same sign.
	 If the
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number of runs is greater than expected this provides
evidence against the random walk. Fama, like Osborne, found
that large daily price changes tended to be followed by
large daily price changes, thus claiming a contradiction of
the independence assumption of the random walk. This,
however, can be explained in terms of the types of orders
carried out on such markets. Finding reversals more common
than continuations reflects, moreover, the effective use of
limit orders within the market. Fama (1970) and
Neiderhoffer and Osborne(1976) discuss such run tests.
Essentially such price changes appear to be random, which
supports the notion of efficiency.
Much early work thus concentrated on the random walk model.
However, it was not until Samuelson (1965) and Fama(1970)
that there was a rigorous theory of efficient markets as
they initiated the development of the EM-I which has been
outlined above. It has been extensively tested to see if it
applies to all financial markets.
Samuelson stated that today's expectations of tomorrow's
forecast equals today's forecast. This means that the
sequence of prices which fully reflect available information
possess the martingale property:
E (P(t+1) : 1(t)] - P(t)	 . . .(4.11)
where P(t) and P(t+1) are, respectively, the price this and
next period and 1(t) is the information set available. A
martingale is a weaker concept than a random walk, as will
be discussed in more detail in chapter six. Samuelson
showed that futures prices should satisfy the martingale,
and it provides the basis of the examination of chapter six.
This concept is related heavily to the notion of a fair
game. Excess returns should not be earned in a market. As
mentioned in equation 4.1 equilibrium returns are difficult
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to specify.	 If one was to consider the excess return
available on an asset it
Z (t+1) - rt+1) - E (*(t+1): 1(t))	 ...(4.12)
II,'
where r (t+1) is the one period percentage return and Z
(t+1) is the excess return. If E (Z (t+1):I(t)] - 0 and the
Z (t) are serially correlated then Z (t) is a fair game.
When such a sequence of excess returns is a fair game with
respect to the information set, Itt), then this is an
efficient market.
Levich (1977) points out that it is not always the case that
the equilibrium expected return is constant. If it was
constant, however, then if actual returns were randomly
dispersed around this equilibrium value then the market
would be efficient, see figure 4.1. However, if
the equilibrium expected return, varied then for the market
to be efficient one requires actual returns to be highly
correlated about this mean expected value. In this exarvle,
figure 4.2, prices do not follow a random walk and yet the
market is efficient. So, as Levich correctly notes, random
price changes suggest market efficiency given a constant
equilibrium rate of return. Yet such random price changes
are not necessary nor sufficient conditions for market
efficiency.
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In equity markets three types of equilibrium processes can
be assumed and tested: expected returns are positive, are
constant or are determined by the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner
(1965) capital asset pricing model. However it is, as
mentioned, difficult to develop such tests in the FEM or
FFM. Also, in the FEM, the government can alter the normal
returns available. Consequently there is increased risk
from dealing in the FEM, unless the government announces
credible plans regarding future intervention in the market.
One could recognise risk aversion and thus allow for the
existence of a risk premium. As a lot of empirical work
finds that the efficiency hypothesis can be rejected at all
but the smallest levels of significance for a variety of
currencies and sample periods this could not only imply
inefficiency but could also provide evidence for a risk
premium. Grauer, Litzinberger and Stehle (1976) find that
risk aversion in the FEM will lead to the forward rate
equalling the conditional expectation of the future spot
rate plus a risk premium. Risk can thus play an important
role, especially when one considers the role of the
government and political risk. Stockman(1978) indeed finds
that the forward rate has three components: an expected
future spot rate, a risk premium and a convexity term. The
last term is of minor importance and is related to the
Siegel Paradox(see below).
Allowing for risk then
F(t-1) a r(t) + E( S(t):I(t-1) ]	 . ..(4.13)
where F(t) is the forward rate available last period and
S(t) is this period's spot rate; I(t-1) is the information
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set available in period
	 (t-1).	 r(t) represents the
non-constant risk premium, where its mean r equals
+ uCt) ...(4.14)
Such a time-varying risk premium could thus explain any
deviations between F(t-1) and 5(t).
Recent literature surveys by Kohihagen (1978) and Levich
(1978) have covered this area. Kohlhagen, like Levich,
agrees that simple risk-free profit opportunities are
quickly arbitraged away. Hansen and Hodrick(1980) examined
the hypothesis that the expected rate of return to
speculation in the FEM is zero. They used asymptotically
more efficient estimation techniques than previous work and
re j ect the EMI. For the FEM to be efficient, such that the
expected rate of return to speculation in the FEM is zero,
there must be risk neutrality, zero transaction costs,
rational use of information and a competitive market.
Existence of a risk premium would be consistent with their
findings and this would provide a positive expected return
to those who buy a more risky currency forward.
Following the analysis by Fama of efficiency most research
concentrated on the FEM. As the equilibrium return has been
very hard to determine in the FEM most tests of efficiency
have tended to focus on the actual exchange rate that
obtains. However, in looking at the price relationship
between spot and forward rates, it is given that it should
not be possible, in an efficient market, to make abnormal
profits.
The standard tests that were conducted in the FEM
concentrated on (4.10). Efficiency suggests that a-O and
b1 so that tests have been conducted on the values of these
coefficients. In addition, e(t) must be white noise.
Appropriate tests for this, particularly for higher order
autocorrelation,	 have only recently appeared in the
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literature. Chapter eight incorporates such tests into the
analysis.
Market efficiency and risk neutrality imply that,
F(t-1)	 Et S(t):I(t-l) I	 .. .(4.15)
Tests of (4.10) constitute weak-form tests of efficiency.
If one was to additionally enter variables from I(t-1) on
the right-hand side this would constitute a semi-strong form
test. Here, one could test,
s(t+1) - f(t) - Y x(t) + E(t)	 . . .(4.16)
under H(0)	 V - 0 H(1) : V 0 where
E(X(t),E(t-i) I - 0
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) test to see if any variables help
to determine forecast errors Use of ordinary least squares
is consistent here as it takes account of autocorrelation.
Generalised least squares was not used as lagged values of
these variables may have been correlated with the current
error. However, Hansen and Hodrick chose arbitrary
variables in their x(t). No econometric techniques were
applied to determine the appropriate variables to consider
or their lag lengths. If one was to omit important
variables from the information set, and hence from x(t),
then this could lead to further and possible higher order
autocorrelation. Hence the importance of testing for such
higher order autocorrelation.
Frenkel's(1980) results support the hypothesis that f(t-1)
reflects all available information f or the dollar/sterling
and dollar/deutschemark. However, b is significantly
different from one for the dollar/French franc. Murf in and
Ormerod(1984) found evidence of positive residual
autocorrelation, or the above parameter restictions implied
by market efficiency were rejected, for seventeen out of
eighteen currencies considered.
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The fact that one is relying on the statistical properties
of the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate
means that inference regarding bias is being conducted on a
very small information set. One needs to see whether the
specification could be improved. The P 2 statistic, by
measuring the goodness of fit, should give some indication
as to how much information is being omitted in the
prediction of the spot rate. Not only does one need to see
if additional variables enter in, but one needs to consider
what functional form any new specification will take.
Assuming rational expectations and risk neutrality of agents
it can be shown that the forward rate is an unbiased
predictor of the spot rate. Whilst such regression analysis
tests for forward market efficiency, unbiasedness should not
be taken as implying efficiency. As it is a necessary, not
sufficient, condition of efficiency, one should see whether
the forward rate is superior to predictions of other series.
A strong test of efficiency requires the forward rate to be
superior to other such indicators. Bilson and Levich(1977)
manage to fit a model that performs better than the forward
rate, altough its superiority fails when applied to
post-sample observations. Levich (1979a),however, finds the
forecasts of advisory services are not as good as those of
the forward rate over the period analysed.
Other relationships based on (4.10) also exist for testing
the EY41. However, if the Bli is not correct then it is not
certain that these will provide similar results. One could
test, for example, to see if forecasting errors are
correlated:
S(t+1) - F(t) - a + b( 5(t) - F(t-1) I * e(t+1) ..(4.17)
As the forecasting error, (S(t+1) - F(t)3, should be
orthogonal to the information set, 1(t), the EM-I implies
that both coefficients should be zero. Also, one could add
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S(t-1) to both sides of 4.10 and look at the relationship
between the change in the spot rate and the risk-premium:
S(t) - S(t-1) - a + b( f(t-1)-S(t+1) I + E(t) ...(4.18)
where the EM-I implies that a-0 and b-i. Rearranging this
and subtracting f(t-1) from both sides one could also test
to see if the expected risk premium is related negatively to
the forward premium (backwardation) or whether it is
positively related (cantango):
S(t)-f(t-1) - a + (b-1)tf(t-1)-S(t-1)) + e(t) 	 ...(4.19)
One could also consider spot market efficiency. Poole
(1967) Burt, Kaen, Booth (1972), tested the hypothesis that
changes in spot rates should be serially uncorrelated. They
found that significant departures will suggest inefficiency.
However, not everyone agrees with looking at these time
series properties of spot rates. Logue and Sweeney (1977)
claim that serial correlation statistics implicitly assume
that the equilibrium exchange rate follows a linear trend
and so are not powerful tests of market efficiency. One
could also look at the profitability of simple filter rule
trading strategies. Spot speculation has relied on their
profitability although during interim periods the filter
rule can be earning a loss. The idea of such rules is, for
an 4 filter, to buy and hold the asset if its price rises
by 4 above its most recent trough, and sell it if falls by
x%, below its most recent peak. Oooley and Shafer (1982)
looked at the out-of-sample profitability of certain filter
rules. However, they did not discuss the riskiness of the
strategies. They stated that many currencies were not
efficient in their use of price information.
This is an interesting result because Frenkel and Razin
(1982) found that the specification of (4.10) is only
strictly valid when individuals are risk-neutral and prices
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are nonstochastic.	 Perhaps	 (4.IQ) should incorporate
variables which pertain to the commodity markets. They
suggest price levels; it only being valid to omit prices
where there are risk-neutral individuals and the correlation
between prices and exchange rates is zero.
If F(t .-1) is a noisy proxy for S(t) then the assumption that
there is zero covariance between F(t-1) and e(t) would
entail a specification error and OLS would imply biased
estimates due to the errors in variable bias. Frenkel uses
a Hausman test(*2) to consider the orthogonality assumption.
His results show that the use of F(t-1) as a proxy does not
lead to significant errors in variables bias and thus use of
OLS seems appropriate. If ECF(t-1),E(t)] does not equal 0
then instrumental variables would be preferred to OLS, which
would yield a biased and inconsistent estimate of b.
Bean (1983) notes a valid criticism of the above types of
tests. He stresses the importance of testing with respect
to an alterative model. This is important. Non-nested
tests allow one to consider different competing models in
turn as the null hypothesis and test its specification
against the other, one or more alternative models. Summers
(1982) criticises the fact that the tests of the EMI have
not been tested with respect to at least one interesting
alternative to market efficiency. Taylor (1983) does
propose a price-trend alternative to th. random walk.
However, his test statistics are very arbitrary and hence
not too many conclusions can be drawn from them. The fact
that one is using information on a particular alternative
provides powerful results. However, the problem is the
formulation of different alternative specifications of the
Er4t in terms of the prices under consideration; hypotheses
(a) to (e) above have attempted to overcome this problem.
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An interesting concept is that of the Siegel Paradox. This
tries to provide a theoretical argument for the forward rate
to be a biased predictor of the subsequent period's spot
rate. This paradox was subsequently used in the debate as
to whether one should work with levels or logs of variables
in the FEM. As Gilbert (1982) emphasises, there has been
misunderstandings in the paradox's implications. Consider,
therefore, this paradox in more detail.
Siegel (1972) claimed that a market agent would have two
expected future spot rates. One in terms of dollars per
sterling, say, and the other in sterling per dollar. If one
bought or sold sterling then one could value one's profit in
terms of either dollars or sterling. The sterling-dollar
exchange rate is stochastic and consequently the expected
value will vary according to which currency is adopted as
numeraire. The movement of funds between interest bearing
assets would move the agent into line with only one of these
expected values.
According to Jensen's inequality one is not able to express
the forward rate in terms of dollars per sterling and also
as sterling per dollar as unbiased forecasts. For
mathematical reasons one can resolve this problem of one
currency being shown to be biased by taking logs.
Let P1 - $ £
and P2 - £ : $ therefore P2 - 1/Pi
It is not possible for P1(t-i)-E(P1:I(t-i)] and for
P2(t-i)-E(P2:I(t-i)] where P1(t-i) and P2(t-i) are last
period's forward prices. Both cannot be true as the inverse
of the expected value of a variable does not equal the
expected value of the inverse of a variable,
1I(ECpl:I(t-i)]) does not equal E(1/pl:I(t-i)]. Logs remove
this paradox. If P2 - 1/PI then log P2 - - log P1.
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Roper(1975) disagreed with Siegel. Speculation would ensure
that only one of these rates was considered if they planned
to take their profits in only one currency. The forward
rate could thus not be equal to two different ways of
expressing the expected future spot rate. The expected
profit would depend on which currency was adopted as
nurneraire. McCul.loch (1975) resolves this paradox even with
independent currencies. When trade is expensive, with goods
bought with foreign money forming a small percentage of the
cost-of-living, then it is possible for both American and
British citizens to make dollar and sterling profits, by
respectively selling their own currency short. But when
they settle their accounts speculators are forced to take
into account the value of the foreign currency. Indeed, he
shows that the expected profits from the Siegel Paradox are
irrelevant for empirical work. It would need 340 years,
using quarterly data before any such bias becomes
statistically identifiable. Because of these small expected
profits generated by Jensen's inequality many people have
chosen to ignore this paradox.
The concepts of efficiency that have been extensively
applied on the FEM also apply to financial futures markets.
The two main areas that have received research are arbitrage
techniques and hedging effectiveness. In the U.S.A. most
research appears to have been conducted on the Treasury Bill
futures market with little work on the efficiency of
currency futures.
With interest rate futures there exists an active secondary
market whereby one can apply the theory of the term
structure of interest rates to allow one to infer, and test,
alternative specifications of the pricing of futures
contracts. This provides the basis for arbitrage
techniques, and the identification of such inefficiencies if
they exist. (Hypothesis (a) above).
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The work on arbitrage possibilities is discussed in detail
in chapter five. For hedging effectiveness the results have
tended to find in favour of a very effective role being
performed by the financial futures markets. These papers
are also covered in more detail in chapter five. A summary
of some of the papers testing efficiency in the FEM and FFM
is presented in table 4.1
Serial correlation tests have been applied to the price
changes on five ir+i currency futures by Naidu & Shin(1979).
The Deutschemark, Canadian dollar, sterling, Mexican peso
and yen contracts were considered over the period 1973-1976.
Examining serial correlation coefficients lagged up to six
weeks they found that the coefficients tended to fall
quickly after the first lag. The fact that only a small
number of significant coefficients existed and that these
were randomly distributed suggests that abnormal profits
probably did not exist.
However, in tests, it should be noted that serial
correlation coefficients do not re].ect nonlinear price
dependencies. Indeed, linear representations of price
movements may not encompass all the aspects that affect
prices in these contracts. Hence, by developing trading
rules one may find that such dependencies may exist and
could be exploited.
One paper that has incorporated price and volume data into
the analysis is that of Dale(1981). Looking at Treasury
Bill futures markets over the period 1976(Mar)-1978(Dec) he
incorporated price and volume data in the examination of the
concept of Brownian Motion. Essentially Brownian Motion is
the consideration of random price behaviour. Dale found
that price congestion and support or resistance levels were
absent, suggesting that Chartists could not profit in the
market. Thus, essentially, the market would be weak form
efficient.
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For low volumes, Dale found the Treasury Bills exhibited
lognormal behaviour, apparantly imipying that agents are
attracted to a market in relation to the volume already
present. Thus, the first exchange to establish financial
futures contracts would be the most succesf ul. After the
first few contracts had been traded, higher volumes and the
normal distribution prevailed.
Dale & Workman(1980) applied moving average trading rules to
twelve contracts on the Treasury Bills futures markets over
the period 1976(Mar)-1978(Dec). In particular they consider
the arc sine law, which is essentially a law with respect to
probability theory. They show that the market is efficient
and that any moving average trading rules will not prove
profitable in the long run.
The fact that mechanical trading rules may exhibit profits
for long time periods is not inconsistent with the fact that
price changes are random. The implication for testing
efficiency is whether one could actually predict such
movements in trading rules. If so, then the market is
inefficient. To construct such a test one could consider
the data over a lengthy period of time prior to maturity of
the futures contract, and divide this into two sections, From
the first set of data one would derive initial, values, and a
trading rule, that one could test over the second data
series. Different assumptions about expectations would
affect the outcome here, as well as the fact that the
division of the data would have an effect on the derived
results.
This is not how Dale & Workman reached their conclusion.
The rationale behind their paper is, however, applicable to
LIFFE. That is, they recognise that, in a two-person game
based on single tosses of a coin one might expect, in the
long-run, the result to be level; half the tosses being
heads and the coin coming up tails for the other half.
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However, in one game over a long time period, one player
will, tend to take the lead with respect to the number of his
coins that win, and so maintain his lead over the majority
of the game. That is, if one examined the price changes in
a futures contract over a long time period , a condition for
the lead to change from one player to the other would
require zero net winnings. Namely, a return to the initial
positions of each player after an even number of tosses.
The arc sine law implies that in such a contract a
mechanical trading rule will have extended periods of
success and, equally likely, extended periods of failure.
The importance of the law with respect to the futures market
is with respect to the maintenance of an initial margin. If
one was to adopt a rule that was making profits then
variation margin payments would allow one to profit well,
with the knowledge that, if the arc sine law was to apply,
one should terminate one's position when one reached a
turning point in the market.
Essentially, Dale & Workman's paper implies that, in the
long-run a random walk series is as useful an approximation
to the market as any trading rule. A speculator who
maintained a long run position may thus not find the market
profitable.	 However this paper's analysis does not get at
the concept of efficiency. The fact that trading rules can
have sustained profitable runs means that abnormal profits
could be made in the market and hence, in an cx post sense,
the market is inefficient. The question is whether the same
applies cx ante. The better one's technical and fundamental
analysis of the market, the more likely it is that one
should be able to stick with mechanical trading rules during
their profitable periods.
One possible explanation of significant serial correlation
could be the volume of trades that occur within a market.
Thin markets, in which few trades occur, and thick markets,
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in which there exists many trades, can have a major
influence on price, and hence on the price patterns that
emerge. They can thus influence the findings of weak form
efficiency tests.
Active markets are characterised by high volume and frequent
price changes. The liquidity of the market will thus tend
to be quite high and agents should find it easier to find
someone to accept the other side of their trade. Floor
traders will tend to be the major ticipants. Their risk
from assuming positions will tend to be smaller, which is
relected in a smaller bid-ask spread. Thus, in an active
market, whilst buy orders will not always be followed by
sell ones the price will tend to jump between a narrow
bid-ask spread, thus giving rise to negative serial
correlation.
The price changes that occur within the market depend on
demand and supply and on how well scalpers assume these
differentials. In an inactive market, the longer is the
time between transactions and hence, if one was a floor
trader, then the longer would be the time over which a
position is held. More information will become available
during this time and ,consequently, the greater is the
adverse price risk from an open position. Thus bid-ask
spreads tend to be larger within inactive markets. This,
however, does not mean that it is easier to fulfill one's
desires within the market. Whilst some tests of efficiency
may find that positive dependencies exist at the start of a
contract's lifetime this may not always be taken as an
indication of market inefficiency. Due to the lack of
trades , the closing prices in these distant contracts may
not be actual prices but notional ones, set purely for the
calculation of variation margin. Care must thus be taken in
assessing such results.	 The daily volume may indicate
whether such closing prices are 	 actual' ones for
transactions that day.
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It may be possible to identify periods of positive serial
correlation in these distant contracts. That is because, in
these inactive markets, large orders to buy and sell are
broken down into executable orders, with the hope of
obtaining a better price. If one wanted to buy, the price
would gradually be driven up, whilst if one wished to sal].
there would be a gradual reduction in price . If one found
that such correlation was significant then this might
indicate that, not only that the narket was inefficient but
also that one might be able to influence the price actively.
Hypothesis (c) proposed is the one that has seen most
attention on FEM. It is also important on FFM, as one is
buying/selling a contract to buy/sell an instrument at a
future date then it should be expected that the spot and
futures rates are equal. Bigman et aX (1983) look at the
concept of unbiasedness through a contract's lifetime in
terms of commodity futures, Up to 8 weeks before maturity
the nearer futures price is a better estimate. No serial
correlation is found, which implies that watching a linear
patterns in past forecast errors will not improve future
forecasting performance. Filter analysis has thus been used
to identify any non-linear patterns.
Filter rules are mechanical trading rules which determine
the buying and selling times of contracts. Fama and
Blume(19b) provide an early analysis, comparing the returns
from a buy-and-hold (B&H) strategy over the same period.
For these two returns to be compatible the B&H strategy
should only be calculated over the period when the filter
provided open positions.
In filter tests the benchmark against which they have tended
to be judged is the buy and hold model. However, this buy
and hold strategy is not a sensible benchmark in FFM. When
one enters a contract one is entering a two person zero sum
game and thus the profits of one side of this contract are
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the losses of the other. Given the daily marking to market
this is not a sensible benchmark and zero would seem to be
far more appropriate.
Dryden (1969) shows that Blume and Fama's results are in
fact biased. In comparing the returns from the filter and
the B8d-I they assume that the long rate of return for a
transaction is the negative of the short rate, which
contradicts what they did for the filter, thus making the
B&H bigger than it actually is, hence introducing bias(*3).
Closing price data is used throughout this research.
However, given the large amount of daily information and
also the Speed of price changes it may be the case that
closing prices are NOT representative of the market. Use of
intraday price data may thus give a different answer to the
question of efficiency. Mann(1981) considers such intraday
data in the analysis of frozen pork-bellies futures. He
rejects the random walk hypothesis, as did Neiderhoffer and
Osborne who looked at intraday stock prices. The floor
traders, who act on their own account, could have added a
non random element to price changes. This may suggest that
the quicker one can react within the market the higher might
be the possible return. Brooks and Francis (1980), for
example, in looking at a moving average price rule for
various commodity futures, find that the trading rule when
the trader was in constant communication provided the
highest returns.	 Thus if one is active in the market
throughout the day then profits might result.
Neftci(1983) examines four econometric problems associated
with the use of daily data in financial futures markets.
The first issue he examined was of particular importance
given the research that has been carried out on day of the
week effects in the FFM. As daily data originating from
such markets was not available at weekends, holidays and on
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special days when the market was closed there would appear
to be gaps in the observed daily price series. Consequently
data from FFM would have unequal observation periods.
Observations on Mondays would thus have different stochastic
properties than observations from other weekdays. Neftci
shows that, even in an efficient market, this would result
in heteroscedastic behaviour. Hence ordinary least squares
would be inefficient and generalised least squares would
need to be employed.
However, a series flaw does appear to question the
generality of this hypothesis. Assuming a continuous time
model, y(t) - x(t)' + e(t), where e(t) a dW(t) and W(t) is a
Weiner process, they then go on to assume that the behaviour
of these time series is not smooth, in that they seem to
react each day but stay constant within the day . Such a
step like function would appear to be uncharacteristic of an
efficient market. It would seem to imply that agents did
not respond to new information during the day. It is true
that, although time is continuous, markets do remain closed
at weekends and, during these periods, relevant price and
other related variables remain constant. Such new
information will only affect prices when the markets reopen
and hence, one must carefully interpret any results. They
raise three other issues. First, they examine whether there
is a significant seasonal effect in daily futures prices.
They show that if the markets are efficient . .Then the data
will not show seasonality in the mean. Yet, the variances
of the observed series will exhibit seasonal variations.'
(p20). Second, daily data is more likely to be affected by
large spikes and hence there exists a greater chance of the
underlying distributions being non-normal. Non-linear time
series models may result,which ties in with the analysis of
Neftci & Policano (1982), who examine various forms of
technical analysis. Assuming non-linear behaviour to the
stochastic processes under consideration can explain the
predictive power of technical analysis models. Third, daily
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price limits could also lead to non-linear forecasting
models. Daily limits are seldom penetrated and so this last
point is not important.
Whilst it is true that the finer the data set the stronger
the test of efficiency, most of the research on the
behaviour of prices in continuous markets has concentrated
on the daily price movements and not on their intraday
movement. The idea of using a finer data set, such as
intraday data, is to try and identify any systematic
patterns that are not apparent in the daily price series.
This will not be examined here as it is very hard to get
relaiable data to test any hypotheses with respect to these.
However, given that many of the agents within the market are
day traders this is an important area to consider. One such
paper that examines intraday price behaviour is that of
Trevino and Martell(1984) which examines the behaviour of
wheat, corn and soyabean futures over the period 1975(Dec)
to 1978(May) at the CBOT. The way they apply their trading
rule raises doubts as to their results. The trading rule's
profits are compared to those which would arise from an
application of this rule to a randomised price series from
the same day. This series was obtained by applying random
numbers to a sequence of price changes as they occured and
then removing the time element from this series by
reordering it according to the random numbers. As this has
removed the time element it seems senseless to apply a
trading rule to this series and hence the observed results
could be because of this wrong filter.
The majority of the work on FEM looked at forecasting
effectiveness. This question can be extended to see how
well the futures market performs with respect to a fully
derived econometric model. Howard (1982), is one paper that
compares the forecast's accuracy of the 13 week Treasury
Bill futures contract with two naive forecasting models as
well as the forward forward rate implied by the term
structure.
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The use of any such econometrically based models is
obviously an advantage to the testing of efficiency of
futures contracts. A well, developed model should obviously
be related to the significant, fundamental variables
effecting the contract under consideration.
The models used by Howard are: the current Treasury Bill
rate as a forecast of future rates (no change forecast); and
an ARIMA model, estimated every 70 weeks using the last 25
w'eks of data (Best Time Series' model). His results were:
for horizons of less than six weeks ahead the models were
better predictors that the futures or forward forward rates.
However, nothing can be drawn from this result as there are
only four delivery dates a year and yet he has considered
all 52 weeks. As the futures rate is only going to match
the forecast week under consideration when the forecast week
is a delivery week one needs to examine delivery weeks
seperately in order to have a correct area of comparison.
This is an important point that is mentioned in more detail
in chapter five. Consequently it is very important to take
account of compatibility of delivery dates between markets
in order to make a comparison of forecasts. Taking account
of this, the futures rate performs best, in terms of the
mean absolute percentage error.
One should treat with caution Howard's conclusion that the
no change model is the best for horizons of less than six
weeks, given the cost of calculating the ARIMA model and
forward rate. No allowance is made for such costs in
relation to the size of potential gain.
For greater than seven weeks to the forecast horizon the
forward rate has a lower MAPE than the futures rate, which
both outperform the models. This level. of accuracy appears
to be constant over long time periods. However, he claims
that the 3-6 basis point advantage of the forward rate may
not be important given the difficulty of calculating it with
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respect to the spot rate. Such a conclusion he draws seems
to resemble work in the forward markets whereby if anyone
finds inefficiency of the forward rate this is attributed to
risk(*4). If one finds the futures rate is not as good a
predictor in such circumstances, but only by a few basic
points, this appears to only cloud the issue.
Indeed, certain aspects of the market could be used to
explain any deficencies of the futures rate, such as the
costs of transactions costs in the two (forward and futures)
market; risk of futures contracts with respect to bills in
the spot market; the markets are new and consequently will
prove to be inefficient initially; the daily effects of
marking to market could provide a severe burden, leading to
a loss on a futures position. Such issues need to be
quantified, and hence resolved.
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4.4 ONCLUSICN
As is evidenced from the above discussion, and from table
4.1 the work on testing efficiency has progressed througt a
number of sequences. Early work on asset markets
concentrated on the detection of dependencies in past
prices.	 Fama(1970) provided a review of much of this
literature. He also defined three broad tests of efficiency
which focussed on different information sets. These were
the weak form, semi-strong form and strong form tests of a
market's efficiency. They have provided the basis for mtch
of the empirical work that followed Fama's paper.
With the advent of floating exchange rates weak form tests
of the unbiasedness of forward rates, as predictors of the
subsequent period's spot rates, were examined intensively.
The majority of the research found in favour of the
efficient markets' hypothesis.
Subsequently, more sophisticated econometric techniques were
used to examine unbiasedness. Systems estimation, for
instance, allowed a number of currencies to be jointly
tested for efficiency. This procedure incorporated more
information into the tests, and hence provided more powerful
results. Such systems estimation was also used to examine
the impact of news effects.
In terms of the foreign exchange markets current research
appears to now focus on trying to determine the size of any
risk premium within the market. If succesful, this would
allow the results from testing efficiency to be examined in
more detail, determining whether any biasedness of the
forward rate is due to a riskpremium, or represents a market
inefficiency.
Examination of efficiency of financial futures markets has
extended much of the analysis applied to forward markets.
Whilst, in addition, other issues of importance to the
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operation of futures markets have received attention. In
particular,the question of arbitrage possibilities has seen
the most research. For example, Poole(1976),Lang &
Rasche(197B), Puglisi(1978), Capozza & Cornell(1979) find
inefficiencies whilst Rendelman & Carabini(1979) and Vignola
& Dale(1979), (1980) find the Treasuey Bills futures market
to be efficient. Most papers compare futures rates with an
equilibrium band derived from the corresponding forward
rates, whilst some use a cash-and-carry model to consider
intertemporal arbitrage, see iones(1981).
Day-of-the-week effects have also been examined in detail on
futures markets, altough there is little evidence to suggest
their existence.
This chapter has built on the discussion in chapter three,
and looked at recent research into the testing of
efficiency. Table 4.1 summarises some of the recent
empirical work. Also, within this chapter, five specific
hypotheses were proposed that an efficient financial futures
market should possess. This provides the framework for the
empirical work that follows.
CORNELL FEM
(1977)
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TABLE 4.1: SOME RECENT RESULTS ON EFFICIENCY TESTING
PAPER	 MARKET TIME
PERIOO
KOFI	 Chicago	 1953
(1973)	 Wheat,	 -1969
Maine
Potato Futures
RESULTS
Chicago, a continuous inventory market,
outperforms Maine, a discontinuous inventory
market, in terms of forecasting performance.
PRAETZ	 Sydney 1965	 Price changes found to be
(1975)	 Wool.	 -1972	 independent and uncorrelated.
Futures	 Filter returns do not exceed
those from buy-and-hold.
MORR IS
	 1t41
& EVANS Currency
(1976)	 Futures
1975 Compare results of six futures
contracts with those from Chase
Econometrics Forex Model. Not
specify the model. Its results
outperform the futures contract.
1973(4)	 Regression Analysis. FF, £.
-1977(1) C$, CM, SF, OG, Y. No
evidence of liquidity premium.
For 2/7 currencies there are
significant autocorrelation in
forecast errors.
NA IOU
& SHIN
(1977)
ItTI	 1976	 Martingale version of E?4-I tested
Currency -1977	 using three different tests:
Futures	 serial correlation; runs;
spectral analysis. Not obey
martingale in 20/31 price changes
of currencies. Profitability not
examined.
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BRANCH
	
T.Bi11	 1976(6)
(1978)	 Futures -1978(6)
Futures market interest-rates
consistently differ in the same
direction from term structure
implying biased rates.
GEWEKE	 FEM	 1962(iii) 7 currencies are efficient
& FEIGE	 -1967(u) when examined seperate].y.
(1978)	 1972(uui) Multimarket analysis rejects
-1977(i) efficiency. No alternative
offered.
LANG	 T.BilI.	 1976(3)	 30 randomly chosen from 3 periods.
& RASCHE Futures -1976(11) Inefficiency found between
(1978)	 forward and futures rates. Futures
rates consistently above forward
rates for later dated securities.
POOLE
	
T.Bill	 1976(1)	 Profitable arbitrage
(1978)	 Futures -1977(6) opportunities do not exist
in nearest contract.
PIJGLISI T.Bill	 1976(3)	 Arbitrage possibilities
(1978)	 Futures -1977(9) between cash and futures
markets. Sign tests indicate
4/7 contracts are inefficient.
APOZZA T.Bill
& CORNELL Futures
(1979)
1976(1) Using weekly data arbitrage
-1978(6) possibilities exist between spot
and futures markets. The
difference increases with the time
from maturity.
EDERING- G1+IA	 1976(1)	 GI+IA superior to T.BiI]. as hedging
TON	 1.8111 -1977(12) instrument in shorter hedges. Hedge
(1979)	 Futures	 ration less than one. Both instruments
more effective with 4 weeks
rather than 2 week hedges.
EMERY &
SCOTT
(1979)
FRENKEL
(1979)
T.Bili.
Futures
FEM
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March	 Unsophisticated technique
1977	 to determine that yields in
Contract the T.Bill futures market
are comparable with yields
implied from term structure.
NAIDU
& SHIN
(1979)
REPIDLE-
MAN &
CARABINI
(1979)
1973(6)	 DM,FF,;Joint coefficients restiction
-1979(7) passed using monthly data;no autocorrelated
residuals;extra lagged forward rates not
significant;Volatility is reflected in
assets traded in highly organised exchanges
and not just in exchange rates;news in
interest rates is significant for £.
11+1	 1973	 Serial correlation of weekly price
Currency -1976	 changes. Small number of
Futures	 significant coefficients which
probably do not allow abnormalL
prof its. Three trading rules
applied; some did well, suggesting
possible inefficiency.
T.Bill	 1976(1)	 Quasi-arbitrage possibilities
Futures -1978(3) are found to exist for the
nearest contract. Inefficient.
VIGNOLA T.Bill
	
1976(3)	 Arbitrage possibilities on a
& DALE	 Futures -1977(12) daily basis. Discrepancies
(1979a)	 persist over time. Inefficient.
VIGNOLA T.Bill	 1976(3)	 Derive two soecifications of
& DALE	 Futures -1978(12) equilibrium T.Bill futures prices,
(1979b)	 based on: (i) theory of storage
costs; (ii) term structure of
interest rates. Model (i) is
better than (ii) in explaining
futures prices, implying futures
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market efficiency depends on the
use of appropriate financing
charges.
ARAK &	 T.BiLI.	 1976(1)	 Ad hoc analysis of various
MCcURDY Futures -1979(12) contracts. Some prices were
(1980)	 out-of-line with prices on
other issues with adjacent
maturities.
BROOK5, Commodity
WIEBE,	 Futures
HIER, FRANCIS
(1 980)
1967	 Arbitrary choice of commodities considered.
-1976 ARIMA model based on the last 50 days used
to forecast. Four stategies based on increased
contact with the market considered. More one
kept in touch, the more sophisticated the mode].
and the higher the profits.
CAVES & FEM	 1953(1)	 Define incremental efficiency.
FIEGE	 -1962(4) Incorporate monetary approach
(1980)	 1970(7)	 to exchange rate. Do not reject
-1975(8) efficiency for C$:$.
DALE &
	 T.Bill.	 1976(3)	 Moving average trading
WORKMAN Futures -1978(12) rules on 12 contracts.
(1980a)	 Arc Sine law implies that
these rules are not profitable
in the long run. Efficient
DALE &	 T.Bi].].	 1976(6)	 Applied working's W statistic.
WORKMAN Futures -1978(9) Sluggishness of price
(198Db)	 movements found.
FRANKEL FEM
(1980)
	
1973(1)	 7 currencies,DM,FF,,L,SF,DG,Y
	
1978(4)	 Increase information set in tests
of efficiency;FF 1 L,DG inefficient
when forward rate is in info' set;
£,L fail when last prediction error
is included. Peso problem discussed.
HANSEN & FEM
HOOP ICK
(1980)
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1973(10)
-1979(1)
plus
1922(1)
-1926(7)
CS, OM, FF, £, SF, Y, L.
Regression of lagged forecast errors
questions E* for SF, L, OH.
Multicurrency tests of lagged
forecast errors are more powerful.
HILL &	 GNNA	 1976(1) Over half of variance on bond
SCHNEE- T.Bond (1977(8)] positions can be covered by
WEIS	 Futures -1979(12) hedges of a month in these 2
(1980)	 instruments.
MANN	 Frozen June	 Looks at intraday price
(1980)	 Pork	 1976	 movements. Rejects random walk
Bellies	 hypothesis.
DALE
(1981 a)
T.Bill	 1976(3)	 Price and volume analyzed 'using
Futures -1978(12) Brownian Motion. Price congestion
and support or resistance levels
not found. Lognormal behaviour
patterns at low volume; normal
distribution as volume increased.
DALE	 1MM	 1974(6) 2 and 4 week hedges in £, OH, Y
(1981b) Currency -1980(6) gave hedging effectiveness of
Futures	 greater than 97.85% for all 3
currencies
HILL &	 1141	 1974(3)	 Hedging effectiveness analyzed
ScHNEE- Currency -1980(12) £, OH efficiency depends on time
WEIS	 Futures	 to maturity. Hedge ratio less
(1981a)	 than one.
HILL &	 11+1	 1972(9)	 Regression analysis for 5
Scl-1NEE- Currency -1978(12) currencies over 1, 3, 6 month
WIES	 Futures	 forecast horizons. Unbiased.
(1981b)	 Accuracy improves nearer
maturity. Possible inefficiency
in long term contracts.
EDWARDS FEM
(1982a)
FRENCH
	
CBOT
(1982)
	
Copper,
Silver
Futures
HEDGE
	
1.8111
(1982)
	
T.Bond
GA
Futures
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SELOOY & FEM
	
1972	 using daily data examine news effects
ROSE	 -1975	 on the Canadian Dollar.
(1981)
BALL
	
London
TOROIJS
	
Gold
TSHOEGL
(1982)
1975(1) Day-of-the-week effects examined using
-1976(6) 2 daily prices. Overnight changes
vary less than within day changes,
daily variances are not equal,
weekend variables not differ much.
No negative weekend effect.
1973(6)	 OLS, ZSURE on 4 currencies
-1979(9) (ft, FF, CM, L). News is
incorporated. Efficiency.
Multicurrency approach
improved estimates.
EDWARDS FEM	 1973(6)	 £, FF, CM, L. OLS & ZSIJRE
(1982b)	 -1979(6) Reject efficiency for 2 currencies
with OLS and only 1 with ZSURE.
News incorporated into the analysis.
1968	 Compares futures on OMEX with LME
-1980	 forward rates. There exists average
differences for silver contract horizons
of O.3%(3 mths), O.6%(6 mths)
and 1%(l2mths).
1979(1)	 2 periods examined following change
-1980(6) in Fed's Monetary Policy 1979(9).
Volume increased in period two; and
hedging effectiveness and hedge ratios
increased -
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HOWARD	 T.BiII 1977(9)
(1982)	 Futures -1981(7)
Comparing forecasting accuracy
of the 13 week Treasury Bill futures
contracts with forward rate implied
by the term structure and two naive
forecasting models. Futures rate
provides as good a forecast.
Efficient.
AGMON	 FEM	 1973(7) £,DM,SF,FF,DG,$; each currency's risk is
& ARAD	 -1977(6) examined with respect to SOR basket of
(1983)	 & 1973(7) currencies. No positive risk premium found.
-1982(6)
BIGMAN	 Chicago
GOLDFARB Wheat,
SCHECHT- Corn,
MAN	 Soyabean
(1983)	 Futures
1975(1) Regression analysis using weekly
-1980(9) observations. Unbiased for up to
6 weeks from maturity. Evidence
of inefficiency for greater
lengths.
HIANG & CBOT	 1972(1) Found Day-of-the-Week effect exists
TAPLEY	 Commodity -1980(12) for 21 futures contracts, examined on
(1983)	 Futures	 the basis of returns, volume and open
interest.
FOSTER- FEM	 1978	 OLS Regression. HK$:S.
SMITH	 -1982	 Efficient. Forward rate a better
(1983)	 predictor of future spot than
current spot.
GRAMMA- 1141	 1974(1)	 Regression analysis of hedge ratios(HR) &
111(03 & Currency -1980(6) hedging effectiveness(I€) of £,C$,SF,DM,Y.
SAIWERS Futures	 currencies. HR and HE increased for £ and
(1983)	 V over time. SF had varied HR.
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HQDRICK FEM	 1973(6) 9 Currencies. Found significant
& SRIVA-	 -1980(12) speculative out of sample profits.
STAVA	 Reject unbiasedness. Risk
(1983)	 premium could be the reason.
MacDONALD FEM	 1921(2)	 Test error ortogonality with
(1983) -1925(5) a constant, lagged forward rate,
lagged forecast error. F:S, F:,
$:f, efficiency not rejected.
TAYLOR	 11+1	 1974(1)	 June, December futures: Trading
(1983)	 Currency -1980(u) rules examined. Strategy on
Futures	 forecasting trends is superior
London	 to buy-and-hold for sugar.
Commodity	 Autocorrelation for cocoa
Futures	 and coffee. Efficient currency
futures.
BAILLIE FEM
& McMAHON
(1984)
1973(6)	 3 currencies (f,L, CM).
-1980(4) Autoregressive process. Term
structure used to construct
forward premium. Reject
efficiency.
BEAN	 FEM
	 1973(7) OLS and ZSIJRE. 4 currencies.
(1984)	 -1979(7) Support EMI. Point estimates
less than one.
BELC*IGIA Options
& GREGORY on 1.
(1984)	 Bond
Futures
1982(10) On six dates data on 53 call
-1983(4) options were analyzed.
Options prices compared with
those from Black's model. No
consistent arbitrage possibilities
were found. Efficient.
FAMA
(1984)
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FEM	 1973(8)	 (F(t)-5(t)] autocorrelated.
-1982(12) Variation in premiums explained most of
the variation in forward rates. The
premium component of forward rates are
negatively correlated with expected future
spot rates. OLS and ZSURE used on 9
currenciesBF,C$,FF,L,Y,DG,SF,f,OM.
GOLDSTEIN T.Bills 1973	 Day of the Week effects analyzed.
& FERRI	 Futures -1981	 Some irregular DOWE arise.
(1 984)
GREGORY	 FEM	 1974(1)	 FF, L, Y, £, CM, studied.
Bc P4cWRDY	 -1981(12) Structural instabilities found
(1984)	 in regression equation. Looks at
parameter constancy and serial
correlation.
MacDONALD FEM	 1976(1)	 AS,C$,FF,DM,L,Y,SF,f 1,$ Mthly data
(1984)	 -1982(12) Support EMH that deviations from
PPP follow a martingale.
M1WFIN BC FEM
ORMEROO
(1994)
1978(9)	 16 Currencies. OLS and
-1983(9) ZSUPE. Inefficient. Time
series model based on
forecast errors outperforms
the market.
ROSE	 FEM	 1971	 C$:$. Daily data. Interest rate
(1984)	 -1980	 news not important.
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TREVINO Wheat,	 1975(12) 26 futures contracts examined on the basis of
& MARTELL Corn,	 -1978(5) transaction-to-transaction prices(excluding
(1984)	 Soyabean	 delivery month). Tendency for positive
Futures
	 (negative) autocorrealtion at the start (end)
of contract.
EDWARDS LIFFE	 1982(9) For twelve eurodollar contracts, the
(1985)	 -1985(9) futures rates lie within an arbitrage
band with respect to the spot market,
hence ruling out systematic arbitrage
profits.
KORAJCZYK FEM	 1974(3)	 £, CS, BF, Fr, CM, 1, DC, SF.
(1985)	 -1981(7) 8 currencies. Arbitrage.
Interest Rate Parity Condition
proposed. Correlation found
between changes in expected real
bond differential and past forecast
errors.
(Some earlier work on FEM is tabulated in Levich(1977) pp258 - 259).
(Unless otherwise stated all currencies have the US $ as base.
Y=Yen,L=Lira,FFFrench Franc,DG=Dutch Guilder,SFSwiss Franc,
DM=Oeutsche mark,C$Canadian Dollar, BFBelgium Franc.)
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FOOTNOTES:
*1: An important issue is that agents differ with respect to
their size, they have access to different information
sources and sets, have different understanding of the price
formation process as well, as having differential. forecasting
ability. Hence, forecast errors will differ across agents.
e(t)-E C p(t):I(t-1) ] - p(t),The expectation of this should
be zero whilst the error should also have no structure.
However, if professionals continue to gain at the expense of
amateurs in the market then this does not appear to be the
case. See Stein(1985(a) and 1985(b)). Breaking this down,
e(t) - E(p(t):I(t)1 - E(p(t)] + E(p(t)] - p(t) - a(t) + b(t)
where aCt) is the differential between the subjective and
ob j ective expectation, and b(t) is the difference between
the actual price and the objective mean. If all agents
possessed rational expectations and complete information
then the subjective and objective expectations would be
equivalent. However, they are not equal. One of the
functions performed by financial futures markets is to make
the subjective expectation of the subsequent period's price
equal to the objective expectation. Economies of scale in
information processing means that agents who take larger
information samples have smaller variances of aCt) above.
*2: In the standard regression Y-a+bX+u there are two
stochastic specifications. (i)conditional expectation of u,
given X is zero--the orthogonality assumption;(ii)u has a
spherical covariance matrix--the sphericality assumption.
Failure of Ci) leads to biased estimates and failure of (ii)
to a loss of efficiency. The Hausman test provides a test of
the othogonality assumption, by testing the standard
regression against an alternative hypothesis.	 See
J.A.Hausman, Specification Tests In Econometrics,
Econometrica,Volume 48,No 6,Noveinber 1978 pages 1251-1271.
Frenkel(1979) uses a Hausman test to test the hypothesis
cov(u(t)lnF(t-1))-O, as failure would lead to errors in
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variables bias on the OLS estimates.	 Hence instrumental
variables estimation is used, in order to construct a
relevant statistic to test the null. hypothesis. If the
hypothesis fails then instrumental variables gives an
unbiased estimate.
*3: The idea of filter tests is to compare the profits
generated by some trading rule with the profits that are
obtained when prices are random. However, it seems to be
implicitly assumed that the maximum profits that can be
obtained when prices are random is that given by a buy and
hold rule(B&H). But such a B&H strategy seems to contravene
the idea of efficient agents; it assumes that such agents
will not respond to any new information and will 	 maintain
their existing position. Also, within the context of
futures markets, a B&H strategy would seem very unrealistic
in terms of the marking-to-market that exists.
*4: Agmon and Arad(1983) analyze FEM risk. They claim that
the issue is different from the EMH. It depends on the risk
versus return portfolio, relative to returns obtainable on
total available investment opportunities. Drawing on the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), where risk is measured
by the covariance of the asset and the weighted market
portfolio. That is, the risk premium of any asset is in
proportion to that asset's contribution to the risk of total
wealth,(b), in
R(i)	 a(i) + b(i) I + e(i)
where R(i) is asset i's one period rate of return, a(i)
is related to the return's time element, I is the index
and b(i) measures systematic risk. Agmon and Arad find that
any risk is a non-systematic risk in a portfolio and
theref ore no risk premium on currencies is required.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXAMINING ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES
AND HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Efficiency can be tested in terms of the roles that a market
is supposed to perform. In fulfilling these roles excess
profits should not be obtainable for the agents who
constitute the market.	 In chapter two it was shown that
there are three main types of agents in a financial futures
market. The scalpers, or market makers, perform the
necessary role of providing liquidity. They also eliminate
arbitrage opportunities. Hedgers come to the futures market
with a definite role that they would like to fulfil. Their
hedging provides the market with its long-term viability.
Speculators, meanwhile, are needed to eliminate the hedgers'
risk.
Speculative success can be subjectively measured in terms of
whether it is possible to find inefficiences in the market.
Certain papers have looked at this in terms of individual
agents. See for instance, Goss(1972), who conducted a
survey of participants on the Sydney Wool Futures Exchange.
As speculatior is a profit seeking motive, it is hard to
quantify how successful a market is for speculators. As
mentioned in chapter four profits earned can depend on luck
as much as they do on realising a market inefficiency.
Speculation will not be explicitly measured here.
Arbitrage and hedging will be the focus of this chapter. As
outlined in chapter four arbitrage techniques and hedging
effectiveness are the two areas of financial futures markets
that have received most attention. For example,
Poole(1976), Lang and Rasche(1978), Puglisi( 1978), Capozza
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and Cornell(1979) find inefficiencies whilst Rendelman and
Carabini(1979) and Vignola and Dale (1979), (1980) find the
Treasury Bills futures market to be efficient. The majority
of this work has applied the same techmiques to different
observation periods and contracts, thus resulting in varied
results. Here arbitrage techniques on imterest rate futures
contracts are examined using an arbitra9e band derived from
the term structure of interest rates. Arbitrage
possibilities between currency futures and forward contracts
are also discussed.
Attention will first be focussed on the sterling interest
rate contract(ST3). Previous work wilfL be discussed and a
correct methodology for examining effioiiency on LIFFE will
then be employed. Arbitrage opportunities will, subsequently
be examined in terms of the currency contracts. Arbitrage
is examined, on the basis of the term structure, between the
ST3 contract and the underlying cash market whilst currency
futures prices are compared with corresponding rates from
the foreign exchange market. The rates in these markets
should be equivalent when they refer to the same future
date.	 If the rates in these markets move out of line,
arbitrage possibilities may become available.
The concepts of hedging are then discussed with a test of
hedging effectiveness being performed n currency futures
contracts. Finally, the hedging effecrtiveness of currency
futures is examined by seeing how closely futures prices
move, with respect to prices in the underlying market.
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5.2 ARBITRAGE ON INTEREST RATE CONTRACTS
In an efficient financial futures market the prevailing
prices should incorporate all relevant information,
including future expectations based on this information. As
the ST3 contract allows one to trade on the basis of one's
expectations of future interest rates one would expect the
pricing of this contract to satisfy the EMH. If it was
possible to rank effeciency tests then one of the worst
types of inefficiency that a market could possess would be
the availability of arbitrage opportunities.
Arbitrage is a set of simultaneously executed transactions
designed to take advantage of price discrepancies and so
guarantee a profit without any net investment or unnecessary
risk exposure. That is, say, when the same good can trade
for different prices in two markets with transaction costs
not accounting for this differential. One could then, in
this case, buy at the low price, pay transaction costs, and
sell at the higher price to obtain an immediate profit.
If such arbitrage opportunities existed they would violate
the weak form type of efficiency as they could be inferred
from current information sets. In testing efficiency in
fininacial futures markets an examination of arbitrage
opportunities should be the first step in the analysis.
Volatile prices in the relevant contracts may mean that it
is impossible to maintain a perfect dynamic equilibrium
between the related contracts. However, because of the
large turnover in the market any discrepancies that exist
may only remain open for a short period of time. It may
therefore be necessary to examine more complex price
anomalies, and hence aim for low risk and not riskless
profit. This low risk would arise because, in more complex
situations, it may not be possible to obtain a closed
arbitrage.	 That is, it may be hard to get a closed
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arbitrage that matches dates, principal amounts and also
protects one's position from interest rate or exchange rate
risk.	 If arbitrage possibilities do exist then an
inefficiency clearly exists. However, as one is testing
arbitrage between two markets it is not always clear which
market is out-of-line, and hence inefficient.
If an arbitrage opportunity exists between the futures and
the underlying spot market then it is regarded that the
futures market is inefficient. This is not necessarily so
but the smaller volume of trades in the futures market would
seem to suggest that it is this market which is inefficient.
If a possibility exists between two futures markets then the
case is not so clear cut. Consequently, one must carry out
further tests to analyse where the inefficiency lies.
If one wants to lock into an interest rate at some future
date then one could either deal in the cash or futures
markets. If the rates in the two markets differ, with
respect to the same time period, then one may be able to
arbitrage between the markets in order to get a better
return.
One problem is that once one abstracts from a riskless
situation it cannot really be called an arbitrage.
Essentially it is using an arbitrage technique to analyse a
speculative position, in order to seek a riskiess profit.
Whilst this riskless profit may not exist, a price anomaly
clearly does. Therefore, one takes up a position as close
as possible to an arbitrage situation but the position is
left uncovered at the tail of the transaction.
In terms of the cash market one could simultaneously borrow
and lend the same amount over different maturities and hence
lock into a future interest rate. Similarly, futures
contracts allow one to secure an interest rate over future
periods. Buying a LIFFE ST3 contract allows one to secure a
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lending rate for three months from the delivery date of the
futures contract. Conversely, selling a contract allows one
to secure a future borrowing.
The rates one locks into by either method should be
equivalent for the same period. From the ST3 contract the
price is quoted as 100 minus the rate of interest:
Pa 100- Rf
where: Rf is the rate implied by the futures contract. This
interest rate should be in line with that from the cash
market. Suppose, Ri is the interest rate on a long-term
deposit over L months and Rs is that on a short-term deposit
of 5 months then Re, the expected interest rate in S months
to cover (L-S) months, should be inferred from the following
equation:
1	 s	 1-s
C I + Ri ) a ( 1 + Rs ) ( I + Re ) .. . (5.2)
This is actually calculated, in terms of LIFFE, as the
following
( 1 + L.RJ. ) a ( l S.Rs ) ( 1 + (L-S).Re) .. .(5.3)
From this one obtains the so-called forward-forward rate
(Re) which is the implied forward rate from the cash market
yield curve.
If Re does not equal Rf then arbitrage possibilities may
exist. Now two possible values exist for Re: one is an
offer rate for a future borrowing; the other is a bid rate
for a future lending. Therefore this cash market spread
allows an arbitrage band to be constructed within which the
futures rate (Rf) should lie.
If Rf exceeds the implied offer rate then one could combine
a long ST3 position with a borrowing position over the
future period in the cash market. Alternatively, if Rf is
below the implied bid rate then a suitable combination would
be a short ST3 position (covering the period L-S) and a
lending position over the future period in the cash market.
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Thus if Rf lies outside this arbitrage band implied from the
cash market rates profitable arbitrage opportunities exist.
Figure 5.1
(a) If Rf	 Re
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LONG 513
)
t	 S	 L
	
t	 S
	
L
BORROW
( -------------------------
t	 L
Ci) CASH MARKET	 (ii) FUTURES MARKET
(b) If Rf ( Re
LEND
------------)
t	 L
BORROW
C-------------
t	 S
(i) CASH MARKET
SHORT ST3
*********** ( ---------
t	 S	 L
(ii) FUTURES MARKET
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The forward-forward rate obtained from equation (5.3) above
is,
Re -	 1	 ( L Ri - S Rs)	 (5.4)
(L-S))	 (1 + S Ps)
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This is the implied forward rate from the cash market yield
curve and it provides the basis for arbitrage analysis.
In an efficient market the futures rate, Rf, should lie
within the bounds of this arbitrage condition. Consider now
how this forward-forward rate is calculated in more detail.
Let A be the current moment, and the period A to C, I (AC),
represent L months; with A to 8, T(AB), being S months.
Thus the period CL - S) is represented by the time T(BC).
If one wanted to lock into a bid rate for a future
investment then one would lend over the period T(AC) at the
rate R(AC), and borrow over T(AB) at the rate R(BA).
LENDING
A:------------------------------
BORROW ING
:B................
BID RATE
(Arrows pointing to the right indicate lending money; to the
left implies receiving money.)
The gain over this period, BC, can be expressed as the
absolute ratio of the amount paid at C over that paid at B.
It is equivalent to the gains over the periods AC and AS.
That is,
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1+R(BC)T(BC)	 1+R(AC)T(Ac) -
	 I
1 +R (BA) T CAB)	 -(5.5)
R(BC) . -1	 (I^R(AC)T(Ac) - 1
T(BC) (1+R(BMrCAs)	 ...(5.6)
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which is equivalent to,
R(BC) - 1
	
(R(AC)T(AC) - R(BA)T(A8) 	 . . . (5.7)
T(BC)	 1^R(BA)T(A8)
Similarly, if T(A8) was a cash lending and T(AC) represented
a cash borrowing then T(BC) allows one to lock into an offer
rate.
BORROWING
A<--------------------------:C
LEM3ING
A: ---------------------------
OFFER RATE
and,
R(CB)	 1	 (1+R(CA)T(AC)) - 1
T(BC) (1+R(AB)T(ABJ)	 .. .(5.8)
Consequently, the above cash market transactions, mean that
one can generate forward-forward rates by simultaneously
borrowing and lending the same amount in the cash market,
but f or different maturities. The spread between the bid
R(BC) and the offer rate R(CB), R(C8) - R(BC), tends to be
larger the more distant the future period (BC) is.
Forward-forward rates do not always resemble cash market
rates. For example, if LIBOR 3 and 6 month rates are 8%,
with the bid-offer spread at 0.125%, then the implied bid
and offer rates are, respectively
R(BC) - (365/91) (((I+o.07875)(1821365)I(1+0.oe)(91/365))-1)
- 0.07598 - 7.60%
R(CB) - (365/91) (((1+o.oB)(182/365)I(1+o.o7875)(g11365))-1)
- 0.07969 - 7.97%
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The spread here is 0.37%, which is greater than in the cash
market.
In summary then, the term structure of interest rates is
employed to construct forward-forward rates. These rates
can be compared with the rates implied from the futures
contracts. If the futures rates lies outside this arbitrage
band then the differential, in basis points, can give an
indication of the potential profit to be made from
undertaking an arbitrage opportunity.
5.3 PREVIOUS WORK
Consider now previous work in this area. From the analysis
of efficiency presented in section 5.2 above, one can see
that arbitrage techniques are essentially a weak form test
of efficiency. If arbitrage possibilities do exist then
this presents clear evidence of inefficiency. However, the
reverse is not true. If they do not exist then one can
improve one's tests to consider other, more encompassing,
and hence stronger, tests of efficiency.
As will be seen, most papers have tended to consider the
relationship between the futures rates and the implied
forward rates by determining an equilibrium band from the
cash rates within which the futures rates should lie. The
determination of this band has tended to be based on the
term structure of interest rates; although the cost-of-carry
model has also been used, see iones(1981).(*1)The rate
implied from this term structure, equation 5.2, allows one
to determine an equilibrium band within which arbitrage
possibilities between the cash and the futures market do not
exist.
Using the term structure of interest rates a problem does
exist.	 One is testing the efficiency of the futures, that
150
the futures rate should equal the implied forward rate over
the same holding period, on the basis of assumptions
surrounding the expectations formation process of agents.
Hence a joint test is being made: one with respect to the
efficiency of the futures market and the other surrounding
the formation of expectations.
Hamburger and Platt(1975) found that forward rates tended to
be upward biased estimates of future spot interest rates,
thus supporting the idea, first argued in terms of Hick's
pure expectations theory of interest rates, that a liquidity
premium existed in the yield curve. Borrowers may have a
stronger need to borrow long then lenders did to lend long
and so have to pay a premium in order to induce lenders to
go long. Edwards(1985) compares this with the Keynesian
theory of normal backwardation. Whilst neither premium has
been explicitly measured, in liquid markets the similar
ratio of hedgers to speculators will cause any differential
between the two markets to be small, and hence the futures
rate should lie within the arbitrage band derived from the
implied forward rates.
Another basis for considering arbitrage is concerned with
cash and carry, or intertempora]. arbitrage. Jones (1981),
Batchelor (1983), and Vignola & Dale (1979)(1980), all.
consider this issue. In the latter an equilibrium model is
derived and tested against the futures rates. A problem
surrounding the derivation of such arbitrage bands is that
they do not provide any quantitative relationships between
futures and cash rates.
To achieve arbitrage positions, and hence riskiess
investment, using the cash and futures markets one needs to
buy or sell a security or a couple of securities whose
maturity exactly coincides with the futures contract. If
not, then one is not going to have a riskiess situation. If
one had purchased a security whose maturity was longer than
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the intended holding period then one would have to 'ride the
yield curve.' That is when the futures contract's period has
finished, one would sell the security on the secondary
market, with the possibility that if the interest rate had
increased during the holding period there would a risk of
principal as one would suffer a capital loss on the security
held.
If one had a cash market instrument whose maturity was less
than that of the futures contract's holding period, one
could roll over cash instruments until the period was
covered. However, there would be a risk of income, if the
interest rate fell over the period, as the interest return
on subsequent securities would fall, thus causing lower
returns.
Thus the maturities in the cash and futures market must
exactly match up for one to obtain a riskiess return and
hence indulge in an arbitrage. Consequently, it will not be
correct to consider arbitrage possibilities through the time
till maturity of a futures contract as the maturities in the
two markets will not match.
Lang and Rasche(t978), for instance, find that Treasury Bill
futures rates were significantly different from their
associated forward rates over the period 1976(3) - 1978(3).
However, in their analysis they linearly interpolated
forward rates to match the futures rates. This is wrong.
New information will be reflected in the futures rates but
not in these linearly interpolated forward rates. Hence
there will be some measurement error within the analysis of
these arbitrage possibilities. Most papers compare futures
rates with an equilibrium band derived from the
corresponding forward rates.
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In terms of the futures market the prices will follow the
series:
F(1 ,90),F(2,89),F(3,88) ..........
where F(1,90) refers to a contract being traded on day 1 for
delivery in 90 days. The prices quoted on subsequent days
for this contract refer to the same delivery date. An agent
could therefore police this relationship. That is, it would
be possible for an agent to buy a contract on day 1 and be
able to sell it at some latter date, hence possessing a
liquid investment opportunity. Consequently this series
should follow a random walk.
Cash market rates, however, do not follow a similar series.
Three month rates would move:
F(1 ,90) ,F(2,90),F(3,90) .....
That is, on each subsequent day, a three month contract is
traded. This series provides no information on the rate of
return from a possible investment opportunity and hence it
is not possible to police this relationship.
The problem then exists in trying to derive a relationship
between the futures rates and the implied forward rates
which one can police. That is, a relationship that one can
act upon if it moves out-of-line, and hence allow one to
consider the arbitrage relationship through time. Only on
certain dates will the rates implied from the cash market
exactly match those in the futures market. For example,
interbank rates are quoted for 7 days, 1,2,3 and 6 months
and at these time periods prior to the delivery of the
futures contract will the rates in the two markets coincide.
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Consider cash rates. Only on four dates a year will these
rates coincide with the delivery of the futures contract.
If one was to just consider the cash market, the returns
would be:
ACt)	 - (s(t+90) - F(t, go)] I F(t90)	 . . . (5.9)
R(t+90) - (S(t+leo) - F(t+90,90)] / F(t+90,90) 	 .. .(5.1O)
R(t+180) - (s(t+27o) - (t+iso,9o)] / F(t+lao,9o) ...(5.11)
R(t+270) (S(t+360) - F(t+270,90)] I F(t+270,90) .. .(5.12)
where: R(t) is the return from a period t investment and
S(t+90) is the spot rate in (t+90). These returns are all
uncorre]ated. If one considered any intervening returns
they would be correlated. Hence only these four dates are
correct for the estimation of efficiency.
Consequently arbitrage possibilities for the nearest
contract, with respect to the three and six month cash
market rates, are only possible on four dates a year. One
can compare cash and futures on other dates when the rates
coincide. However, on intervening dates the rates do not
match.	 The question then arises as to how one can analyse
policing of arbitrage bounds on a daily basis?
Poole's (1976) analysis was one of the first to examine the
efficiency of interest rate futures when he looked at U.S.
Treasury Bills. Examining the cash market returns to a bill
holder and the returns to a combination of bills and futures
transactions, he found arbitrage opportunities were rare,
and hence the futures market in U.S. Treasury Bills was
efficiently priced.
Using the term structure of interest rates he determined two
arbitrage bounds, which he finds that the futures rate lies
within. Hence the market is efficient. Looking at six
contracts from January 1976 to June 1978, he considers the
three months prior to delivery and finds that the mean
futures rate was below the mean implicit forward rate,
calculated from bid-ask mean returns. Finding a significant
negative difference between the futures rate and the forward
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rate, when he considers the first twenty observations for
each contract, he claims that one can interpret the futures
market rate as the market's unbiased estimate of the future
spot rate on 13 week Treasury Bills. However, as he does
not test unbiasedness, he is wrong to conclude this. Also,
if there are unbiased estimates in the futures market then,
if there exists arbitrage opportunities, it is the cash
market that is inefficient. Consequently this contradicts
the way Poole derived his arbitrage bounds, whereby he
assumes that spot bill yields are fixed and then looks for a
range of futures yields as benchmarks.
Lang & Rasche (1978) found that Treasury Bill futures rates
over the period 1976 (March) to 1978 (March) were
significantly different from their associated forward rates.
They extend Poole's analysis to later dated contracts and
contradict his idea of extrapolating his results to other
futures contracts.
Lang & Rasche use yields on outstanding U.S. Treasury
securities to construct forward rates for each of the
quotation dates considered. These forward rates were
calculated for each quotation date such that they exactly
matched the Treasury Bill futures contract.
	 This is
correct. They then interpolate forward rates to match the
futures rates but new information, while it is incorporated
in the futures rates, is not reflected in these linearly
interpolated forward rates. A set of 30 quotation dates as
randomly selected from 3 different time periods to give 90
dates. Differences between futures and forward rates (*2)
were then calculated in terms of absolute and arithmetic
value and then categorised for each different quotation date
from category 1, the contract nearest to security, to
category 8, furthest from maturity. However, as these
quotations dates are arbitrarily chosen, the contracts will
not be at the same time to maturity in each category. For
example, one may be considering contracts with 10 days to
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maturity as well as ones with 20 days to maturity in
category 1. Therefore inconsistent results will be obtained
from each category. Given that these discrepancies exist in
the data it is not surprising that Lang & Rasche find that
the mean absolute differences are significantly different
from zero at the 1% level. This difference tended to
increase with maturity.
Statistically significant spreads were found between the
futures and forward rates which did not fall over time.
They raise the question as to whether these differences are
systematic and, if so, what factors explain them? Rather
than looking at other variables to explain the movements in
prices they consider the mean arithmetic difference between
the futures minus the forward rate. This difference is
negative for category one (forward rate is greater), zero
for category two and positive for categories three to eight.
Lang & Rasche claim that the futures rate can be divided
into expected and premium components, which can be
considered as a liquidity premium with respect to interest
rate risk and a term premium with respect to maturity
premiums. They claim wrongly that a futures contract is not
default free and therefore futures contracts may contain a
risk premium associated with default risk. But, the futures
exchange does guarantee the contracts and so this risk does
not actually apply.
Puglisi's (1978) examination of the Treasury Bill futures
market is based on deriving, and testing, a model from the
term structure of interest rates. Considering seven
contracts from March 1976 to September 1977 he concludes
that the iaarket is inefficient. Looking at the holiday
period return over this period he finds that, on the basis
of a sign test, four out of the seven contracts analysed
indicated that arbitrage possibilities existed between the
cash and the futures market.
	 He also found that such
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inefficiencies decreased as the market matured.
Rendleman & Carabini(1979) and Vignola & Oale(1979) both
contradict Puglisi's results. Vignola & Oale(1979) show
that Puglisi's summary statistics are misleading and that
one must examine the market on a daily basis. The time
series of futures minus forward rates show that,
'.. Although the mean difference between these returns on
average are small, and their standard deviations large, there
are distinct arbitrage returns from using the futures
market,' and these returns may be substantial on any given
day (*3)
They are correct in their preference for daily examination
of rates, rather than consideration of mean returns. Small
means can be found even when there exists wide swings in
rates. Thus, on certain days there may exist substantial
differences between the futures and the forward rates. Such
wide variations also show why it is incorrect to linearly
interpolate forward rates over the period and hope to
examine the efficiency of the futures rate. As these rates
will not react to new information they will therefore not
resemble actual movements in the market. Whilst they may be
of assistance as an indicator they provide no quantitative
information on the correct difference between futures and
forward rates.
In their later paper Vignola & Dale(1BOQ) again use charts
of daily rates rather than concentrate upon summary
statistics. They derive two specifications of equilibrium
Treasury Bill futures prices based on the theory of storage
costs and on the term-structure of interest rates.
Examining Treasury Bill futures over the period March 1976 -
December 1978 they find that the model based on storage
costs is better f or explaining futures prices and hence,
futures market efficiency depends on the appropriate use of
financing charges. These financing charges are related to
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the two different specifications. Pure arbitrage, which
occurs when one finances the position from borrowed funds,
is related to the storage costs derivation. This is based
on Working's theory of storage costs in which any deviation
between the spot prices and futures prices depends on the
cost of storing the commodity until further delivery.
Batchelor considers such cash and carry with respect to
LIFFE's Gilt contract.
However, a necessary condition for consideration of this
model is that this model be storable. Treasury Bills are
deliverable for 91 days prior to delivery. Thus one should
look at efficiency based on this model only for the three
months prior to delivery. Vignola & OaJ.e(1980), however,
apply this analysis to the last nine months of a contract.
Given that different results are obtained from the first 3
compared with the 3 - B and B - S months of the contract to
maturity, it may be that such an analysis is inappropriate
here. For the near contract, the cost of carry indicates
that the analysed differences were only two basis points,
with fluctuations around zero being common.
Batchelor looks at cash and carry with respect to LIFFE's
Gilt contract. Whilst this is a long term instrument it is
not always the case that the instrument stored at time 3
months before maturity, say, is the one that will, be most
profitable to deliver. As this contract is delivered at the
sellers'option (*4), there may well be an extra opportunity
cost involved in deciding to store an instrument which may
not necessarily prove to be the cheapest deliverable
instrument on settlement day. Thus I do not believe this
analysis is applicable. It is certainly not so with respect
to short-term instruments. One cannot buy short-term
instruments at a particular time and deliver them intact,
later on, to the futures market. He does not conduct any
tests.
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Capozza and Cornell(1979), using weekly data, examine the
returns in the Treasury Bill spot and futures market over
the first 30 months of trading on the cME. Large deviations
were found to exist in the returns available in the two
markets, thus suggesting inefficiency. Their explanation of
the failure of their derived arbitrage condition is that
there exists either large arbitrage costs or differential
risk obtains. This latter point does not appear to be
valid. Alternatively the traders in the two markets must be
distinct, nonoverlapping groups. This last suggestion does
not seem valid in terms of the interest rate futures market.
It could be correct in futures markets for currencies, where
there already exists a large interbank forward market. Here
one could possibly find larger organisations dealing in the
forward market, where they could possibly obtain favourable
bid-ask spreads,	 and smaller groups or individuals
participating in the futures market.
The contracts are categorised into their three quarters up
until delivery. The average and absolute deviations between
the futures minus the forward rates are then considered.
Not only are these averages misleading, as one need only
take positions when differences are particularly large, but
Capozza and Cornell also average these differences over the
13 weeks in each quarter. Thus the maturity of the futures
contract is not being held constant when the average is
computed. Deviations are found to be close to zero for the
near contract. Beyond 16 weeks to maturity positive
deviations exist.
Within the context of the stock index futrures contract, an
equilibrium model can be derived that should prevail in an
efficient market. If it does not then arbitrage
possibilities may exist involving the stock index futures
contract.	 However, transaction costs and taxes may lead to
some slight deviations.
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Modest and Sundaresan(1983) extend this analysis to stock
index futures as they compare and contrast the three stock
index futures traded in the USA: Value Line Composite
Average on the Kansas City 801, the SW 500 index on the CME
and the NY stock exchange index on the NYFE. They examine
arbitrage possibilities between the futures price and the
contemporaneous spot prices. The equilibrium condition they
examine follows from two stategies that they propose, which
produce the same cash flow at the maturity time of the
contract. The discountred futures price should equal the
spot price. Taking account of transaction costs they derive
an equilibrium(arbitrage) band within which the futures
price should lie. Graphical analysis is just presented of
only two of the S&P 500's contacts (June and Dec 1982).
Thus the generality of their analysis is questionable.
Bounds are derived by assuming full, half and zero use of
proceeds by short sellers. When Treaury Bills maturing on
the exact date of the futures contract were not available
neighbouring bills were used to infer an implied forward
rate. The futures rate did lie outside the bounds when full.
use of proceeds were available to the investor. Whilst this
suggests inefficiency their exa ;mination of the cx post
exploitable arbitrage opportunities is not conclusive.
Finally, Edwards(1985) examines LIFFE's eurodollar contract.
For the twelve contracts closest to delivery he finds that
arbitrage opportunities are absent and hence the market is
efficient.
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5.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The analysis above will, now be implemented. The data for
the ST3 contracts are obtained from LIFFE's daily sheets.
Forward-forward rates have to be calculated from the cash
rates. London interbank rates for 1, 3 and 6 months are
obtained from the Henley Centre's database. These rates
were the mean of the bid-ask spreads, obtained from the
London close.
Table 5.1 shows the mean 3 and 6 months rates used.
	 These
then imply bid-offer rates, given the spread of 1/6%
Table 5.2 relates these to the present date (A), the
delivery date of the futures contract (B) and its maturity
date (C). The time in days is shown at the top of table
5.2, where T(AB) covers the period A to B, for example.
Column (a) then shows the one month rates corresponding to
one month before the delivery, and the maturity, of each
futures contract. The three month rates relate to three
months before the delivery and the maturity of each
contract, whilst the six month rate corresponds to six
months prior to the contract's maturity.
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TABLE 5.1
(i) 3 Month Rates
(a)	 (b)	 (ci
CONTRACT	 MEAN	 BID	 OFFER
M83	 0.108437 0.107812 0.1090
383	 0.111563 0.110938 0.11218
883	 0.098125 0.0975 	 0.0987
D83	 0.097500 0.096875 0.9812
M84	 0.095313 0.094688 0.0959
384	 0.089375 0.08875 0.09
S84	 0.094375 0.09375 0.095
(ii) 6 Month Rates
(a)	 (b)	 (c)
CONTRACT MEAN	 BID	 OFFER
M83	 0.106250 0.105625 0.10687
383	 0.109375 0.10875	 0.11
883	 0.098125 0.0975 	 0.09875
083	 0.098750 0.09813 0.09938
M84	 0.098125 0.0975 	 0.09875
384	 0.09	 0.08938 0.09063
884	 0.098438 0.09781 0.09906
Notes:
Column (a) shows the mean of the daily close of the London
Interbank 3 and 6 month rates, respectively.
Columns (b) and (c) are derived by assuming a spread of
1/8% in the market.
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Table 5.2
T(AB) T(BC) T(AC)Contract Delivery
Date
	
M83	 9.3.83
	
383	 8.6.83
	
883	 14.9.83
	
t83	 14.12.83
	
M84	 14.3.84
	
.184	 13.6.84
	
S84	 12.9.84
Contracts Time Covered
By Futures
Contract
M83	 9.3.83
9.6.83
383	 8.6.83
8.9.83
883	 14.9.83
14.12.83
083	 14. 12.83
14.3.84
M84	 14.3.84
14.6.84
384	 13.6.84
13.9.84
884	 12.9.84
12.12.84
1
month+
11.125
10 .3125
10 .3 125
11 .25
9.3125
9.1563
9. 1563
9 .2969
9.2969
9.00
9 .0937
10.9375
10 .9375
3
months+
10.8437
11 .3750
11 .1563
10.0313
9. 8125
9.75
9.75
9.5313
9.5313
8.8125
8.9375
9.4062
9.4375
10.75
6
months+
10.6250
10 .9375
9.8125
9.8750
9 .8125
9.00
9.8438
* The first date in the first column for each contract
refers to the delivery date of the futures contract, and
the second date shows the time covered by the contract.
+ These 1, 3 and 6 month rates refer to the rates
corresponding to the time from the dates represented by
column (a).
163
These rates are then used to determine an arbitrage band.
In table 5.3 forward forward rates are derived using the
Spread of 1/8% from table 5.1
TABLE 5.3
CONTRACT LPPER BOUIC) LOWER BOU'ID
M83	 0.103214	 0.0995
383	 0.106095	 0.104216
583	 0.097615	 0.093899
083	 0.099482	 0.095792
M84	 0.100398	 0.09673
384	 0.090486	 0.08679
584	 0.102018	 0.098297
As with Vignol.a 8c Dale(1979) mean bid-ask spreads are used.
Their rationale for using bid-ask means follows from,
Theoretical and institutional considerations.' Neither
buyers or sellers of the futures contracts, or of money in
the interbank market should excessively influence either
market, and thus the equilibrium influence tend, in the
limit, to the mean. However, in distant contracts, of few
trades, this may not be the case.
Table 5.4 relates the futures rate to the forward-forward
rate spread. Any deviation of the futures rates from within
this band indicates that arbitrage profits may be available.
M83:
.383:
583:
083:
M84:
384:
584:
9.96%
10.24%
9.34%
9.58%
9.67%
9.68%
9.83%
10. 31%
9.86%
9.72%
9.72%
8.80%
9.94%
10.08%
10.32%
10.61%
9.76%
9.95%
10.04%
10.09%
10.20%
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TABLE 5.4: ST3 CONTRACT: ARBITRAGE POSSIBILITIES
Contract	 Futures Rate	 Forward-Forward Rate Spread
Table 5.5 shows the results from the calculation of an
arbitrage and a reverse arbitrage between the futures market
and the cash market when the futures contract is three
months from its delivery, and the dates in the two markets
coincide as mentioned above. An arbitrage here involves
lending in the cash market over the next 3 months; borrowing
in the cash market over the next 6 months and buying a three
month futures contract for delivery in three months. As can
be seen no profits can be earned from such a position. If
such an arbitrage exhibits a loss this does not mean, as
Vignola and Dale(1979) wrongly assume, that a reverse
arbitrage will earn a profit.
	 In such a reverse arbitrage
each leg of the position is reversed, which means that bid
and offer rates are interchanged. Thus, if an arbitrage is
unsuccessful for the buyer of a futures contract it is not
necessarily true that the reverse arbitrage will be
successful for the seller of a futures contract. As the
results show, such reverse arbitrage exhibits losses in 5
out of 7 cases. It is, however, interesting to note that
gains may have been possible for the 383 and 1184 contracts.
Transaction costs in setting up such a position may well
account for such a result.
	 Overall, on the basis of this
test, the ST3 contract would appear to be efficient.
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TABLE 5.5
Gain (+) or loss (-), in basis points, from undertaking
an arbitrage (buy) or reverse arbitrage (sell).
Co nt r act
	
Buy
	 Sell
	
M83:	 0	 -9
	383:	 -19
	 9
	583:	 -2	 -3
	D83:	 -7	 -4
	
M84:	 -31
	
20
	
-5	 -31
	
584:	 -4	 -6
FIGURE 5.2
ARBI TRACE
	
REVERSE ARBITRAGE
A-----------,B*********C A---------B*********C
LEND £
	
BUY ST3
	 BORROW £ SELL ST3
BORROW £
	
LEND £
A-----------------------C A--------------------
This equilibrium band of 1/8% within which futures rates
should lie will be indicative of the bid and offer rates
available to most participants in the market. It may be
possible to construct a smaller spread (1/16%, say) which
might be obtainable by large traders or market makers. This
would imply a smaller band of forward rates, within which
futures rates should lie.
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Futures closing rates are used here. However market prices
move very quickly and so the data to be used in such fast
moving markets is a problematic area. As long as the data
is consistent and is as appropriate to the theory as
possible then the problems will be reduced. In addition, if
possible, one should allow for any possible discrepancies
that may occur during the day.
If the quoted futures rate lies within these bounds this
suggests no arbitrage possibilities. However, as few
contracts are actually delivered this suggests that buyers
of futures contracts probably settle for cash delivery
instead. Consequently, one uses the futures rate minus
0.25%, say, to make the comparison. Also, sellers must
therefore arrange their own borrowing rate at, say, the
futures rate minus 0.125%.
Also one could consider the daily high or low in the futures
market. This would suggest a futures rate band. If this
overlaps the implied forward rates band then it may have
been possible during that day to engage in an arbitrage,
thus guaranteeing a profit.
The above is thus allowing one to consider the relationship
between forward rates and futures rates at certain points in
time. The next part of the analysis is to extend the data
to consider any discrepancies over time.
If one was to adopt what others have done then one would
have to interpolate the interest rate data to obtain upper
and lower bounds for a no-arbitrage condition. The problems
behind this were mentioned in section 5.3.
From analysing interest rate futures contracts it had been
shown above that arbitrage opportunities do NOT exist. An
arbitrage band is determined from the term structure of
interest rates and, as in an efficient market, futures rates
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tend to lie within this band. Only two possible profit
making arbitrages arise. These were from conducting a
reverse arbitrage with the 383 and M84 contracts. With a
tick value of £6.25 this would indicate, a profit on each
contract of £56.25 and £125.00 respectively. Such figures
are so small in comparison to the size of the contract and
even to the margin requirement that it is not possible to
infer that arbitrage opportunities existed here.
5.5 ARB ITRAGE ON CURRENCY CONTRACTS
Arbitrage is examined here in terms of LIFFE's four currency
contracts. Such possibilities are examined between the
forward market for foreign exchange (FEM) and the financial
futures market (FFM). As with interest rates above, these
currency rates should only be compared for the dates on
which they are exactly compatible. That is, when the rates
in the two markets refer to the same future date. Hence,
the spot date in the FEM should be the SAME day as the
delivery day in the FF14.
The futures rate used are the daily closing prices from
LIFFE's daily sheets while the forward rates are obtainable
from the • Financial Times'. One and three month forward
rates are considered. These rates do not correspond to
calendar months. Each one month forward rate, for example,
refers to the spot rate in one month's time plus two days
for delivery. However, if this day is not a working day
then it refers to the next working day. For example, the
one month forward rate quoted on Wednesday, 26th June 1985
refers to the spot rate in one month and two days.
	 This
date is Sunday, 28th 3uly 1985. As this is not a working
day then it refers to the next working day Monday 29th July
1985. Hence the one month forward rate quoted on 25th June
1985 refers to Monday, 29th July 1985.
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As futures rates within a contract refer to the same
delivery date one must make comparisons between the FFM and
the FEM on the basis of rates which refer to this delivery
date. That is, it is necessary to work from this delivery
date in order to have consistency. Therefore, we look for
the spot delivery date in the FEM that falls on the same day
as the FFM's delivery date. The forward rates that then
correspond to this date are calculated.
Delivery dates in the FFM are the second Monday in March,
June, September, and December. The one month and three
month forward rates that exactly refer to these dates are
shown in table 5.6 to 5.9. A comparison of these closing
forward rates with the corresponding futures rates should
show them not to be different. If any differences exist
then this could be produced as evidence of arbitrage
opportunities arising between the FFM and the FEM. Hence,
an inefficiency would have arisen.
Alternatively, an explanation would need to be found for
such a difference. One possibility could be transaction
costs between the two markets. Second, it could be said
that it is not always possible to obtain a competitive quote
in the FEM. However, given that the rates being compared
here are readily quotable for the FEM then neither of these
explanations should have any significance. Unfortunately,
the times at which prices were being quoted in the two
markets are not available. If they were, then it would have
been possible to infer from the daily price ranges whether
large arbitrage opportunities arose from discrepancies in
the two markets throughout the day. If it was possible to
obtain the times at which prices were quoted then this would
provide a stronger test of arbitrage possibilities.
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5.6 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This ex post analysis is carried out between the yen:dollar
(table 5.6), dollar:sterling(table 5.7), deutschemark:dollar
(table 5.8), and the swiss franc:dollar(table 5.9)
contracts. One month rates are examined over the period
from November 1982 to May 1985, whilst three rates are
considered between December 1982 and March 1985. Table 5.10
summarises the	 results.	 It shows the basis	 point
differential between rates in the two markets.
In terms of the yen:$ contract there appears little
difference between the futures and forward rates one month
from maturity. However, there are wide discrepancies three
months from maturity.
With the $: contract arbitrage opportunities may well, have
existed. The mean absolute difference for one month from
maturity is 28 basis points, whilst it is 40 basis points
for three months from maturity. Futures rates tend to
exceed forward rates for the one month maturity, wtilst this
is reversed at the three months distance from maturity.
For the OM:$ contract, as with the yen:$ contract, arbitrage
possibilities may not exist for one month but could exist
three months from maturity. Similar results seem to prevail
for the SFr:$ contract. The SFr:$ contract is sometimes
very illiquid. Futures rates, therefore, do not always
change in response to new information as no contract may
change handg .	 This could explain deviations here.
Arbitrage opportunities do appear to be present in the $:
contract. Possible explanations for such results could be
that closing prices may not always be representative of
arbitrage possibilities. This could be due to numerous
agents closing their positions before the end of the day.
Differential closing times in the markets could be an
explanation. FEM closes after the FFM and hence the closing
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prices are not taken at the same time.	 New information
arising before the FEll shuts could therefore cause a
discrepancy.
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EXAMINING ARBITRAGE POSSIBILITIES
BETWEEN THE FEM At'l) THE FM.
TABLE 5.6: DOLLAR:YEN EXCHANGE RATE.
DELIVERY DATE TWO DAYS	 ONE MONTH (FEM)
(LIFFE)	 BEFORE
Mon 6.12.82	 Sat 4. 12.82	 Thurs 4.11.82
Mon 14.3.83 Sat 12.3.83 Fri 11.2.83
FEM: 0.4276
FM: 0.4272
Mon 13.6.63 Sat 11.6.83 Weds 11.5.83
FEM: 0.4331
FM: 0.4335
Mon 12.9.83	 Sat 10.9.83	 Weds 10.8.83
FEM: 0.4079
FM: 0.4083
Mon 12.12.83	 Sat 10.12.83 Thurs 10.11.83
FEM: 0.4274
FM: 0.4277
Mon 12.3.84 Sat 10.3.84 Fri 10.2.84
FEM: 0.4270
FM: 0.4274
Mon 11.6.84 Sat 9.6.84 Weds 9.5.84
FEM: 0.43a6
FM: 0.4381
Mon 11.9.84 Sat 8.9.84 Weds 8.8.84
FEM: 0.4130
FM: 0.4126
Mon 11.12.84	 Sat 8.12.84	 Thurs 8.11.84
FEM: 0.4160
FM: 0.4162
Mon 11.3.85	 Sat 9.3.85	 Fri 8.2.85
FEM: 0.3844
FM: 0.3849
Mon 10.6.85 Sat 8.6.85 Weds 8.5.85
FEM: 0.3960
FM: 0.3956
THREE MONTHS (FEM)
Fri 10.12.82
FEM: 0.4098
FM: 0.4117
Fri 11.3.83
FEM: 0.4219
FM: 0.4228
Fri 10.6.83
FEM: 0.4166
FM: 0.4162
Fri 9.9.83
FEM: 0.4118
FM: 0.4091
Fri 9.12.83
FEM: 0.4264
FM: 0.4231
Fri 9.3.84
FEM: 0.4505
FM: 0.4465
Fri 8.6.84
FEM: 0.4376
FM: 0.4317
Fri 8.9.84
FEM: 0.4120
FM: 0.4076
Fri 7.12.84
FEM: 0.4074
FM: 0.4043
Fri 8.3.85
FEM: 0.3858
FM: 0.3827
* FEM refers to the Foreign Exchange Market.
** FM refers to the Futures Market. The quotes are the day's
closing price for the contract nearest to maturity.
Fri 10.12.82
FEM: 1.6103
FM: 1.6135
Fri 11.3.83
FEM: 1.4933
FM: 1.4921
Fri 10.6.83
FEM: 1.5709
FM: 1.5775
Fri 9.9.83
FEM: 1.4945
FM: 1.4945
Fri 9.12.83
FEM: 1.4385
FM: 1.4340
Fri 9.3.84
FEM: 1.4660
FM: 1.4610
Fri 8.6.84
FEM: 1.4031
FM: 1.3940
Fri 8.9.84
FEM: 1.2775
FM: 1.2765
Fri 7. 12.84
FEM: 1.2024
FM: 1.2015
Fri 8.3.85
FEll: 1.0564
FM: 1.0679
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TABLE 5.7: DOLLAR:STERLING EXCHANGE RATE
DELIVERY DATE TWO OAYS
	 ONE MONTH (FEM) THREE MONTHS (FEM)
(LIFFE)	 BEFORE
Mon 6.12.82	 Sat 4.12.82	 Thurs 4.11.82
Mon 14.3.83
Mon 13.6.83
Mon 12.9.83
Mon 12.12.83
Mon 12.3.84
Mon 11.6.84
Mon 11.9.84
Mon 11.12.84
Mon 11.3.85
Mon 10.6.85
*FEM: 1.6676
**FM: 1.6700
Sat 12.3.83 Fri 11.2.83
FEM: 1.5421
FM: 1.5465
Sat 11.6.83	 Weds 11.5.83
FEM: 1.5662
FM: 1.5695
Sat 10.9.83	 Weds 10.8.83
FEM: 1.4830
FM: 1.4844
Sat 10.12.83 Thurs 10.11.83
FEM: 1.4911
FM: 1.4910
Sat 10.3.84 Fri 10.2.64
FEM: 1.4148
FM: 1.4160
Sat 9.6.84 Weds 9.5.84
FEM: 1.3925
FM: 1.3860
Sat 8.9.84 Weds 8.8.84
FEM: 1.3158
FM: 1.3100
Sat 8.12.84	 Thurs 8.11.84
FEM: 1.2688
FM: 1.2695
Sat 9.3.85	 Fri 8.2.85
FEM: 1.1060
FM: 1.1083
Sat 8.6.85 Weds 8.5.85
FEM: 1.2032
FM: 1.2055
* FEM refers to the Foreign Exchange Market.
** FM refers to the Futures Market. The quotes are the day's
closing price for the contract nearest to maturity.
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TABLE 5.8:
	 DOLLAR: DEUTSCHEMARK EXCHANGE RATE
DELIVERY DATE TWO DAYS
	 ONE MONTH (FEM) THREE MONTHS (FEM)
(LIFFE)	 BEFORE
Mon 6.12.82	 Sat 4.12.82	 Thurs 4.11.82
*FEM: 0.3894
ft*FM: 0.3896
lIon 14.3.83	 Sat 12.3.83	 Fri 11.2.83	 Fri 10.12.82
FEM: 0.4172	 FEM: 0.4112
FM: 0.4175	 FM: 0.4116
Mon 13.6.83	 Sat 11.6.83	 Weds 11.5.83	 Fri 11.3.83
FEM: 0.4111	 FEM: 0.4206
FM: 0.4110	 FM: 0.4224
Mon 12.9.83	 Sat 10.9.83	 Weds 10.8.83	 Fri 10.6.83
FEM: 0.3683	 FEM: 0.3955
FM: 0.3691	 FM: 0.3962
Mon 12.12.83	 Sat 10.12.83 Thurs 10.11.83 	 Fri 9.9.83
FEM: 0.3771	 FEM: 0.3777
FM: 0.3773	 FM: 0.3745
Mon 12.3.84	 Sat 10.3.84	 Fri 10.2.84	 Fri 9.12.83
FEM: 0.3654	 FEM: 0.3671
FM: 0.3666	 FM: 0.3638
Mon 11.6.84	 Sat 9.6.84	 Weds 9.5.84	 Fri 9.3.84
FEM: 0.3632	 FEM: 0.3922
FM: 0.3626	 FM: 0.3883
Mon 11.9.84	 Sat 8.9.84	 Weds 8.8.84	 Fri 8.6.84
FEM: 0.3459	 FEM: 0.3762
FM: 0.3450	 FM: 0.3706
Mon 11.12.84	 Sat 8.12.84	 Thurs 8.11.84	 Fri 8.9.84
FEM: 0.3408	 FEM: 0.3399
FM: 0.3412	 FM: 0.3357
Mon 11.3.85	 Sat 9.3.85	 Fri 8.2.85	 Fri 7. 12.64
FEM: 0.3078	 FEM: 0.3272
FM: 0.3086	 FM: 0.3238
Mon 10.6.85	 Sat 8.6.85	 Weds 8.5.85	 Fri 8.3.85
FEM: 0.3145	 FEM: 0.2965
FM: 0.3138	 FM: 0.2946
• FEM refers to the Foreign Exchange Market.
•* FM refers to the Futures Market. The quotes are the day's
closing price for the contract nearest to maturity.
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TABLE 5.9: DOLLAR:SWISS FRANC EXCHANGE RATE
DELIVERY DATE TWO DAYS
	
ONE MONTH (FEM)
(LIFFE)	 BEFORE
Mon 6.12.82	 Sat 4.12.82	 Thurs 4.11.82
*FEM:
Mon 14.3.83 Sat 12.3.83 Fri 11.2.83
FEM: 0.5021
FM: 0.5021
Mon 13.6.83	 Sat 11.6.83	 Weds 11.5.83
FEM: 0.4937
FM: 0.4922
Mon 12.9.83	 Sat 10.9.83	 Weds 10.8.83
FEM: 0.4583
FM: 0.4579
Mon 12.12.83	 Sat 10.12.83 Thurs 10.11.83
FEM: 0.4664
FM: 0.4865
Mon 12.3.84 Sat 10.3.84 Fri 10.2.94
FEM: 0.4992
FM: 0.4503
Mon 11.6.84 Sat 9.6.84 Weds 9.5.94
FEM: 0.4417
FM: 0.4409
Mon 11.9.84 Sat 8.9.84 Weds 8.8.84
FEM: 0.4113
FM: 0.4098
Mon 11.12.84	 Sat 8.12.84	 Thurs 8.11.84
FEM: 0.4151
FM: 0.4151
Mon 11.3.65	 Sat 9.3.85	 Fri 8.2.85
FEM: 0.3615
FM: 0.3621
Mon 10.6.85 Sat 8.6.85 Weds 8.5.85
FEM: 0.3733
FM: 0.3730
THREE MONTHS (FEM)
Fri 10.12.82
FEM: 0.4870
FM: 0.4859
Fri 11.3.83
FEM: 0.4894
FM: 0.4932
Fri 10.6.83
FEM: 0.4789
FM: 0.4767
Fri 9.9.83
FEM: 0.4639
FM: 0.4611
Fri 9.12.83
FEM: 0.4597
FM: 0.4522
Fri 9.3.84
FEM: 0.4768
FM: 0.4695
Fri 8.6.84
FEM: 0.4532
FM: 0.4447
Fri 8.9.84
FEM: 0.4100
FM: 0.4037
Fri 7.12.84
FEM: 0.3974
FM: 0.3931
Fri 8.3.85
FEM: 0.3755
FM: 0.3464
* FEM refers to the Foreign Exchange Market.
** FM refers to the Futures Market. The quotes are the day's
closing price for the contract nearest to maturity.
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TABLE 5.10: SUITIARY OF RESULTS FROM TABLES 5.6 TO 5.9:
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FEM A FM.
Referring to	 Ooll.ar:Yen	 Dollar:Sterling
Delivery Date:	 1 month / 3 month	 1 month I 3 month
6. 12.82	 -24
14.3.83
	
4
	
-19	 -44	 -32
13.6.83	 -4	 -9	 -33
	
12
12.9.83	 -4
	
4
	
-14	 -66
12.12.83	 -3
	
27
	
0
12.3.84	 -4
	
33	 -12
	
45
11.6.64
	
5
	
40
	
65	 50
10.9.84
	
4
	
59
	
58	 91
10.12.84	 -2
	
44	 -7
	
10
11 .3.85	 -5
	
31	 -23
	
9
10.6.85
	
4
	
31	 -23	 -115
Dollar: Deutschemark Dollar: Swiss Franc
1 month / 3 month	 1 month I 3 month
6. 12.82	 -2
14.3.83	 -3	 -4
	
0
	
11
13.6.83
	
1	 -18
	
15	 -38
12.9.83	 -8	 -6
	
4
	
2
12. 12.83	 -2
	
32	 -1
	
28
12.3.84	 -12
	
33	 -11
	
75
11.6.64
	
6
	
39
	
B
	
73
10.9.84
	
9
	
56
	
15
	
85
10.12.94	 -4
	
42
	
0
	
63
11.3.85	 -8
	
34	 -6
	
43
10.6.85
	
7
	
19
	
a
	
291
Differences are represented here as the
FEM Rate minus the FM Rate.
Thus a + figure - FEll Rate ) FM Rate.
Differences are in basis points.
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5.7 HEDGING WITH CURRENCY FUTURES
The hedging effectiveness of LIFFE's currency futures is
examined here. Hedging is vital for the long term viability
of financial futures markets. It does not, however,
strictly enter into the discussion of efficiency in terms of
allowing an agent to make excess profits. But, assessment
of it allows one to determine whether the market is
fulfilling the role it is supposed to perform on the behalf
of agents.
The effectiveness of a hedge depends on the relationship
between the cash and the futures market, whilst arbitrage
opportunities depend on rea]ising any discrepancies in this
relationship.
Market efficiency tests focus therefore on this cash,
futures relationship. In addition they could be backward
looking, in terms of the past relationship in futures or
they could be based on the future expectations of futures
prices.
CASH MARKET	 FUTURES MARKET
Ct-i)	 (a) AUTOREGRESSIVE
TE5TS
(t -0)	 ARBITRAGE (c)
(
HEDGING Cd)
EXPECTAT IONS
(t+i)	 (
SPECULATION
(b)
where t - 0 is today.
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This diagram provides a graphical representation of the time
scale over which positions are taken. At time t - 0, today,
positions could be taken on the basis of weak form,
autoregressive tests, (a), or on the basis of expectations
over the future period to Ct + 1). Speculation would be
based on this period (b). Arbitrage would involve
recognising differentials between the cash and the futures
at time t - 0, Cc). Hedging, meanwhile, would involve
taking a position today on the basis of the future
relationship between the cash and the futures market&•
The need or desire to hedge can arise for a number of
reasons. It allows a transfer of risk with the hedger
safeguarding the value of his current market holdings from
price fluctuations. Two main issues arise after the
decision to hedge has been made. One is what is the optimal
number of futures contracts needed to safeguard the value in
the underlying cash instrument? This would be the optimal
hedge ratio. In addition, would be the question of how
effective would be the futures market be in allowing this
hedge to succeed. This would be the hedging effectiveness.
These two issues will be briefly examined here in terms of
LIFFE's currency contracts. As Cornell (1981) has stated,
the reason for establishing a futures market arises because
of future price uncertainty. This uncertainty leads to the
desire to transfer risk. It also, allows agents with
different information or different probability assessment of
the future value of the contract to enter into the market
and increase their utility ax ante. How effective are the
hedging facilities offered by the market is an important
question. Grosssman's (1975, 1977) model supported the view
that an increase in uncertainty would increase belief
trading and hedging, hence leading to an increase in volume.
This leads on to the issue, of whether hedging can enhance
volume in FFM to such a degree as to lead to a significant
effect on the stability of spot prices.	 This question of
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the effects of futures trading on spot markets has been
discussed in much of the early literature on whether
speculation in futures is stabilising or destabilising.
Thus hedging effectiveness could lead to a consequent
increase in volume, and hence increasing liquidity. This is
an area that needs further consideration. The success of
futures markets will be a function of liquidity, which in
turn is a direct consequence of the number of trades
undertaken. This number is a function of hedging activity,
which results from the hedging effectiveness of the market.
Chapter three outlined the various definitions of hedging.
There is the one to one hedge. McEnally and R'te.e (19)
show that in terms of hedging possibilities in floating debt
securities, this will only result if the maturity, risk and
coupon level are the same. Johnson (19O) propossed a
variance minimising model whilst Working(1933) and Irwin
(1931) formulated a rule of acting on the basis. Here the
risk reduction implicity in the traditional hedge is still
important but, in addition, a speculative or arbitrage role
is introduced by the agent trying to act on futures prices
movements, through the basis, in order to improve return.
Rutledge (1972) extended this to a utility maximising hedge
whereby return is maximised subject to a constraint on its
variance. These different concepts of hedging overlap.
Hedging effectiveness is also crucial from the viewpoint of
commercial users of the market. Such hedgers would not be
as concerned with the forecasting performance of the market
as they would be with the effectiveness of using futures to
manage risk. Also, it may be the case that potential
hedgers can use many futures contracts, which has been
analysed by Anderson and Oanthine (1980) in a complete
portfolio approach.
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McLeod and McCabe (1980) discuss the concept of bank spread
management and conclude that TreasuryBills futures were the
most useful hedging instruments. Bacon & Williams (191b),
meanwhile, consider how hedges can be initiated in terms of
GP14A futures contracts. As would be expected, McLeod and
McCabe explain that interest-sensitive balances could be
hedged at each maturity layer by the use of FFM.
The question of hedging is an area that needs to be
considered. As Al1.ingham(1983) states, 1f the futures
market is to be efficient in practice it should not be
possible to achieve consistent profits by taking positions
in the basis which are determined from any freely available
forecasts of stock levels,(pl). He looks at this in terms
of wheat, corn,oats and soyabeans. Small profit
opportunities are found to be possible for members with
small transaction costs, but these would soon disappear if
commision rates were payable.
Dale (1981) looks at the hedging effectiveness of currency
futures markets, as he claims that hedgers are essential to
maintain the long term viability of most futures markets.
He finds that the futures market for £,DM and yen were as
effective at hedging as the more heavily traded agricultural
commodities. Thus more rational hedgers can be expected to
use these contracts and, given the greater risk reduction
from such markets, the greater should be the potential
demand for traded goods.
The hedging performance of futures markets has been examined
by a number of authors. Ederington(1979) and Franckle(1980)
have looked at the Treasury Bill futures market whilst Dale
(1981) and Hill & Schneeweis(1981) have considered foreign
currency futures. The main approach is to choose some
prespecified hedging period, of 1 or 2 weeks, say, and then
regress the change in the cash price on the change of the
relevant futures price over this period.
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OC(t) - a + b DF(t) + u	 .. .(5.13)
where DC cash price changeover (t-i) to Ct);
OF - futures price changeover Ct-i) to (t);
and I - hedging horizon.
As hedging relies on the relationship between the cash and
the futures price, an effective hedging instrument should be
one whose movement is closely correlated with the underlying
cash market. The degree of hedging effectiveness will be
measured by the R 2 , goodness of fit, of equation (5.14) as
this shows how much of the change in the cash price can be
accounted for by the change in the futures.
DC(t) + DF(t) .N - 0	 .. .(5.14)
Allowing for expectations in a hedge formation this
becomes,
E CDC(t+1):I(t)] + E (DF(t+i):I(t)] . N 	 0	 .. .(5.15)
The results from the currency contracts are presented here,
in tables 5.11 to 5.14. For the sterling:dollar contract
(table 5.11) and the yen:dollar(table 5.12) the hedge ratios
and hedging effectiveness measures are quite high. In terms
of the sterling contract there is little difference between
the results for the contract closest to delivery and second
closest to delivery. Interestingly, the highest hedging
effectiveness is found in both cases for the longer, four
week hedges.	 Nevertheless, the figures are high for all
four hedges, 1,2,3 and 4 weeks. Similar results are found
for the yen contract, although in this case the differential
between the one and the four week hedges is more pronounced.
The optimal hedge ratios are extremely high for the second
nearest yen contracts.
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The Deutschemark contract (table 5.13) performs very badly
as a hedging instrument, particularly in terms of the
shorter hedges.	 The Swiss franc contract (table 5.14)
portrays more varied results than the other contracts.
	 It
still, however, performs adequately in terms of hedging
effectiveness.	 On relection then, three of the currencies
perform their hedging role effectively.
	 The Oeutschemark
contract appears to be the exception.
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FOOTNOTES:
*1: Cash and carry refers to delivering cash instruments
to settle futures contracts. The cost of carrying this
instrument proves profitable if the net carrying costs are
less than the futures price minus the cash price
(the basis). A positive (negative) carry exists when
long-term interest rates exceed (are below) short-term
interest rates.
*2: Lang & Rasche calculate forward rates using Roll's
formula (1970) 'The Behaviour of Interest Rates: An Application
of the Efficient Market Model to U.S. T.Bifls.' p.16
n- 91 F91 - nRn - (n-91) Rn - 91 / 91
n-91 F91 is the forward rate on a 91 day loan in (n - 91) days.
*3:They compute the annualised return from a short-term
bill, that matures at the same time as the futures,
and from a long-term bill.
Rs - Os/S . 365/Ns
RL-F-L-T/L .365/Ns
where: Rs is the annual return from bills only;
RL is annual return from bills and futures;
Os is the discount on a short-term bill;
S and L are, respectively, the prices of short
and long bills; F is futures contract price;
T is transaction costs.
*4: This means that on delivery day there is a whole
list of instruments that can be delivered in settlement of
the contract. The seller makes his choice from these
and the buyer must accept the instrument he receives.
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TABLE 5.11
STERLING: DOLLAR CONTRACT
Nearest Contract	 Second Contract
a	 b	 OW	 a	 b	 R	 DI.J
One Week	 -0.00016	 0.9640 0.941 2.760 -0.00017
	 0.96237 0.940 2.661
Hedge	 (0.00033) (0.02394)	 (0.00033) (0.02413)
Two Week	 -0.000095 0.99073 0.962 1.602 -0.00018
	 0.98674 0.957 1.412
Hedge	 (0.000371) (0.01972)
	 (0.00039) (0.02088)
Three Week -0.00024	 0.97039 0.971 1.483 -0.00032
	 0.97136 0.965 1.224
Hedge	 (0.00040) (0.01673)
	 (0.00045) (0.01865)
Four Week -0.00026
	 0.97330 0.975 1.483 -0.00044
	 0.95869 0.967 1.165
Hedge	 (0.00044) (0.01581)	 (0.000498) (0.01805)
TABLE 5.12
YEN: DOLLAR 0NTRACT
Nearest Contract	 Second Contract
a	 b	 OW	 a	 b	 R* OW
One Week -0.00007
	 0.9737 0.736 2.9233 0.00010
	 1.00387 0.7276 3.067
Hedge	 (0.00054) (0.05801)	 (0.00069) (0.07189)
Two Week	 -0.00010	 0.98014 0.859 1.7888 0.00024
	 1.00516 0.8671 1.889
Hedge	 (0.00056) (0.03968)	 (0.00068) (0.04703)
Three Week -0.000168 0.95965 0.8918 1.6840 0.00037
	 0.94187 0.887 2.036
Hedge	 (0.00059) (0.03359)	 (0.00075) (0.04104)
Four Week -0.00016	 0.96306 0.9102 1.5627 0.00049
	 0.93039 0.906 2.007
Hedge	 (0.00063) (0.03056)	 (0.00079) (0.0374)
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TABLE 5.13
DEUTSCHEMARK :OOLLAR CONTRACT
Nearest Contract	 Second Contract
a	 b	 OW	 a	 b	 Rt
One Week -0.00191
	 0.28189 0.0455 2.479 -0.00072
	 0.71041 0.2829 2.858
Hedge	 (0.2819)	 (0.1312)	 (0.00153) (0.1148)
Two Week -0.00171
	
0.6342 0.2934 1.5521 0.00005
	 0.9263 0.596 1.868
Hedge	 (0.00204) (0.1004)	 (0.00155) (0.07786)
Three Week -0.00193
	 0.7275 0.4019 1.5504 0.000153 0.95125 0.6843 2.026
Hedge	 (0.02233) (0.09107) 	 (0.01704) (0.06628)
Four Week -0.00199
	
0.76927 0.494 1.307 0.00023
	 0.95188 0.763 1.698
Hedge	 (0.00238) (0.08028) 	 (0.00164) (0.0547)
TABLE 5.14
SWISS FRANC:DOLLAR CONTRACT
Nearest Contract	 Second Contract
a	 b	 A2	 OW	 a	 b	 R	 ouj
One Week -0.00011	 0.96022 0.851 2.599 -0.00152
	 0.53320 0.5122 2.785
Hedge	 (0.00033) (0.02394)	 (0.00033) (0.02413)
Two Week -0.00015	 0.97800 0.9088 1.1414 0.00235
	 1.11049 0.885 1.223
Hedge	 (0.00071) (0.03113) 	 (0.00186) (0.09711)
Three Week
Hedge
Four Week -0.00007	 0.9867 0.919 0.8601 -0.00205
	 0.79626 0.7414 1.687
Hedge	 (0.00078) (0.02953)	 (0.00164) (0.05973)
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CHAPTER SIX
RANDOM WALKS AND MARTINGALES; USING
ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS TO EXAMINE
EFFICIENCY FROM PAST PRICES.
6.1 INTRODUCION
Crucial to the EMI is the fact that prices fully reflect
available information. Consequently knowledge of past
prices should not allow an agent to earn excess returns. In
an efficient market it is thus claimed that prices should
conform to a random walk (RW) or follow a martingale
process. Sometimes the terms appear to be interchanged
without the distinction between them being examined. 	 The
first part of this chapter clarifies the difference.
Section 6.2 analyses the concept of a martingale whilst
section 6.3 considers the random walk model. It is shown
that financial futures markets should satisfy the notion of
a martingale. The use of martingales in different fields of
Economics is covered in section 6.4 whilst the implications
for futures markets are mentioned in section 6.5.
The focus of the chapter then centres on trying to identify
any profitable trading rules from past prices. Dependencies
in past prices are found for the contracts under
consideration in section 6.6. The results of forecasts
based on these significant lags are then discussed in
section 6.7 and their profitability is examined in section
6.8. The implications of these results for the efficiency
of financial futures markets are covered in 6.9 whilst
section 6.10 concludes the chapter.
The martingale concept is shown to be relevant for FFM. It
states that past prices should be of NO use in forecasting.
This is hypothesis (b) in chapter four. The market would
thus be weak form efficient. It should therefore not be
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possible to use dependencies in past price movements in
order to make excess profits on these markets.
Part two of this chapter empirically assesses the validity
of this. Results are presented from the analysis of price
movements of contracts traded on the LIFFE. The four
currency contracts (:$, SwF:$, Yen:$, and OM:$) as well as
the 20 year gilt interest rate contract and the three month
Sterling interest rate contract(ST3) are analysed.
Weak form efficiency will be examined on these contracts by
seeing whether dependencies in past price movements can be
identified and, if so, whether they could then be exploited.
The profitibility of any such rules,, if carried out, is then
discussed.
6.2 MARTINGALES
The concepts of martingales and random walks are of
particular interest given the emphasis attached by market
participants to the statistical behaviour of price series
themselves.
A martingale implies that the expected returns from buying
a contract or the expected price changes are zero. To view
this consider the following equation,
E(P(t+1):I(t)] P(t) . . .(6.1)
where p(t) is the price at time t and 1(t) is the
information set at time t. If one was to think of p(t), not
as the price at time t, but rather as the fortune of a
gambler, then the equality in (6.1) would refer to the
concept of a fair game. If, however, the equality sign
was replaced by a greater than or equal to, or a less
than or equal to' sign, then the sequence of random
variables would become a submartingale, or a supermartingale
respectively, with the gambler then participating in a
favourable or an unfavourable game.
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A martingale is a weaker concept than a random walk. Based
on mathematical probability theory it extends the fair game
mode], and has been applied extensively in the area of asset
markets as well as in other fields of Economics. (See, for
instance, Lucas (1978), Ohlson (1977) and Mandeibrot (1971).
The understanding of martingales is important in an
application of the EP4-f. . . . It was recognized that the
martinga].e property of Brownian motion was the crucial
ingredient of the efficient market hypothesis.
Lippmann and McCall(1977)p260.
In a fair game an agent does not expect to make excess
profits and, also, does not anticipate making excess losses.
The martingale posits that in such a model of a fair game
the expected profit on any subsequent day is just the
agent's current profit, and is independent of the series of
all previous profits. A number of important assumptions,
which are perfectly reasonable, underlie the martingale's
property.
As the maturity of the contract is approached there will be
learning on the behalf of agents as their information set is
increased. Tbus the information sets will, be increasing
with time, such that
I(t+1)	 )	 1(t)	 ,	 I(t-1) ) ......>	 I(t-i).
In examining efficiency it is possible to focus on different
information sets that are presently available. These
provide the weak form (We), semi-strong form (5SF) and
strong form (SF) tests of a market's efficiency.
Thus the information set is expanding and, at any moment in
time, the futures price is measured with respect to a subset
of the current information. Samuelson (1965) showed that
futures prices should follow a martingale. Crucial to this
would be the assumption that futures prices are integrable.
That is, the expectation of a future price is finite.
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These three assumptions, increasing information set, the
futures price is measured with respect to this information
set and integrabi].ity of futures prices, help derive the
martingale property, (6.1) above.
E(P(t+l):I(t)]	 P(t)	 .. .(6.1)
Let F(T,t) be the futures price at time t for future date
(t^T). At time t this price will be the best expectation
that one has of the price of the contract on maturity date,
(the spot price). Thus,
F[T,t] - E(P(t+T:I(t)] .. . (6.2)
with both the conditional expectation of P(t+T) and the
current futures price being functions of the current
information set:
F(T,t]	 f(I(t)]
and p(t+T) - f(I(t)] .. . (6.3)
The rational expectation of the price at (t+T), given the
current information set, is P(t+T).
EEP(t+T):I(t)) - P(t) + e(t+T)
where e(t+T) represents new information that has become
available over the time interval 1, and which was not
incorporated into the information set 1(t). If there was no
such new information, which seems unlikely, and in addition
one's forecast was rationally based on 1(t), then
p(t) + e(t+T) would equal p(t+T), perfect foresight.
Whilst random disturbances will occur over the forthcoming
interval I they are not known at present. Following from
(6.2) one can see that (6.4) is equivalent to (6.5),
F(T,t) - P(t) + e(t+T) .. . (6.5)
As P(t) is assumed to be bounded, not having infinite
variance, then P(t)dP is less than infinity, which implies
that the futures price is integrable. This is a crucial
distinction for a martingale.
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Consequently,
E(F(T-1 ,t+1):I(t)] - E(E(P(t+T):I(t+1)):I(t)]
- EtP(t+T):X(t)]
- F(Tt)	 ... (6.6)
The analysis above can be extended such that,, from (6.6),
for the sequence of future prices,
F (T,t], F(T-1, t+1] .......F(1,t^T-1)
+---------------------------------------)
t	 t+T
it is the case that,
E(F(T-i,t+i):I(t)] - F(T,t] 	 . . .(6.7)
for i -1 from t to t+T.
Mandelbrot(1966) sumniarises the above in terms of a two
stage definition for a martingale. The first is that it is
possible to define E (P(t^T):I(t)] without specifying the
information set of past prices and then, second, is the
martingale property.
The above implies that past prices should be of no use in
forecasting. The market would thus satisfy hypothesis (b)
in chapter four.
6.3 RAICOM WALK
The martinga].e was identif led above as consisting of a
number	 of	 important factors:	 monotonic increasing
information sets, prices are a	 function of current
information and integrability of prices. These all
contribute to the martinga].e property, which was shown to
exist on futures markets.
The random walk model is a stronger condition than the
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martingale. It consists of two parts.	 First, as in the
martingale, the current price will, fully reflect available
information,	 and so successive price changes are
independant.	 Second, these successive price changes are
also identically distributed.
If these successive price changes are expected to be zero
then a random walk results; if positive, a random walk with
drift is the outcome. As with the martingale, past prices
should not help to predict future prices but, in terms of a
random walk, they can help in the assessment of the
distribution of future prices.
In terms of the fair game model excess returns are not
available, whereas the random walk means that the
distribution of the equilibrium returns repeats itself
through time. As Fama (1970), states, .......the basic
model of market equilibrium is the 'fair game' expected
return model, with a random walk arising when additional
environmental conditions are such that distribution of
one-period returns repeat themselves through time. p.396.
The random walk is a stronger concept than a martingale.
Prices would follow an AR(1) process with
P(t) - P(t-1) + e(t)	 ...(6.B)
where e(t) U(t-1). This U(t-1) is in theory,
independently identically distributed over time and is
completely predictable, with the price change not being a
function of past prices.	 In practise, however, U(t-1) is
not observable.
In terms of the random walk this e(t) is idependently,
identically distributed through time whilst, in terms of the
martingale, its expectation Just exists. This then is the
main difference between a random walk and a martingale.
Table 6.1 sunwnarises the difference.
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Mandeibrot (1966) shows that the random walk is not needed
for an efficient market as the martingale will be
sufficient. This is also supported by Roll (1970) in his
analysis of the Treasury Bills market,
'Instead of a random walk, however, the
efficient market model implies that security prices follow
subrnartingale sequences and that the present value of market
prices, discounted by appropriate expected returns, follow
pure martingale sequences.' p.122.
The concept of a martingale has important implications for
the pricing of contracts and assets in financial markets.
Whereas for a random walk prices are independently
identically distributed over time, with a martinga].e the
probability function is independent of time.
Thus,
E(F(T,t) - F(T,t-1J] . 0
which implies that, in terms of interest rate contracts,
liquidity premiums should be absent. As the price change
between periods is uncorrelated then, in terms of its
spectral density function, the price change series should be
flat. For a random walk it would be centred on zero. One
thus examines the random walk hypothesis by examining the
time series of prices, or price changes, for statistical
dependency.
In examining the random walk and martingale property one
attempts to see if the current price reflects all the
information contained in the past price series. Fama (1970)
incorrectly claims that it is not possible to empirically
test whether prices fully reflect available information.
Given the vast empirical literature that exists this seems
to be a strange statement.
The random walk implies that trends in past prices should be
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absent. (If dividends are paid, this is not necessarily so,
see below). Alexander (1961) implies that speculators act
on such trends.. Rather than having price jumps in response
to new information, trends would be generated due to the
fact that agents were only aware of certain subsets of the
information set. This would mean that not all the available
information was being immediately profitably exploited, and
hence the market was inefficient.
Such trends could either be reflected in past prices alone,
or such prices might be responding to trends in fundamental
variables. In either case, positive serial correlation of
price changes would result. Taylor (1983) criticises tests
of the random walk that examine dependencies, for not being
conducted against an alternative hypothesis. He thus
examines such a trend, based on statistics which have
arbitrary parameter values to 'ensure high test power.'
Taylor (1983) P.176. Bird (1984) uses this approach on the
London Metal Exchange. However, the arbitrary nature of the
test statistics raises doubt as to their usefulness.
Early work on this area started with Bachelier(1900) and was
then examined by Kendall (1953), Osborne (1959) and Roberts
(1959). Kendall, whose analysis was based on serial
correlation coefficients, found a random price series. The
question of Brownian motion was important in the analysis of
Roberts. Bachelier's analysis had considered three
different models of varying complexity. The current price
being an unbiased predictor of the future price; the random
walk, P(t+T) - P(t), for all t and T is independent of all
P(t-i) for all i ; and Brownian motion, P(t+T) - P(t) is a
Gausian random variable whose expectation is zero and whose
variance is proportional to time.
As infinite variance distribution satisfy a martingale, the
random walk and Brownian motion are not necessary conditions
in an efficient market. As mentioned above, Mandeibrot
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(1966) and Fama (1970) emphasise the martingale component of
Brownian motion as being the crucial distinction of an
efficient market.
Underlying Brownian motion are three axioms. The first is
the independence axiom, namely P(t+Dt) - P(t) is independent
of all information till t. This is the important axiom for
efficiency. Second is stationarity, in which the
distribution of P(t+Ot) - P(t) is independent of t. Hence
any price change over this interval depends only on the
interval's length and not on its location with respect to
time. Third is continuity, whereby
lim Prob P(t + Dt) - P(t)	 e	 0
op-o L	 Op	 J	 ...(6.10)
Consider how a random walk could occur and why it is
consistent with the EMH. Samuelson claimed it is the new
information itself which causes the random effect on prices.
Given the wide amount of information that exists this would
seem possible. However, it may well be possible to predict
the qualitative consequence of any new information as well
as the fact that the contract price will often exhibit an
upward or downward trend.
The microeconomic literature with respect to information is
also important. Some agents are not as informed as others
in the market and hence only learn about the new information
after a lag. Such information specialisation falls within
the concept of rational expectaions. This island idea of
information would mean that, using dissagregated data, one
would be able to test the EMH, and gain important insights,
and perhaps diferent results by using such data. Under
strong form tests the market would be inefficient if these
well informed agents could profit from their superior
knowledge.
Even if these well informed and not so well informed agents
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existed it ii still possible for the market price to satisfy
the random walk hypothesis. The price change would satisfy
this condition if the well informed agents could anticipate
how the information lags of the other agents affected the
price. This seems to be implausible.
Osborne(1959) and Fama(1965) found evidence against the
random walk in that large daily price changes tended to be
followed by daily price changes. This, however, could also
be due to volatilty of prices which, if the price changes
were not predictable would not imply inefficiency. Runs
tests have been employed to examine such succesive price
changes. Neiderhoffer and Osborne(1976) and Fama(1970)
discuss these. Essentially, such price changes appear to be
random, which supports the notion of efficiency.
With the random walk it might be expected that the
distribution of price changes is normal. But Mandelbrot
(1966), (1970), has pointed out that any departure from the
normal distribution could be explained by a general form of
Bachelier' s analysis.
From above, with no serial correlation existing in terms of
these stochastic processes, this means that the analysis of
linear patterns in past forecasting errors would not improve
forecasting performance. However the question remains as to
whether nonlinear patterns exist.
P(t) - P(t-1) + e(t)
e(t) - U(t-.1)
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TABLE 6.1
RAt4OM WALK
	
MART INGAL.E
(1) Monotonic Increasing Information Sets
(2) P(t) - f(I(t))
(3) P(t) is integrable
I
V
(4) MARTINGALE
PROPERTY: E (P(t+1):I(t) - Nt)
(1) Probability distribution
of OP is INDEPENOENT of
P(t) & P(t-i) Vi
(2) Successive OP are
identically distributed
(1) Actual distribution do NOT depend
on past and present prices.
Trading rules based on past prices
do NOT earn economic rent.
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6.4 USE OF MART INGALES IN ECONOMICS.
Before examination of LIFFE's contracts in part two of this
chapter, consider the use of martingales in other fields of
Economics. [f the rates of returns on stocks follow a
martingale process then it should be the case that the
expected rate of return, conditional on realised past rates
of return, is equivalent to its unconditional expectation.
Sarnuelson(1965) supported this, provided that there existed
a given rate of return. Relaxing this notion of a given
rate of return La Roy(1973) found that, under risk aversion,
there existed no rigorous theoretical j ustification for the
martingale property and hence it would only be approximately
satisfiesd. However, he does claim that, The simple
assumption of the martingale property is acceptable on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. p.445.
Mandlebrot(1970) finds conflict in the application of a
martingale. If prices followed a martingale then, using
Doob's Martingale Convergence Theorm, prices would converge
to some limit, thus ceasing to fluctuate. Hence,
speculation on these future price movements would cease. In
fixed horizon contracts this would not be a problem whereas
in other assets this could appear to be too stringent a
criterion. Two issues are raised from this. First, futures
markets are indeed fixed horizon contracts, in which
Samuelson showed that the martingale process would
hold. Second, the condition that prices should converge
appears to exceed what is implied by a martinga].e, and hence
by efficiency.
Whilst La Roy appeared to show that the martingale was only
derived as a special case, Ohlson(1977) proved otherwise.
Making three new assumptions in the context of Le Roy's
model, including constant relative risk aversion as opposed
to constant absolute risk aversion and percentage changes in
dividends are random, he showed that the martingale property
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is easily derived. Le Roy's assumptions are thus too
restrictive.
Lucas(1978) used a theoretical framework similar to Le Roy
in order to utilis. the concept of a martingale in an
examination of the stochastic process of equilibrium prices.
The model derived is used as a context within which an
analysis of a price series' 	 failure to satisfy the
martingale property is viewed as irrational behaviour. The
role of the martingale in this paper is in understanding to
what extent it is actually satisfied by a price series.
Lucas finds that asset prices themselves do NOT possess the
martingal.. property but, given little aggregate risk, if
they are corrected for dividends and for any discount
factors involved then they do. A diminishing marginal rate
of substitution of future for current consumption is found
to be inconsistent with this martingale property.
Le Roy, Ohison, and Lucas thus all find that risk is an
important question to be considered in the context of a
martingale, which is essential for an efficient market.
Risk on futures markets will be analysed below but, in doing
so, Lippen & McCall's comment, should be borne in mind,
Much economic behaviour is a direct consequence
of uncertainty and is independent of risk aversion.
P.212.
In Chapter three, expectations more than risk, were deemed
to be important in FFN.
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6.5 APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL FUTURES MARKETS
As explained in chapter two the fiancial futures market is
institutionally different from other markets. Above it was
shown that prices in a futures market would follow a
martingale process. This, however, would not necessarily be
true in a bond market, as explained below. Because of the
operational aspects of futures markets the treatment of
efficiency may differ with respect to other markets, as too
might the relationship between prices and returns.
Suppose that the prices in the futures market follow a
random walk, (6.8) above. To calculate the return available
over a day in this market one must not only take into
account the price change but one must also consider the
initial margin requirement and the effect of any price
change on the value of this.
	 Thus the daily marking to
market and the tick value must be taken into account.
The return on the first day will be the value of the price
change as a percentage of the initial margin. On subsequent
days it will be in proportion to the combination of initial
and variatin margins. That is,
R(t) - (P(t)-P(t-1)] y / (x+VM) 	 ... (6.11)
where, R(t) - Return over day (t-1) to
day Ct); P(t) - Price at close of day (t); y - Tick Value, a
fixed number; x - Initial Margin, also a fixed amount; VM -
Variation Margin.
VM is a function of past price changes, and as such
VM - (CP(t-i) - P(t-i-1)]y)
	 . ..(6.12)
Thus,
R(t) -
	 (P(t) - P(t-1)] y -
	
x + [P(t-i) - P(t-i-1)]y	 . ..(6.13)
Now,
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P(t) - P(t .-1) - aCt)	 .. .(6.14)
and similarly,
P(t-i) - P(t-i-1) - e(t-1)	 . . .(6.15)
therefore,
R(t) --	 e(t) y
x + e(t-i) y	 .. (6.16)
EER(t):I(t-i-1)) •	 E(e(t):I(t.-i-1)) y
Cx + E( aCt-i) : I(t-i-i)3 y) ...(6.17)
implying,
E(R(t):I(t-i-1)] - 0
	
... (6.18)
as,
E(e(t):I(t-i-1)) - E(e(t-i):I(t-i-1)] - 0
	
...(6.19)
Thus if prices in a futures market follow a random walk
returns will be white noise, with their expectation being
zero. If there were no margin requirements then x,y would
drop out of the above equation, implying
R(t) - P(t) - P(t-1) - e(t)	 .. .(B.20)
The expectation of next period's return being zero is what
is implied by the fair game model. Whilst returns are
implied by prices, the relationship between them is
different in futures markets and in other markets, such as
bond markets. In a bond market coupons are sometimes paid,
depending on the nature of the bond, such that the current
price will be the present discounted value of the coupon and
par value. Rather than buying and holding a bond one could
perhaps think,in these terms, of a futures contract as being
approximately equal to buying a daily (1 period) Treasury
Bill and rolling them over.
Whilst a pure discount bond would not have a coupon element
to the price it would be unlike a futures contract in that
the capital gain on it would be known. That is it would be
bought below par at the period's end, such that the expected
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capital gain, as represented by the interest rate, would be
known. Thus the price would follow a trend path upwards.
So, whilst the trend in prices could be predicted here the
market would not be inefficient.
All, information, in an efficient market, is incorporated
into the current price. This price will be the best
expectation of the Exchange Delivery Settlement Price (EDSP)
in the futures market, or the present discounted value of
future earnings in the bond market. This attaches a value
to the contract and, if the current price does not equal
this value, profit opportunities will become available.
t - 0 p a value
t - I news implies that p does not equal value
t 2 p - value
In terms of the EMH, unbiased prices should exist in the
market (hypothesis (c) in chapter four).
this implies that p a value for all t.
However, news causes changes and
	
therefore p(t) a p(t-1) + NEWS	 (6.21)
But, as news is random,
	
p(t) - p(t-1) + e(t)	 (6.22)
therefore,
E (POV : I(t-1)] - P(t-.1) (6.23)
where PDV is the present discounted value. If this PDV
reflects interest and dividend payments, as in a bond, then
E (PDV : I(t-i)) P(t-1) S(t) (6.24)
where S(t), the discount rate, is greater than or equal to
zero. Therefore,
E (P(t):I(t-1)] ) p(t-1). 	 (6.25)
As I(t-1) incorporates all past prices this implies that
bond prices will follow a submartingale process. This
is applicable to discounted bonds where it is known that
there will be a positive discount rate paid each period.
Continuous compounding causes this'rate to accumulate over
time. This is similar to the idea of normal backwardation
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by Keynes, with the price tending to its limit as maturity
approaches. This normal backwardation was recognised as
being a reward to speculators for risk bearing. Being
analgous to a submartingale it is interesting to note that,
as mentioned above, a futures price would not follow this
process but would satisfy a martingale. As a submartingale
is greater than or equal to a martingale this then raises
the question as to what is the risk in a financial futures
market.
Due to the operations of the Clearing House and the payment
of a margin there is no default risk in the market. The
other side of the contract will always be honoured. Also,
due to the nature of the contracts there will not be any
risk as to the the quality of the deliverable instrument,
nor	 is there any risk of the contract's underlying
instrument not actually being delivered(*1).
	 Thus, any
risks would be associated with the price movements relative
to expected prices.
	 These expected prices depend on the
information sets and the models used by the agents.
	 In
addition, the resources available to them determine what
positions these agents can take within the market.
Consequently risk considerations can very from agent to
agent within the same market.
In bond markets it may be found that there is an increasing
premium the further is the date from maturity. However, as
mentioned above, the martingale's probability function is
independent of time and such premiums will be absent.
Whilst in these asset markets the buyer pays all, or a
portion of, the amount due at the start of the deal, the
seller has to put up no such amount. In financial futures
contracts, however, this is not the case. Whilst the price
agreed at the initiation of the deal is the one that will be
paid on the delivery date there are, due to daily marking to
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market, many price movements over the period in which the
contract is held open that will affect margin requirements.
Both sides to a deal, buyer and seller, are thus required to
deposit initial margin with the clearing house. Hence,
unlike in other markets, the seller is required to pay the
same amount as the buyer at the start of the deal.
Thus, another issue is the relative risk faced by the buyer
and seller and whether they are, in any way, offsetting.
That is whether, for example, a risk loving, speculative
buyer, removes some, if not all, of the risk being hedged by
a seller. Given the anonymity of these markets such
comparisons could be misleading. As in the foreign exchange
market, greater analysis of this risk is an area for future
research.
6.6 DEPENOENCIES IN PAST PRICES
Following the methodology outlined here and in earlier
chapters, dependencies in past prices should be absent on
the financial futures market and, if they do exist, then one
should NOT be able to exploit them profitably. It is
examined here whether such exploitable dependencies actually
do exist. The examination of dependencies in past prices is
coninon in the financial literature. However, in much
previous work the price series has been examined cx post in
order to see if such dependencies exist. This does not get
at the concept of efficiency. It is not a question of
whether one can identify such dependencies cx post, but of
whether one can predict them ex ante, and hence act upon
them.
Here it is investigated whether it is possible to construct
autoregressive schemes which enable systematic profits to be
made. This is a more powerful procedure than noting that
statistically significant variables exist from the
regression of the current price on any number of previous
lagged values.
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Six instruments traded on LIFFE are examined here. These
are the three month Sterling interest rate contract (ST3),
the four currency contracts and the long-term gilt contract.
Up to eight contracts are examined for each of these
instruments from March 1983 (M63) up to, and including,
December 1984 (D84). The eight ST3 contracts and the
various currency contracts are examined over their last six
months to maturity. Liquidity has not been sufficiently
high in the market to ensure that prices are always set,
each day, for contracts further than six months from
maturity.	 However, because of high liquidity, the gilt
contract is examined over the last nine months to delivery.
The sample period available for each contract is divided
into two. Partitioning the price series into two subsets
allows an autoregressive expectations rule to be chosen from
the information available in the first subset. This rule is
then used to test the EMH over the subsequently available
data in the second subset.
It is an arbitrary question as to when to partition the
data.	 Here, the initial subset over which Box-Jenkins
analysis was carried out, consisted of the first 62
observations for the 513 and the currency contracts, and the
first 75 observations for the Gilt contract.
A sufficiently lengthy period of observation has thus been
chosen f or each contract in order to see if dependencies in
past prices exist. Over this first subset, the current
price was regressed on past prices, lagged up to 20 days.
Changes in prices could be used instead of the level of
prices, but this does not fundamentally alter the analysis.
Such a procedure would give a relationship,
P(t)	 a + b P(t-1) + c P(t-2) +.. .+e(t)	 .. .(6.26)
or
• (6.27)
to most
in past
forecast
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CP(t) - x + y DP(t-1) + 2 DP(t-2) +. . .+u(t)
where OP(t)-P(t)-P(t-1).
This search through the past data attempts
effectively capture the information contained
prices, and so provides an optimal time series
based on an ARIMA (1,0,0) or ARIMA (1,1,0) model.
These forecasts can then be used over the remaining data,
allowing one to adopt a strategy based on it over the time
to maturity. At each subsequent period, the information set
is updated such that the forecasts are made using updated
past prices and hence the currently available information
set. These one step ahead forecasts allow optimal
predictions to be made.
If it was found that expectations were based on this
autoregressive scheme, then the forecast would be
represented by
E[P(t):I(t-1)] - a' + b' P(t-1) + c' P(t-2) +	 (6.28)
or
E(DP(t):I(t-1)] - x' + y' DP(t-1) + z' DP(t-2) +	 (6.29)
For efficient expectations, it is required that (a,b,c) from
(6.26) equals (a',b',c') from (6.28). Also, (x,y,z) from
(6.27) should equal (x',y',z') from (6.29). Pesando (1975)
considered this in terms of inflation forecasts.
Expectations of prices should, if fully efficient, contain
all the information contained in past prices, hence implying
equality of coefficients from the above regressions.
This would imply that,
P(t)-E[P(t):I(t-1)] - (a-a')+(b-b')P(t-1)+(c-c')P(t-2)+
.....+(z-z')P(t-i)+e(t)-e'(t)
- e(t)-e'(t)	 . . .(6.30)
As one would expect, any deviation between actual and
expected prices would be white noise. With efficient
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expectations the deviation between the actual and the
expected value would be accounted for by news (see chapter
eight). Whilst this might appear to imply that the same
lagged values were signigicant throughout the sample period
it is important to note that, following on from the concept
of a martingai.e, this does not contravene efficiency as long
as these forecasts do NOT earn economic rent.
If it was found that equation (6.28) was a valid
representation of people's expectations then a further issue
could be raised. In an efficient market it could be expected
that all information would be immediately incorporated into
last period's lag, thus making any longer lags redundant.
[n (6.26) it would then be the case that (b',c') - (0,0).
Hence, a broader information set would be incorporated into
the analysis for the true series of past prices,
E(P(t):P(t-1),P(t-2),P(t-3) ......] - P(t) + e(t) 	 .. . (6.31)
EtP(t):P(t-1),I(t-1)] - P(t) + e(t) 	 .. .(6.32)
However, much of this information will become redundant in
an efficient market once expectations are made. That is,
whilst I(t-1) may Include information that is relevant for
price expectations this should all, be included in P(t-1).
This would result in (a,b,c) - (0,1,0) in the regression,
P(t) • a + b P(t-1) + c X(t-1), where X(t-i) refers to any
other variables.
The above imply a number of issues which can, in terms of
efficiency, be stated as the following. One, is it possible
to identify an autoregressive price scheme that could be
used for expectations? Second, would this scheme prove
profitable?
Determining the optimal extrapolative predictor using
Box-Jenkins analysis will generally be a more efficient
predictor than the immediate lagged price, even though it
may not yield a fully rational forecast.
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The first 62 observations for each contract constitute the
data from which a regression equation will be selected.
Then, using this equation, sequential one step ahead
forecasts will be carried out on the remaining price series
till the contract reaches maturity.
An autoregressive process is estimated for the futures
price, p(t), over the initial sample (1-62) and is then used
to predict the futures price in period 63. The estimation
period is then extended to 1-63 and a prediction for period
64 is calculated. This process was continued until the
contract was delivered, using a forecast based on the
updated information set for each period. This also
overcomes another problem with previous work. Looking ex
post at a series assumes a far greater information set than
was actually available at the time that prices were set in
the market	 For example,	 if the time sequence was
0.................t-1,t.......................T then, at T,
one looks back at the price series on the basis of all.
information from 0 through to 1. However, at time t, say,
one would have only had information available from 0 to t.
Thus, cx post, one is assuming that there was available
excess information from (t+1) to 1. Too big an information
set is being assumed and hence these ex post tests are
biased.
One step ahead forecasts allow this criticism to be taken
into account.	 The information set increases as one
progresses through the sample. The processes being
conducted in this analysis are as follows. First, on the
first 62 observations, for each of the 8 ST3 contracts under
consideration the current price was regressed on its
previous 20 lagged values.	 This screening of the data
allowed one to select the lagged values that were
significantly different from zero. The lagged
autocorrelations (up to lag 8) for all 8 contracts are
presented in table 6.2. From this initial screening a
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chosen equation is selected which is then used to make
one step ahead forecasts. From table 6.2 it can be seen
that a number of significant lagged prices exist for each
contract.
The one step ahead forecasts that are generated from these
equations should incorporate innovations regarding the price
series and hence provide a rational test of the market's
efficiency.	 This is a much more powerful test of the
market's efficiency than	 simply examining whether
significant values of the autocorrelation function exist
over the entire sample period. The latter method does not
provide the agent with any information as to whether it
would be possible to make systematic profits, using
autoregressive schemes, constructed in advance of the
position being taken in the contract.
One way to incorporate and account for this criticism is by
recursive estimation techniques. This technique bases the
test on the information set that was available at each time
period that agents made their decisions. The information
set that is used is thus the one that was available to
agents in the economy. As one progressed through the
sample, each one step ahead forecast would provide the
expectation for the particular variable under consideration
in that period. From t to t+1 the estimate would be for
that particular period. The recursive innovations in each
period will be the deviations between the actual and
expected values.
	
These would account for the news term.
(See chapter	 on news). The recursive innovations will
allow an analysis of news effects. Hence this technique
allows an efficient analysis of news effects; efficient
results being obtained because one takes account of such
effects at each successive stage of the sample.
Such recursive techniques do not effect the timing of
decision variables but only affect the treatment of the
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coefficient estimates. However, as one progresses through
the sample, more observations become available thus allowing
one to update the estimators. By taking account of new
observations in this way this technique is equivalent to
rational expectations information processing. 	 At each
successive stage of the estimation one can obtain
information from the forecast errors. These allow one to
update the predictions. The recursive predictions thus give
the rational expectations on the basis of the available
information set (*2).
Autoregressive processes will only be fully rational in
Muth's terms under restrictive circumstances, (see Wa].lis
(1981)), namely only when one stochastic disturbance
determines the endogenous variables.
Dale (1981) applies the idea of Brownian motion to price and
volume in the Treasury Bill futures market. With respect to
price he refutes the idea that Chartists could profit by
showing that Treasury Bill futures do not exhibit the
presence of resistance and support levels.
A number of significant lagged values were found throughout
the contracts considered. As can be seen in tables 6.2 to
6.7 significant values can be found up to lag 5 for a number
of the contracts. The coefficients of the lagged values do,
as one would expect, fall with the increasing lagged value
under consideration. 1-statistics are used to determine
which lags are significantly different from zero. These
lags are used in the formation of one step ahead forecasts.
The results from examining the predictive power of these
chosen regression equations are presented in tables 6.8 to
6.12. The results are sunmiarised in terms of correlation
coefficients, root mean squared errors (AMSE), mean absolute
errors(MAE), and mean squared errors(MSE).
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The results appear to exhibit the same pattern for all the
contracts. The forecasts both over and underpredict the
actual prices. This is as one would expect in a market
where the actual prices react continuously to new
information. In fact, on certain occasions, the one period
ahead forecasts were exactly correct. These forecasts do
appear to be reasonably accurate predictors. The question
does remain as to whether one could use these forecasts to
actually make profits, hence implying that the market is
inefficient.
Having carried out these one step ahead forecasts based on
the autoregressive price schemes it is then necessary to try
to identify whether such forecasts could have been
exploited. That is, did they provide any significant
information?
If the forecasted price change is significantly correlated
with the actual price change then the market is inefficient.
That is, one looks at the correlation between:
( E - A(-1) ] ( A - A(-1) I	 ...(6.33)
where: E is the expected price in period t and A is the
actual price in period t.
Using the significance test for correlation coefficients, if
the correlation test coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 5% level of significance then this
indicates that the particular price rule for that contract
was significant. Hence it could be used to predict the
future movement of prices in that contract on a daily basis.
The significance test for correlation coefficients is based
on the following:
t - rif-2
(C1-rY
where r is the observed correlation coefficient, and n is
the number of observations.
	 If the absolute value of
t exceeds tc, the critical value from the t-distribution
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with (n-2) degrees of freedom,	 then the correlation
coefficient is significantly different from zero.
From the results it can be seen that 4 such coefficients are
significantly different from zero for the four currency
contracts. These four are the 883 deliverable instrument
for the Sterling/Dollar contract, the M84 and the D84
instruments for the Yen/Dollar contract and the 883
instrument for the Swiss Franc/Dollar contract. The actual
correlation coefficients tended to be low overall, so it is
perhaps not surprising at the .low overall number of
significant contract forecasts. What is also interesting is
that there are a number 0f contracts where the correlation
between the actual and expected price changes are negative.
Using past prices, the forecasts, whilst optimal, are
adaptive rather than rational expectations. Hence with
variable prices, as reflected in futures market prices,
expected prices could easily move in the wrong direction
from the actual price changes whilst, at the same time,
still being correlated. This negative correlation also
appears to be significant for the Sterling/Dollar M83
contract and 084 contract, and the Swiss Franc/Dollar 883
contract. Whilst this may appear a strange result it can be
rationalised in terms of the random element in price
movements, when the optimal forecast is based on an
autoregressive price scheme. 	 This can also affect the
profitability of the forecasting rules as shown below.
6.7 RESULTS OF FORECASTS BASED ON SIGNIFICANT LAGS
Having carried out one step ahead forecasts based on the
autoregressive price scheme it is then necessary to try to
identify whether such forecasts could have been exploited.
That is, did they provide any significant information? This
is calculated by looking at the correlation between DE and
DA, where DE(t) refers to the differential between the
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expected price in period t and the actual price in (t-t),
whilst DA(t) is the actual price change over the same
period. Thus one is identifying any correlation between
expected and actual price changes.
6.8 EXAMINING PROFITABILITY
Following the discovery of price forecasts which are
significantly correlated with actual price changes a
stronger test of efficiency would be to see how profitable
these rules would be. That is, how would the return that is
available on these forecasts relate to other returns that
might be available in the market? The profitability of
these rules if they were implemented on these four contracts
is examined here.
The profitability of all contracts where the forecasts
proved to be significantly correlated above, are examined
over the data set on which the forecasts were examined. On
futures markets an initial margin requirement must be paid,
by bothbuyer and seller, when a position is taken in a
contract. This is a $1000 for any currency contract. There
exists, for each contract, a minimum price movement called a
tick, which has a specific cash value. (See chapter two for
a discussion of the institutional and operational aspects of
LIFFE).
At the end of each day the price movements are assessed with
those people who have lost money on the day having to
maintain their initial margin. This necessary change that
is needed to maintain the initial margin is called the
variation margin. It essentially means that money is paid
from those who have lost money on that day to those who have
made money.
This marking to market has been incorporated into the
analysis here, with those contracts whose forecasts have
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proved significant being analysed. To calculate the
profits, or losses the following procedural rules were
assumed:
(1) The agents act on the autoregressive scheme, outlined in
tables 6.2 to 6.7 above. An Initial margin of $1000 is
posted with the clearing house.
(ii) The position is reassessed daily, on the basis of the
close of day prices.
(iii) If the expected price change for the subsequent day is
positive, the agent buys the contract, if negative, he
sells.
(iv) If this expected price change and the actual price
change are in the SAME DIRECTION, then variation margin will
accrue to the agent If they are in opposite directions
variation margin will have to be paid by the agent.
(v) The initial margin is recorded as -1000 in table 6.13
below. If the agent's position has proved correct, in which
case he has gained, then the variation margin received will
reduce the total money committed. That is, whilst the
initial margin will be maintained at its level of $1000 the
amount of that actually committed by the agent, in excess of
variation margin received, has been reduced. Thus the daily
position of the agent is written as; Variation margin -
Initial margin. A figure of greater than -$1000 would
indicate a forecast that has generated a positive variation
margin.
One point to make is that whilst correlation coefficients
look at the correlation between the expected and actual
price change, here the expected price change is used only
for the basis of judging what positions to take. Meanwhile,
profits and losses are calculated on the basis of price
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changes only, that is (P(t) - Nt-i)). Consequently, it
will not necessarily be true that if the correlation
coefficient is significant it will provide a profit.
6.9 IMPLICATIONS
Table 6.13 considers the profits, or losses, that might have
arisen if one had acted on the one step ahead forecasts from
these four contracts. As can be seen 3 out of the 4
contracts would have earned a positive return whilst one,
the SwF:$ 583 contract would have returned a substantial
loss. As the initial margin is represented as -$1000 in
table 6.13 any net positive figure represents a positive
return.
The Yen:$ M64 contract provides a phenomenal return of
747.25% over a 66 day period. This was the maximum return
that would have been achieved over this period within this
contract on the basis of the one-step ahead forecasts here.
Meanwhile, the Yen:$ D84 contract also provided an
impressive 228.75% return if held to maturity. However, the
maximum return would have occured after 53 days of this
contract rule and not at maturity.
In the Yen:$ M84 contract there is evidence of extreme
volatility in this market on the basis of actual price
changes. Break-even is not achieved in this contract until
after 23 days. Thus, there was an opportunity cost in this
contract of having funds tied up to meet margin requirements
over this period.
The forecasting ability of the optimal extrapolitive process
was poor in terms of the SwF:$ 583 contract. At no stage
was a break-even achieved in this contract and, in the
unlikely extent of an agent holding this contract to
maturity a net loss of $5037 would have resulted in addition
to transaction costs.
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A significant return was also possible for the £:$ S83
contract.
What then do these results imply about the market's
efficiency? Due to the volatile nature of price movements
in this market it is possible for an agent to either quickly
lose a lot of money on a contract, as in the SwF:$ S83
contract, or to gain a significant amount. High returns are
possible in the market but with a certain amount of risk
attached. One must therefore be careful in interpreting the
implications of these results. As such one step ahead
foreits are not free from the risk of potential losses, the
profits that are obtained could be regarded as the rewards
for risk.
However these risks can be contained. Whilst an agent may
continue with his rule when doing well he may want to ensure
that margin requirements do not put too severe a drain on
his liquidity when actual prices are moving in the opposite
directions from his forecasted values. A stop loss order,
which closes one's position if the market price adversely
moves by a prespecified amount, is a way to overcome this
problem. This essentially limits the loss that the agent is
prepared to take by, for example, placing an order with the
broker to sell if the contract hits a certain price. This
should be sufficiently high, else it may result in positions
being closed too early. As the Yen:$ M84 contract shows,
the forecasts can soon provide positive returns even after
quite large losses.
The efficiency of the LIFFE contract cannot be severely
questioned on the basis of these results. Of 6 different
instruments examined, 4 out of 46 correlation coefficients
from one-step ahead forecasts proved significant. A total
of 9% of the contracts analysed. If these forecasts had
been followed on these contracts then positive returns would
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have been earned on three of them. These would have been
extremely high. However, there is the risk and the problem
that in such a fast moving market prices could move against
one's position.
Consequently use of these forecasts with a correct strategy
in the market could prove successful. Such a strategy would
involve a stop loss order at a sensible price, and close
monitoring of the market.
Despite the fact that high returns may be possible it is not
reasonable to suggest that a systematic rule has been found
that would question the efficiency of LIFFE.
An interesting question arises as to the timing of when to
initiate a position in the market on the basis of one's
forecasts. In one case a position may be initiated prior to
a turning point whilst in another it might occur after such
a turning point.
6.10	 cONCLUSIOtIS
The examination of dependencies in past prices is coawnon in
the financial literature. However, in much previous work
the price series has been examined cx post in order to see
if such dependencies exist. This does not get at the
concept of efficiency. It is not a question of whether one
can identify such dependencies cx post, but of whether one
can predict them cx ante, and hence act upon them.
Here it is investigated whether it is possible to construct
autoregressive schemes which enable systematic profits to be
made.	 This is a more powerful procedure than noting that
statistically significant variables exist from the
regression of the current price on any number of previous
lagged values.
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The distinction between martingales and random walks is
shown, with the random walk being a stronger condition than
that of a martingale. A martingale is shown to be satisfied
by financial futures markets.	 Hence past prices should not
help to earn any excess profits. This condition is
subsequently analysed using one step ahead forecasts. This
test procedure makes correct use of the information set
available at each moment in time.
The efficiency of 46 futures contracts on the London
International Financial Futures Exchange are considered in
this paper. These are examined over a two year sample and
over the period of the last six months to delivery for each
deliverable contract.
The significance, in terms of forecasting ability, on
one step ahead forecasts based on autoregressive price
schemes are analysed. The forecasts for four contracts
proved significant. Incorporating daily marking to market
into the analysis it was found that three of these contracts
would have provided high positive returns.
Due, however, to the variability of price movements the
efficiency of the LIFFE contracts cannot be rejected. There
appears to be a high risk involved in taking an open
position in the market, and hence an appropriate order
limiting losses would be important. The importance of this
risk component is an area that requires further research.
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FOOTNOTES:
*1: This could be a problem in a coimnodity futures market.
For instance, in November 1984 potato futures prices soared
as it became clear that a buyer was going to demand delivery
of his contract, whilst there were insufficient stocks to
honour the contract.
*2: In updating the information set at each period to carry
out the forecasts it was found that the significance of the
most distant lags tended to quickly diminish, with the
immediate lagged value, as one might expect, remaining
extremely significant. Hence, to take account of this, and,
in order to rationalise what was said in section 5. it was
decided to carry out one step ahead forecasts over exactly
the same time period as used above, using only the lagged
price of the last period. That is, whilst the
autoregressive scheme used above was p(t)f(p(t-1) pCt-2)
p(t-3)) for the Sterling:Oollar 383 contract, forecasts were
now calculated using p(t)-f(p(t-lfl. This was conducted for
all the currency contracts. The results overall, tended to
be slightly different. Over all four currencies thirty
deliverable contract months in total have been considered.
Basing forecasts on these, six significant price rules were
found. That is, there was significant correlation between
the expected and the actual price change. This compares
with only four significant price rules for these contracts
when based on the autoregressive schemes above. The six
significant contracts now were the 1483, S83, 083 and 084
contracts for the Sterling:Dollar, the 383 Yen:Oollar
contract and the S83 Swiss Franc:Dollar contract.
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TABLE 6.2: EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPENDENCIES IN THE
THREE MONTH STERLING CONTRACT
(1) M83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUT0ORA	 0.874 0.718 0.587 0.495 0.412 0.354 0.300 0.277
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.248 0.295 0.322 0.340 0.352 0.361	 0.367
0 STAT	 33.3	 56.4	 72.5	 84.5	 93.4	 100	 106	 111
(2) 383
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.824 0.587 0.444 0.366 0.218 0.054 -0.072 -0.108
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.240 0.273 0.290 0.299 0.303 0.303 0.304
O STAT	 29.5	 45.1	 54.5	 60.3	 63.2	 64.2	 65.2	 66.7
(3) S83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOcORR	 0.923 0.844 0.746 0.651	 0.570 0.435 0.326 0.242
ST ERROR	 0.155 0.257 0.317 0.358 0.385 0.405 0.417 0.423
a STAT	 37.0	 68.9	 94.7	 115	 131	 142	 149	 154
(4) D83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.861	 0.691	 0.536 0.435 0.302 0.117 -0.069 -0.216
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.246 0.290 0.313 0.327 0.327 0.335 0.335
a STAT	 32.3	 53.8	 67.3	 76.7	 81.9	 83.6	 84.9	 88.3
(5) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.840 0.673 0.547 0.438 0.390 0.361 0.337 0.224
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.243 0.285 0.309 0.324 0.335 0.344 0.352
O STAT	 30.7	 51.1	 65.1	 74.6	 82.5	 89.7	 96.2	 99.9
(5) 384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.918 0.828 0.754 0.688 0.609 0.512 0.398 0.296
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.256 0.315 0.356 0.387 0.410 0.425 0.434
0 STAT	 36.7	 67.3	 93.6	 116	 135	 149	 158	 164
(7) 584
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.929 0.813 0.732 0.624 0.524 0.443 0.377 0.330
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.258 0.317 0.355 0.381	 0.398 0.410 0.419
O STAT	 37.6	 68.5	 93.3	 112	 126	 137	 145	 153
(8) 084
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AiJTOcORR	 0.932 0.864 0.803 0.730 0.632 0.519 0.436 0.338
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.258 0.321	 0.367 0.401 0.424 0.440 0.450
0 STAT	 37.8	 71.2	 101	 126	 146	 161	 172	 179
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TABLE 6.3 EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPENDENCIES IN THE
YEN: DOLLAR CONTRACT
(2) .:183
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.817* 0.726* 0.644* 0.450 0.325 0.226 0.095 0.004
ST ERROR 0.158
	
0.242 0.291	 0.325 0.340 0.348 0.351	 0.352
0 STAT	 28.4	 51.5	 70.3	 80.2	 66.0	 89.4	 91.1	 92.3
(3) S83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.847* 0.748w 0.602* 0.49 1 0.389 0.205 0.050 -0.073
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.247 0.298 0.327 0.345 0.356 0.359 0.359
0 STAT	 30.5	 55	 71.6	 83.2	 91.1	 94.2	 95.6	 97.2
(4) 083
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOORR 0.943*	 0.892* 0.831* 0.768* 0.708 0.627 0.547 0.466
ST ERROR 0.158
	
0.264 0.331	 0.379 0.416 0.445 0.467 0.483
O STAT	 37.8	 72.8	 104	 131	 155	 175	 191	 204
(5) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
ALJTOORR 0.794*	 0.667* 0.560 0.509 0.442 0.307 0.217 0.164
ST ERROR 0.518	 0.238 0.281	 0.307 0.328 0.342 0.349 0.353
0 STAT	 26.8	 46.3	 60.6	 72.8	 62.6	 88.0	 91.4	 93.9
(6) 384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOORR 0.847* 0.660* 0.459 0.273 0.093 -0.021 -0.015 -0.022
ST ERROR	 0.158	 0.247	 0.288	 0.305	 0.311	 0.312	 0.312	 0.312
O STAT	 30.5	 49.7	 59.5	 63.6	 64.9	 65.8	 66.7	 67.6
(7) 584
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOcORR 0.892* 0.809* 0.737* 0.689 0.633 0.572 0.499 0.413
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.254 0.312 0.353 0.385 0.410 0.430 0.444
O STAT	 33.8	 62.4	 87.0	 109	 128	 145	 159	 169
(8) 084
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.829* 0.699* 0.644* 0.538 0.400 0.357 0.233 0.083
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.244 0.289 0.323 0.345 0.356 0.365 0.369
0 STAT	 29.2	 50.6	 69.4	 83.1	 91.4	 98.4	 102	 104
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TABLE 6.4 EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPENDENCIES IN THE
GILT CONTRACT
(1) .383
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOcOAR 0.141	 -0.126 0.066 0.049 0.049 -0.097 -0.0711 -0.078
ST ERROR	 0.134	 0.136	 0.138	 0.139	 0.139 0.139
	 0.1411	 0.141
Q STAT	 1.16	 2.11	 2.38	 2.55	 2.72	 3.32	 3.67	 4.08
(2) 583
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.016 -0.064 -0.099 -0 .079 0.101 0.067 -0.0611 -0.098
ST ERROR	 0.115	 0.115	 0.116	 0.116	 0.119	 0.118	 0.116	 0.119
0 STAT	 0.020	 0.340 0.349 0.849	 1.66	 2.83	 2.34	 3.14
(3) 083
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORA 0.088	 0.006 -0.110 0.061	 0.107 -0.013 -0.060 -0.025
ST ERROR 0.104	 0.104 0.105	 0.106	 0.106 0.107 0.107
	 0.108
O STAT	 0.741	 0.749	 1.93	 2.30	 3.43	 3.46	 4.11	 4.19
(4) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR _0.497* _0.	 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.002
ST ERROR 0.102	 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
o STAT	 24.4	 24.5	 24.6	 24.8	 24.9	 25.0	 25.2	 25.3
(5) 384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORA	 0.105	 -0.021 -0.107 -0.143 -0.059 0.149 	 0.117	 0.011
ST ERROR	 0.104	 0.105	 0.109	 0.111	 0.113 0.113	 0.115	 0.116
O STAT	 1.04	 4.88	 6.00	 8.01	 8.38	 10.6	 12.0	 12.1
(6) 584
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTO0RR 0.103 -0.024 -0.024 -0.145 -0.090 -0.155 -0.17 0.067
ST ERROR	 0.104	 0.105	 0.105	 0.105	 0.107	 0.108	 0. 1 itO	 0.114
0 STAT	 1.01	 1.07	 1.13	 3.18	 3.99	 6.36	 9.86	 10.4
(7) 084
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOcORR 0.023	 0.114	 0.032 -0.116 0.027 -0.137 0.122 	 0.003
ST ERROR	 0. 104	 0.104	 0.105	 0.105	 0.107	 0.107	 0.108	 0.110
0 STAT	 0.051	 1.30	 1.40	 2.71	 2.79	 4.64	 6.13	 6.17
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TABLE 6.5 EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPEI'C)ENCIES IN THE
DEUTSCHEMARK : DOLLAR CONTRACT
(1) M83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOORR	 0.911*	 0.817 .410 0.323
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.258 0.316 0.356 0.383 0.402 0.415 0.425
0 STAT	 35.3	 64.5	 88.6	 108	 122	 134	 143	 150
(2) 383
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 6
AUTOCORR	 0.803* 0.659* 0.534 0.324 0.177 0.032 -0.054 -0.116
ST F.RROR	 0.158 0.239	 0.281	 0.305	 0.314	 0.315 0.316 0.31
C STAT	 27.4	 45.5	 59.5	 64.9	 67.2	 68.2	 69.2	 70.8
(3) 863
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.848* 0.727* 0.610* 0.477 0.382 0.305 0.259 0.219
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.247 0.296 0.326 0.343 0.353 0.360 0.364
Q STAT	 30.6	 53.8	 70.7	 81.6	 89.3	 94.7	 99.1	 103
(4) 083
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.894* 0.770* 0.649* 0.521 	 0.399 0.254 0.120 0.022
ST ERROR 0.158 0.255 0.308 0.340 0.359 0.370 0.375 0.376
O STAT	 34	 59.9	 79.1	 92.1	 100	 105	 107	 108
(5) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.927* 0.849* 0.798* 0.740 0.670 0.686 0.498 0.411
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.261	 0.322 0.369 0.404 0.435 0.450 0.464
O STAT	 36.5	 68	 967	 122	 144	 161	 175	 185
(6) 384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.932* 0.876* 0.794* 0.725 0.857 0.566 0.498 0.413
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.262 0.327 0.372 0.406 0.431 0.450 0.463
C STAT	 36.9	 70.4	 98.9	 123	 144	 161	 175	 185
(7) 584
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.845* 0.733* 0.615 0.519 0.433 0.307 0.215 0.112
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.146 0.296 0.326 0.346 0.360 0.366 0.369
O STAT	 30.4	 53.9	 71.1	 84.0	 93.5	 99.0	 102	 105
(6) 084
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 5	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.737* 0.544* 0.444 0.338 0.226 0.199 0.175 0.089
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.228 0.259 0.277 0.287 0.292 0.295 0.298
O STAT
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TABLE 6.6 EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPENDENCIES IN THE
STERLING: DOLLAR CONTRACT
(1) M83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOcORR	 0.855* 0.718* 0.643* 0.501	 0.401	 0.301	 0.213 0.112
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.253 0.308 0.340 0.358 0.369 0.375 0.378
0 STAT	 33.3	 60	 78.9	 91	 99.4	 105	 108	 111
(2) 383
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.784* 0.705* 0.591* 0.472 0.366 0.188 0.082 -0.050
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.236 0.284 0.313 0.330 0.340 0.343 0.343
O STAT	 26.1	 47.9	 63.7	 74.4	 81.4	 84.1	 85.6	 86.9
(3) S83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.774* Q595* 0.436 0.350 0.210 0.079 0.002 -0.024
ST ERROR	 0.158	 0.234	 0.270	 0.287	 0.297 0.301
	 0.301	 0.301
O STAT	 25.5	 41.1	 49.9	 55.9	 58.7	 59.7	 60.6	 61.4
(4) 083
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.863* 0.696* 0.519 0.364 0.238 0.095 -0.012 -0.056
ST ERROR	 31.7	 53.0	 65.5	 72.2	 75.7	 77.1	 78.2	 79.4
O STAT	 0.158	 0.250	 0.294 0.316 0.327 0.331
	 0.332 0.332
(5) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 6
AUTOORR	 0.906* 0.818* 0.747* 0.676 0.614 0.538 0.455 0.366
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.257 0.315 0.357 0.388 0.411 0.428 0.440
o STAT	 34.9	 64.2	 89.4	 111	 129	 144	 155	 164
(6) 384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.945* 0.895* 0.826* 0.758 0.678 0.579 0.495 0.400
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.264 0.331	 0.379 0.415 0.442 0.461
	 0.474
o STAT	 38	 73	 104	 131	 153	 170	 184	 194
(7) S84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.823* 0.687* 0.592* 0.512 0.433 0.358 0.290 0.257
ST ERROR	 0.156 0.243 0.287 0.316 0.336 0.350 0.359 0.365
O STAT	 28.8	 49.5	 65.4	 77.9	 87.3	 94.3	 99.5	 104
(8) 064
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AIJTOcORR	 0.546* 0.198 0.110	 0.045 -0.148 -0.019 0.149 0.043
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.200 0.205 0.206 0.206 0.209 0.209 0.212
0 STAT	 12.7	 14.6	 15.3	 15.6	 16.8	 17.0	 18.3	 18.6
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TABLE 6.7 EXAMINATION OF PAST DEPENOENCIES IN THE
SWISS FRANC:OOLLAR CONTRACT
(1) J83
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 8	 7	 8
AUTO4ORR	 0.817* 0.726* 0.644* 0.450 0.325 0.226 0.095 0.004
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.242 0.291	 0.325 0.340 0.348 0.351
	 0.352
o STAT	 28.4	 51.5	 70.3	 80.2	 86.0	 89.4	 91.1	 92.3
(2) 583
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORA	 0.647* 0.748* 0.602* 0.491
	
0.389 0.205 0.050 -0.073
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.247 0.298 0.327 0.345 0.358 0.359 0.359
o STAT	 30.5	 55	 71.6	 83.2	 91.1	 94.2	 95.6	 97.2
(3) 083
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR	 0.943* 0.892* 0.831* 0.768* 0.708 0.627 0.547 0.466
ST ERROR	 0.158 0.264 0.331	 0.379 0.416 0445 0.467 0.483
0 STAT	 37.8	 72.6	 104	 131	 155	 175	 191	 204
(4) M84
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0 794* D.667* 0.560 0.509 0.442 0.307 0.217 0.164
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.238 0.281	 0.307 0.328 0.342 0.349 0.353
O STAT	 26.8	 46.3	 60.6	 72.8	 82.6	 88.0	 91.4	 93.9
(5) .384
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.847* 0.680* 0.459 0.273 0.093 -0.021 -0.015 -0.022
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.247 0.288 0.305 0.311	 0.312 0.312 0.312
O STAT	 30.5	 49.7	 59.5	 63.6	 64.9	 65.8	 66.7	 87.6
(6) 584
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.892* 0.809* 0.737* 0.689 0.633 0.572 0.499 0.413
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.254 0.312 0.353 0.385 0.410 0.430 0.444
O STAT	 33.8	 62.4	 87.0	 109	 128	 145	 159	 169
(7) 084
LAG	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
AUTOCORR 0.829* 0.699* 0.644* 0.538 0.400 0.357 0.233 0.083
ST ERROR 0.158	 0.244 0.269 0.323 0.345 0.356 0.365 0.369
O STAT	 29.2
	 50.6	 69.4	 83.1	 91.4	 98.4	 102	 104
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TABLE 6.8
513 CONTRACT: MARCH 1983 CONTRACT
ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
065	 E
63	 88.72366
64	 88.90928
65	 88.91772
66	 88.99551
67	 69.23952
68	 89.45313
69	 89.46030
70	 89.50587
71	 89.50365
72	 89.47643
73	 89.47906
74	 89.41842
75	 89.35555
76	 89.17112
77	 88.91301
78	 86.90568
79	 88.88766
80	 88.95644
81	 88.91788
82	 88.85393
83	 88.87843
84	 88.92115
85	 89.04828
86	 89.10638
M83
88.90000
88.92000
88.98000
89.23000
89 .46000
89.47000
89.50000
89.50000
89.47000
89.47000
89 .41000
89.34000
69.15000
88.88000
88.86000
88.86000
88.93000
88.90000
88.83000
68.85000
88.90000
89.03000
89.10000
89 .06000
0
-0.17635
-0.01072
-0.06229
-0.23449
-0.22048
-0.01687
-0.03970
0.00587
0.03365
0.00642
0.06905
0.07842
0.20554
0.29112
0.05301
0.04568
-0.04234
0.05643
0.08788
0. 00393
-0.02158
-0.10885
-0.05172
0. 04839
ST3 MARCH 1983:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT	 -0.0515
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0581
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0408
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0040
ST3 JUNE 1983:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.2069
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0247
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.0 175
MEAN ERROR	 - -0.0086
ST3 SEPTEMBER 1983:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0579
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0194
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0152
MEAN ERROR	 a -0.0002
ST3 DECEMBER 1983:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a -0.1837
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0213
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0143
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0054
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5T3 MARCH 1984:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0059
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0211
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0 165
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0067
ST3 JUNE 1984:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.1223
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0234
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0 173
MEAN ERROR	 - -0.0030
ST3 SEPTEMBER 1984:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT	 0. 1696
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0212
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0618
MEAN ERROR	 -	 0.0007
ST3 DECEMBER 1984:
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.1344
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0212
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0614
MEAN ERROR	 a -0.0053
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TABLE 6.9
OEUTSCHEMARK : DOLLAR ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
DM:$ MARCH 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 	 0.1422
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR	 0.0520
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0041
MEAN ERROR	 0.0010
DM:$ JUNE 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 	 0.1714
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR 	 0.0230
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0182
MEAN ERROR	 0.0124
OM:$ SEPTEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -0.1177
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR 	 1.3619
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.1819
MEAN ERROR	 0. 1672
DM:$ DECEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -0.1676
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0191
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0158
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0027
DM:$ MARCH 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.1568
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR 	 0.0206
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0160
MEAN ERROR	 - -0.0034
DM:$ JUNE 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.2127
ROOT-MEAN--SQUARED ERROR	 0.0216
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0 160
MEAN ERROR	 - 00046
DM:$ SEPTEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0736
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0218
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.016 1
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0043
Cfl:$ DECEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.0014
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0196
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0154
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.000 1
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TABLE 6.10:
STERLING:OOLLAR ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
£:S MARCI-I 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.0509
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0106
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0081
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0008
£:$ JUNE 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -0.1586
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0107
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0086
MEAN ERROR	 - -0.0021
£:S SEPTEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
	
0.2597
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0080
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0064
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0017
£:$ DECEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT	 0.1945
ROOT-MEAN--SQUARED ERROR - C) .0055
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0045
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0023
£:$ MARCH 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -0.0100
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0090
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0072
MEAN ERROR	 a -0.0009
£:$ JUNE 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.0318
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0073
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 	 a 0.0054
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0016
£:$ SEPTEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a -0.1878
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0079
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.0062
MEAN ERROR	 0.0011
£:$ DECEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a 0.0613
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0 103
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 	 0.0080
MEAN ERROR	 a 0.0011
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TABLE 6.11:
YEN: DOLLAR ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
YEN:$ JUNE 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0625
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0023
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.00 18
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0004
YEN:$ SEPTEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT -0.1471
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0020
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 	 - 0.0015
MEAN ERROR	 0.0004
YEN:$ DECEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.1101
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0017
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.00 13
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0002
YEN:$ MARCH 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT	 0.2370
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0035
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0021
MEAN ERROR	 - -0 .0001
YEN:$ JUNE 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0223
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR = 0.0019
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.00 15
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0002
YEN:$ SEPTEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.0257
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR - 0.0019
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.00 15
MEAN ERROR	 - -0.0001
YEN:$ DECEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT = 0.2445
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0019
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.00 15
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0003
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TABLE 6.12
SWISS FRANC: DOLLAR ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
SwF:$ JUIE 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - 0.1804
ROOT-rEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0. (1029
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 - 0.0023
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0009
SwF:$ SEPTEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a -0.2953
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0027
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.002 1
MEAN ERROR	 - 0.0002
SwF:$ DECEMBER 1983
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT - -0.0958
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0022
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 0.0018
MEAN ERROR	 a 0.0009
SwF:$ MARCH 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a 0.037 1
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0035
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.0029
MEAN ERROR	 a -0.0003
SwF:$ JUNE 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a -0.1872
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0026
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 	 a 0.0020
MEAN ERROR	 a 0.0006
SwF:$ SEPTEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT = 0.0011
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0027
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 	 0.0021
MEAN ERROR	 a 0.0002
SwF:$ DECEMBER 1984
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT a 0.0910
ROOT-MEAN-SQUARED ERROR a 0.0028
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR	 a 0.0023
MEAN ERROR	 a 0.0003
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TABLE 6.13:
SU+IARY OF TABLES 6.8 TO 6.12:
RESULTS OF CARRYING CUT ONE STEP AHEAD FORECASTS
(1) YEN: DOLLAR MARCH 1984 CONTRACT
INITIAL MARGIN:	 - $ 1,000
TOTAL MARGIN AT MATURITY: 	 $ 7,472.50
TOTAL RETURN (IF HELD):	 747.25 %
MAXIMUI RETURN	 $ 7,472.50 ( 747.25 % ) ACHIEVED AT MATURITY
MAXIMLJI LOSS - -s 1,600	 C - 60 S 3 ACHIEVED AFTER 4 DAYS
BREAK EVEN ACHIEVED AFTER 23 DAYS.
(2) YEN:DOLLAR DECEMBER 1984 CONTRACT
INITIAL MARGIN:	 - $ 1,000
TOTAL MARGIN AT MATURITY:	 $ 2,287.50
TOTAL RETURN (IF HELD):	 228.75 S
MAXIMLIl RETURN a $ 2,412.50 C 241.50 5) ACHIEVED AFTER 53 DAYS
MAXIt&R1 LOSS - -$ 1,000	 C	 0 5 ) ACHIEVED AT INCEPTION
BREAK EVEN ACHIEVED AFTER 4 DAYS
(3) SWISS FRANC:DOLLAR SEPTEMBER 1983 CONTRACT
INITIAL MARGIN:	 - $ 1,000
TOTAL MARGIN AT MATURITY: - $ 5,037
TOTAL RETURN (IF HELD): 	 - 403.7 5
MAXIMIJ'1 RETURN a -$ 37.50 ACHIEVED AFTER 8 DAYS
MAXIMIfI LOSS - -$5,037 ( -50.37 S 3 ACHIEVED AT MATURITY
BREAK EVEN NOT ACHIEVED
(4) STERLING:DOLLAR SEPTEMBER 1983 CONTRACT
INITIAL MARGIN:	 -5 1,000
TOTAL MARGIN AT MATURITY: $ 1,007.50
TOTAL RETURN (IF HELD):	 100.75 5
MAXIMUI RETURN	 $ 1,077.50 C 107.75 5 ) ACHIEVED AFTER 66 DAYS
MAXIMLII LOSS - -$ 1,717.50 C -71.75% ) ACHIEVED AFTER 5 DAYS
BREAK EVEN ACHIEVED AFTER 19 DAYS
NOTE: The maximum returns and maximum loss figures include the
initial margin, represented here as -s 1,000.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECTS AND UNBIASEDNESS OF FUTIJE5
RATES: AN IIWESTIGATION.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter adopts the methodology outlined in chapters one
and four for examining the efficiency of futures contracts.
There five hypotheses were proposed that an efficient
financial futures contract should satisfy. Here attention
is focussed on one of these hypotheses. Namely, that in an
efficient market, assuming risk neutrality, futures rates
should be unbiased predictors of the futures rate at
matutity.
This hypothesis has been examined extensively in terms of
foreign exchange markets (FEM) but has received minimal
application in terms of futures markets. (See chapter four,
table 4.1).	 It has not been examined on the London
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE).
	 This
paper examines the unbiasedness of futures rates on LIFFE's
four currency contracts:	 Deutschemark:Dollar,	 Swiss
Franc:Dollar, Yen:Dollar and Sterling:Dollar.
Before biasedness is tested, however, the important issue of
day-of-the-week effects (DOWE) must be considered. This has
been examined, to a limited extent, on asset markets. It
analyses the daily return in a market in order to see
whether there exists a systematic rule to the return that
could be achieved on a particular day of the week,
throughout time. The DOWE has important implications for
the examination of unbiasedness. If a significant return
was available on the same day throughout time then, use of
data from this day for the examination of efficiency could
give biased results. As tests of unbiasednesss based on a
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weekly time frame are carried out using data from the same
day of the week the consideration of DOWE is an important
first step for the examination of unbiasedness. The DOWE is
also important in its own right for the testing of
efficiency.
Section 7.2 examines the theory underlying OOWE and
covers previous work on this hypothesis.	 Section 7.3,
meanwhile, presents results from LIFFE; no DOWE are found.
The theoretical considerations of unbiasedness are covered
in section 7.4 whilst previous work on this area in FFM is
discussed in section 7.5. The results of the application to
LIFFE's currency contracts are discussed in section 7.6
along with the implications for the market's efficiency.
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.	 It is found that the
four currency futures contracts are efficient.
7.2 PREVIOUS WORK ANG ISSI.ES ARISING
The DOWE has been analysed on various asset markets by, for
instance, Cross (1973), French (1980), Gibbons and Hess
(1981), Christie (1981), Lakonishok and Levi (1982), Ball,
Torous, and Tschoegl. (1983) and Chiang and Tapley (1983).
In view of some of their results the analysis of the average
daily returns has given rise to the term, 'The Weekend
Effect'; see for example, Lakonishok and Levi (1982) and
Ball et al (1983). This is a direct result of the fact that
it has been found that the daily return tended to be
negative from a Friday to a Monday, whilst proving to be
positive for the other four weekdays. In addition, it was
found by a number of authors that Wednesdays exhibited the
highest returns on a systematic basis; see French (1980),
Gibbons and Hess (1981) and Chiang and Tapley (1983).
If the analysis of DO?E provides similar results on LIFFE
then this has important implications for the efficiency of
this market. It would show that there exists a predictable,
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systematic element to the movement of prices in this market
and, as such, it would contravene the notion of efficiency.
If an agent took up a position from a Tuesday to a Wednesday
then his return would, ceteris paribus, be higher than on
other days. Similarly, on the basis of this information, it
would be in the interests of an agent to close his position
before the weekend.
Apart from the work of Chiang and Tapley (1983) and of
Gibbons and Hess (1981) the DOWE has not been examined on
futures markets. However, for Chiang and Tapley only 6 out
of the 21 commodities they considered were financial
instruments, whilst Gibbons and Hess just considered US
Treasury Bills. Thus, it can be said, the DOWE has not been
sufficiently analysed on financial futures markets. It has
not been considered on LIFFE. The DOWE tries to identify
any systematic patterns between contracts over various days.
For example, the daily return from Monday to Tuesday is
examined to see whether this return is significantly
positive or negative. If any systematic patterns exist then
a question can be raised about any tests of efficiency in
which the data used is derived from the same day. Biased
results could possibly exist. For example, Capozza and
Cornell's (1977) analysis of Treasury Bills used Wednesday's
prices, which Gibbons and Hess (1981) showed produced higher
returns than other days.
The work of French (1980) and Cross (1973) raised two
issues. In looking at returns on stocks, the first was
whether the market exhibited a weekend effect in that
Monday's returns were negative. Second, did average returns
fall following a holiday, or when the market was shut on the
same day on a systematic basis? French had found that the
market's return tended to be negative on the following day
whenever the market was shut on a systematic basis. Gibbons
and Hess confirmed this result. 	 The Treasury Bills index
had a lower return on Monday.
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French tried to explain market returns on the basis of
either the calendar time model or the trading time model.
The former explained returns on the basis of calendar months
whilst the latter seemed more applicable in that it
attempted to explain returns in terms of the market's
opening hours.
In both models a weekend effect should be absent. In the
trading time model, the distribution of returns should not
differ between days, whilst the calendar time model would
imply that if the mean and variance of returns were
significant then they would be significantly positive, not
negative. Thus in the latter case the variance of returns
would increase when the market was closed. Ball et al
(1982) examine these two explanations in terms of the gold
market, in that overnight price changes were less than
within day changes.
If a weekend effect was found to exist then this could
possibly be explained by agents not wishing to hold open
positions over a three day period, Friday to Monday. Whilst
other financial markets would also be closed over this
period any important news that did become available could
possibly lead to a severe change in the contract's price
when the market reopened on Monday morning.
If one's position in the futures market was for hedging
purposes then it may well be the case that such an effect
was not so important. An open position would be held for a
lengthy period of time in order to offset the risk of price
movements in the underlying Instrument. It is not the risk
of not being able to inwnediately react to any new
information over the weekend or holiday period which is so
important. Day traders, or market makers, meanwhile, would
not hold positions outside the market's hours. Also other
traders who take positions on trends would probably not
leave their positions open. Speculators, meanwhile, would
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maintain their positions on the basis of their expectation
of future information and its effect on prices.
Thus, the fact that the intensity of information flow could
be greater over the weekend would affect the amount of
volume and open interest in the market on the days
surrounding the weekend. Chiang and Tapley found no DOWE in
terms of open interest whilst Tuesday tended to have the
highest volume.
Whether DOWE are found on LIFFE is examined below.
7.3 RESULTS FROM LIFFE
The DOWE is examined here in terms of LIFFE.	 This
represents the first analysis of this effect on this market.
Six contracts are examined: The Financial Times Stock
Exchange 100 Index(FTSE 100); Sterling:Dollar; Yen:Dollar;
Swiss Franc:Dollar; Deutschemark:Doflar and the 20 Year Gilt
Contract. The FTSE contract is analysed over its first year
of existence whilst the other five contracts are examined
over their first two years. Daily closing prices are used
throughout.
To ascertain whether DOWE exist on these contracts the daily
return was calculated for each contract. This was
calculated for each day as
R(t)	 (P(t) - P(t-1)) I P(t-1)	 . ..(7.1)
where, R(t) would be the return from holding the contract
from (t-1) to Ct), and P(t) equals the closing price on day
(t) . These daily returns were then aggregated for the
same day throughout the lifetime of the contract. That is,
the mean returns from Friday to Monday, for example, were
combined.	 The results are represented in Tables 7.1 - 7.6.
In each contract the results are analysed in terms of the
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days for the contract closest to delivery. A contract is
closest to maturity when it is the next contract to be
delivered. Thus it is within the period 0 to 3 months from
maturity. It is second closest to delivery when it is
between 3 to 6 months from maturity. For the Gilt contract
in Table 7.6 there is, in addition, the results of returns
for the contract third closest to maturity. (That is 6 to 9
months from maturity).
The results of combining the returns over the same days
throughout the contract's lifetime are considered. Looking
at the mean returns, none are found to be significantly
different from zero, in any of the contracts.
For the FTSE contract negative returns were found from a
Wednesday to Thursday and on the day following a holiday
period. This negative return following a holiday period was
also found for the SWF:$, OM:$, and Gilt contract.
Interestingly, it was the case that the FTSE 100 index con-
tract was the only one that did not exhibit negative mean
returns from a Friday to Monday. The other five contracts
possessed negative returns over the weekend. However,none of
these proved significant. Thus no weekend effect was found.
From an analysis of Tables 7.1 to 7.6 it can be seen that
there are no significant returns on any day of the week on a
systematic basis. This does not contravene the notion of
efficiency. Therefore, no bias will thus be introduced
into the analysis if one examines a contract's efficiency
on the basis of futures rates from the same day for any
period of time. Interestingly, however, an insignificant
weekend effect is found with mean returns tending to be
negative from a Friday to a Monday.
One conclusion to be drawn from an examination of OOWE is
that no bias will be introduced into the examination of
unbiasedness of futures contracts. This question of
unbiasedness will now be addresed.
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7.4 LJ'1B IASEDNESS: ThEORETICAL CONS IDERAT IONS
In an efficient market all available information should be
fully incorporated into the price at all moments of time.
Any new information about subsequent futures prices should
be i,wnediately and correctly incorporated into the current
price. This price should also discount any information
relevant to the contract's pricing in the future.
Given, however, that futures markets tend to be
characterised by high turnover and frequent price changes it
may well be the case that there are occasions when this may
not be so. For instance, arbitrage opportunities may arise
between the futures market and the underlying spot market.
Alternatively, some agents may respond immediately to any
item of new information whereas the vast majority of those
acting on the market react with a lag. This could either be
due to inside information, as with the Phelps-Taylor idea of
islands of information (See chapter.jar3, or due to scalpers
recognising any price discrepencies in a fast moving market.
Whilst it is possible for these cases mentioned above to
arise, the important question remains as to whether they are
quickly eliminated or persist. In an efficient market they
are not expected to persist. Thus, the futures prices
should not be biased estimates of the price at maturity. If
there is any deviation between these two prices then this
should be solely due to new information, which has become
randomly available over the intervening period(See chapter
8). If this forecast error was due to any information that
was available at the time when futures prices were
determined then this would imply that the presently quoted
futures price was not an unbiased estimate of the price at
maturity, and hence the market was inefficient.
In a futures market the presently quoted futures price
should be a rational predictor of the price that will occur
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at maturity. In terms of LIFFE the futures price on the day
of delivery of the underlying contract is called the
Exchange Delivery Settlement Price(EDSP). In this chapter
the EDSP is referred to as the spot rate, s(t), where t
refers to the delivery date. Thus one would expect equation
(7.2) to hold,
f(t-i) B E I s(t) : I(t-i) ]
where f(t-i) is the futures price at time Ct-i) and I(t-i)
is the information set at the same point in time. From
(7.2), which assumes risk neutrality and embodies the
concept of rational expectations, futures rates should prove
to be unbiased predictors of the spot rate.
The relationship between the futures price and the spot
price has a similar analogy in terms of the FEM, when one
considers the relationship between the spot and
corresponding forward rate. The two markets are similar in
concept but differ in their operational aspects(See chapter
2). One ma j or difference between examining unbiasedness in
the FEM and futures markets is that in the former the time
to maturity is fixed whereas in tte futures market it is the
maturity date that is fixed.	 This distinction is important
for the examination of arbitrage possibilities between these
markets (See chapter five).	 For example, 90 day forward
rates are quoted each day in the FEM. However, in the
futures market, whilst there may exist a 90 day futures rate
today, tomorrow there will be quoted an 89 day futures rate;
both these rates corresponding to the same spot rate.
All prices for a contract thus refer to the same fixed
delivery date, which in terms of LIFFE's currency contracts
is the second Wednesday of the four delivey months, namely
March, .June, September and December. On LIFFE as one
contract matures trading begins in a new contract dated
three months beyond the most distant contract presently
239
traded. In currency contracts on LIFFE the number of months
one can trade ahead in varies, depending on the liquidity of
that currency's contract.
The futures price at any moment in time would thus be based
on all available information, including current expectations
of future information. Thus, at two different dates, it
would be the case that:
E ( s(t) : 1(t) ] - f(t)
	 (7.3)
and
	
E I s(t)	 I(t-i)] - f(t-1)
	
(7.4)
With the new information arising between Ct-i) and Ct) being
unpredictable, it would imply that
E I s(t) : 1(t) 1 - E C s(t) : I(t-1) I - e(t)	 .. .(7.5)
where
F C e(t) 3 . 0, and var(e(t)) .
In terms of the future prices themselves,
f(t) - f(t .-1) - e(t)	 .(7.6)
This implies that the futures price is a martingale, with
the best forecast of tomorrow's futures price being today's.
That is, taking expectations through (7.6),
El f(t):I(t-1)]	 E (f(t-1):I(t-i)] + E[e(t): I(t-1)]
- f Ct-i)	 .. .(7.7)
If futures prices adhere to this then one should not be able
to use past prices to correctly predict, and profit from,
future price movements.
All information should be incorporated into the present
futures price which should thus be an unbiased predictor.
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Therefore
E ( s(t) : I(t-l) ] - s(t) - e(t) 	 .. .(7.8)
with e(t) acounting for the new information that arrives
randomly.	 As the expectation at Ct-i) of the spot rate at
it) is given by the futures rate at (t-i) this implies that
fit-i) - sit) - e(t) .17.9)
which is the basis of the unbiasedness assumption. This is
tested by examining the following regression, which is
genaraily taken in logs,
sit) - a + b fit-i) + e(t) .. .(7.10)
Efficiency implies that Ca,b)-(0,1) and that e(t) must be
white noise.
This relationship can be examined at any time i, up until
the maturity of the contract. As daily data is available
this relationship can be considered on a daily basis,
allowing one to examine how the market reacts to any new
information. In this paper the relationship is examined on
a weekly basis, with information being combined across
contracts within a currency. Thus, in terms of (7.10) for
i*1, all the futures rates one week from maturity are
combined for a particular currency within this regression.
The regression (7.10) is examined for i1 to 20, on a weekly
basis. As one approaches maturity the information set
increases, as learning takes place on the agents' behalf:
I(t-1)	 I(t-2) , ............., I(t-20) 	 .. .17.11)
Which implies that the futures rates will be superior
through time,
f(t-1)	 f(t-2) ...............f(t-20)	 .. .(7.12)
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and hence the goodness of fit of the equation should
improve,
Rt(l) >
	 R(2) ) ...................., R '(20) ...(7.13)
where L(1) is the	 of the regression i weeks from
maturity.
If it was found that the constant and futures terms were
biased away from their hypothesised values, of zero and one
respectively, or that the error term was not white noise,
then there would be evidence of inefficiency. The futures
price would thus not be an unbiased predictor of the spot
rate.
If such bias existed then this could mean that there exists
some other variable X which when added to the right hand
side of equation (7.10) would prove to be significantly
different from zero. That is, in
s(t)	 a + b f(t.-i) + c X(t-i) + e(t)	 ...(7.14)
efficiency should imply that (a,b,c) - (0,1,0). This
variable X could be determined by economic theory and could
be some fundamental variable which would influence the
exchange rate in that contract under consideration. Such
fundamental analysis involves more information than is just
embodied in the price series itself.
If there was some correlation between past prices this would
mean that the current futures rate did not embody all
information. If this were the case then technical analysis,
based on chart analysis of past prices, may allow a
prediction of future prices.
If such bias arises in the PEM then risk is often presented
as an explanation. However, this is always an ex post
analysis, with little attempt made to incorporate risk
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explicitly into the regression cx ante. In financial
futures markets risk will not prove to be a cajor problem.
As explained in chapter two, the clearing house guarantees
all contracts and hence default risk will be zero, whilst
chapter three highlightened the importance of expectations
as opposed to risk.
Combining the rational expectations idea of information
specialisation with the literature on microeconomic
efficiency(See chapter 4 for a discussion of this issue) it
may be the case that, at any moment in time, individual
forecasts are not perfectly correlated. Due to the vast
amount of information that is available and also the search
and transaction costs involved, individuals may sometimes
have different information sets on which to base their
forecasts of the future. Even with the same information
sets their forecasts may still differ. Given that these sets
may be different it may be possible for individuals to
combine information and hence improve their forecasts.
Levich(1979) has combined forecasts in terms of the FEM to
obtain what he calls a composite forecast whilst
Edwards(1953) and Murf in & Ormerod(1985) have used Zeliner's
seemingly unrelated regression equation (ZS1JRE) procedure to
integrate currencies. This latter issue will be covered in
more detail in chapter eight in the examination of news
effects.
In ZSIJRE the cross equation covariance structure of the
currencies' residuals are incorporated into the estimation
procedure. With increased information better estimates
should be obtained. The extra information used allows one
to conduct a stronger test of efficiency. However, if new
information causes greater uncertainty then, although the
information set is larger, the estimates need not be better.
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7.5 PREVIOUS WORK
As explained above the issue of unbiasedness has been
covered at length in the FEM but still awaits adequate
investigation in the financial futures markets. Table 4.1
in chapter four covered some of the recent research into the
area of efficiency. There exists little work on the value
of the futures currency exhange market as a source of
information on future spot rates. This seems strange given
the large literature on forward exchange rates. The
structural diferences between the two markets would mean
that their performance and results are not necessarily
similar. Attention here will focus in more detail on
certain papers on FFM, as oppossed to the FEM literature.
Bigman et al(1983) look at the relationship between spot and
futures rates as one proceeds through a contract's lifetime.
Examining commodity futures prices for wheat, corn and
soyabeans they examine the process by which new information
that has been incorporated into the futures price
contributes to the predictive power of futures prices. They
find that up to 8 weeks before maturity the nearest futures
price is a better estimate of the delivery spot price,
whilst beyond the eight week there is little differnce
between the Rand the standard error of estimates quoted.
The soyabean futures prices are inefficient beyond the eight
week to maturity
A stronger test would be to examine futures prices with
respect to alternative forecasts. Bilik(1982) makes a bad
attempt at doing this. Predictions of seven currencies from
twelve forex forecasting firms are compared with forward
rates. As these firms only used quarterly forecasts of
future average spot rates this comparison is not exact. A
distinction is drawn between dimensional and directional
forecast errors, where the former refers to the magnitude of
deviations from future spot rates and the latter concerns
244
the question of whether the predictions are on the correct
side of the forward rate, as well as the current spot rates.
The second point does not seem to be of great interest to
me. As one is interested in the relative forecasting
performance, then it does really not matter in what
direction the forecast is wrong. New information could
cause a subequent movement in the spot rate, after the
prediction is made, which would cause the forecast to be
wrong. It is only of relevance in the extreme case of where
the forecast always under, or overpredicts by the same
amount.	 Their evidence supports the efficiency of the
market.
One paper that does consider the futures market in
currencies is by Hill and Schneeweis (1981), which examines
five currencies (sterling, mark, Swiss franc, Canadian
dollar and yen) on the Chaicago International Money
Market(I+i) over 1972-1978. Using weekly data on contracts
with 1, 3 and S months to delivery they find that the
futures markets are, on average, unbiased forecasts of
future spot rates.	 They also exhibit lower degrees of
forecast efficiency the longer the forecast horizon. As
they claim, •A futures market is structually analagous to a
series of forward contracts' , and hence they apply
methodolical tests used in the forward markets.
Hill and Schneeweis found that futures prices tended to be
low rather than high estimates of future spot rates; only
the CS did not have a positive forecast error. The
magnitude of this error was the highest ,whilst that of the
DII and SF were the lowest. On average, the futures rates
were unbiased forecasts of spot rates; the forecast
improving the closer to expiration of the contract.
However, in long term contracts it appears that the market
could be inefficient as , depending on the forecasting
ability of the model one uses, profits and losses will
exceed transaction costs.
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Stein et al(1984), in examining the forecasting ability of
futures contracts, also on the X?+1, found that the current
spot rate is as good a predictor of the subsequent spot rate
as is the current futures rate. There is no extra
information contained in the futures rate that is not
already possessed by the spot rate. The current spot rate
is, in fact, found to explain 97% of the current futures
rate. The authors try to seperate out the influence of s(t)
and of f(t-.3) in the same regression, but multicollinearity
will render the estimates incorrect.
7.6 RESULTS FROM LIFFE
The four currency contracts are examined here.	 Four
contracts are delivered each year for each cwrency, in
March, June, September and December. The first contract
delivered for the £:$ contract was December 1982(082),
whilst for the other three contracts the initial 'contract to
be delivered was March 1983(M83). Information was combined
across all the contracts that had been delivered up to the
084 contract.
Unbiasedness of futures rates was examined in terms of
equation (7.10) over the last twenty weeks t maturity.
This was done on a weekly basis, using Wednesday's closing
prices throughout. Information was combined across
contracts by combining data for the futures rates across all
the contracts delivered 1,2,...,20 weeks from maturity.
Tables 7.7 to 7.10 show the results from examining equation
(7.10) for each currency . The DM:S contract's results,
shown in table 7.7, show that for this currrency the
hypothesis of efficiency (a-0,b-1) appears to be accepted.
There are 9 observations for each equation up to 9 weeks
from maturity, whilst there are only 8 observatiens for the
other regressions. The Durbin-Watson statistics can be
misleading here, given the low number of observations, and
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hence not too much attention should be paid to them. As
implied from section 2, the goodness of fit should improve
as the time to maturity approaches. However, it is
surprising that the futures rate's explanation of the spot
rate should fall, so dramatically as one moves from 11 to 12
weeks from maturity and beyond. For example, at F(t-13)
only 40% of the subsequent spot rate is explained by the
futures rate. Whilst this is a significant figure it does
seem to imply that there may exist some other variable
X(t-13) would could prove to be statistically significantly
different from zero in equation (7.15)
s(t) - a + b f(t-13) + c X(t-13) .. (7.15)
This question, of whether the futures rate exhibits minimum
variance, is an interesting area for consideration.
Table 7.8 presents similar results from the Yen:$ contract.
At (t-13) and (t-14) both hypothesised values for the
constant and futures rates are not satisfied, thus implying
inefficiency. For greater than 14 weeks from maturity the
number of observations for each regression falls to 7 and,
at t2O, to 6. This is a result of the lack of liquidity in
this market. The small volume in this contract at these
weeks from maturity means that a futures rate does not
always exist. In this case the very small R' are quite
important. They indicate that beyond one week from maturity
the futures rate does not explain the majority of the spot
rate. This is particularly true beyond 12 weeks from
maturity.
The £:$ contract, shown in table 7.9, satisfies the
efficiency hypothesis for all 20 weeks considered. This is
the most heavily traded currency contract, which is probably
refected in the R statistic. The higher volume of
contracts means that futures rates will tend to better
reflect currently available information, and hence explain
most of the subsequent spot rate. Table 7.10 shows similar
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results in terms of the SwF:$ contract. 	 No inefficiency is
evident.
Tables 7.12 to 7.17 report the results of carrying out the
regressions in tables 7.7 to 7.10 using a systems
estimation. The cross-equation terms will incorporate
information that has not been exploited in the regression
equations. As table 7.11 shows there is a large correlation
between the futures rates quoted for each currency at each
subsequent week. A correlation matrix is shown for the
currency contracts up to 12 weeks from maturity. The SWF, £
and CM contracts are all highly correlated with one another
throughout the whole period. 	 However, the Yen contract is
not correlated with any of the other currencies. 	 These
currency correlations show the importance of carrying out a
systems estimation. With this extra information being
incorporated into the analysis the equations' estimates are
improved.
Due to the number of coefficients that would need to be
estimated in a complete systems estimation, and due to the
small number of observations available, it would be
misleading to carry out a complete systems estimation as
there would be a lack of degrees of freedom. However, the
correlations from table 7.11 show that it may be beneficial
to combine information across a couple of currencies, rather
than across all four.
Tables 7.12 to 7.17 report the results of using ZS1E.
Estimating two currencies at any one time meant that 4
parameters were being estimated, leaving 4 or 5 degrees of
freedom at each stage of estimation. The regressions are
conducted up to 12 weeks from maturity in order to have a
consistent sample across all four currenies, in view of the
number of degrees of freedom. It was not felt that it could
be justified carrying out any regressions if the number of
degrees of freedom fell below the already low figure of
four.
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As can be seen the only additional inefficiency, compared to
that in standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions,
is when the OM:$ and Yen:$ contracts are considered
together. Bias is found for the constant and futures rate
8,11 and 12 weeks from maturity for the DM:$ contract and at
6,7,8,9,11 and 12 weeks from maturity for the Yen:$
contract.
7.7 CONCLUSION
Day of the Week Effects have recently been analysed in the
literature. They are analysed for the first time on the
London International Financial Futures Exchange in this
paper. Six contracts are analysed. Within these contracts
closing prices are considered over the last six months to
maturity of the contract for five out of six contracts,
whilst the Gilt contract is considered from nine months to
delivery.
A negative weekend effect is found for five contracts. Mean
returns were negative from Friday to Monday. This could be
due to the fact that intensity of information flow to the
market's participants over this period could create
uncertainty in the market, and hence people would prefer to
close their positions before the weekend.
Whilst such an effect is found it is thought to be minimal
as NONE of these returns are significantly different from
zero. The fact that no returns were found to be
significantly different from zero means that no systematic
significant bias was found and hence these results do not
question the efficiency of these six financial futures
contracts.
The absence of any DVE means that one will not be able to
infer any bias in tests of unbiasedness using futures price
data from the same day in different weeks. Efficiency in
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terms of unbiasedness is then examined on LIFFE's currency
contracts. As shown in section 7.4, the standard regression
analysis of the efficient markets hypothesis (Er#4) can be
extended to incorporate many possible tests, all of which
are essentially based on different versions of the
regression equation.
The E*4 requires that any news is random, and will thus be
white noise, having no structure or serial correlation.
Thus ECp(t+1):!(t)] - E(p(t):I(t-1)] - e(t) and E(e(t)] - 0.
If this is true, as is necessary in an efficient market,
the price series will satisfy the notion of a martingal.e.
Hence, futures rates should be unbiased predictors of the
spot rate.
Such unbiasedness is examined on a weekly basis for all four
currecies traded on LIFFE, for up to 20 weeks from delivery.
Using single equation OLS the four currencies appear to be
efficient. However, the goodness of fit of the regressions
tends to fall dramatically the further is the date to
maturity. Semi-strong form tests may therefore recognise
inefficiencies in these currencies.
Correlation across currencies is shown to exist at each time
interval. Thus extra information is incorporated into the
analysis via a systems estimation. Oue to the low number of
observations, degrees of freedom problems exist. Hence a
complete systems estimation across all four currencies could
not be carried out. Instead, information was combined
across two currencies at any one time. Overall the currency
contracts still appear to be efficient.
Efficiency implies that any deviation between the futures
rate and the subsequent spot rate should be soley due to new
information. Chapter eight will now go on to consider this
crucial area of news effects. A correct way of examining
news effects is proposed, which like the systems estimation
250
used in this chapter, provides a more powerful analysis.
The speed of reaction to news effects is also considered
within the next chapter.
47	 47
0.00106	 0.00133
0.01005	 0.01041
0 .02228	 0.02184
-0.02205	
-0 .02200
0 .04990	 0.06238
52	 52
	
0.00193	 0 .00 195
	
0.00980	 0.00973
	
0 .02315	 0. 02770
	
-0.02151	
-0.02214
	
0.10045	 0.10133
53	 53
	
0.00067	
-0 .00099
	
0 .00717	 0 .00724
	
0.0 1572	 0.01632
	
-0.01368	
-0 .0 1478
	
-0 .03574	
-0.05269
54	 54
	
0 .00 165	 0.00133
	
0 .00933	 0.0 1004
	
0.02310	 0.02572
	
-0.02037	
-0 .02021
	
0.08890	 0.07187
7	 7
	
-0.00713	
-0.00680
	
0.00809	 0.00776
	
0 .00207	 0 .00241
	
-0.02221	
-0.02072
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TASLE 7.1
	 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: FT-SE 100 INDEX
CONTRACT
DAY	 NEAREST CONTRACT	 SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT
FRIDAY-MONDAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONDAY-TUESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-TI-LJRSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOLIDAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
49	 49
0.00007	 0.00042
0.00961	 0.00960
0.02594	 0.02411
-0.02402	
-0.02434
0.00321	 0.02047
93	 79
0.00119	 -0.04980
0.00639	 0.02091
0 .0 1825	 0.01691
-0.02547	 -1.00000
0.11105	 -3.93433
102	 90
	
-0.00017	 -0 .0 1090
	
0.00566	 0.10561
	
0.01825	 0.02497
	
-0.02547	 -1.00000
	
-0 .0 1703	 -0 .98102
104	 90
0.00049	 0.00004
0.00506	 0.00043
-0.0 1292
0.05065	 0.03364
103	 91
	
-0.00044	 -0.00054
	
0. 00612	 0 .00457
	
0.02714	 0.02635
	
-0.01335	 -0.01347
	
-0.04499	 -0.04934
12
	 13
0.00172	 0.00382
0.00384	 0.00601
0.00940	 0 .01793
-0.00358	 -0.00141
0 .02069	 0.04584
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TABLE 7.2 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: YEN:DOLLAR CONTRACT
DAY	 NEAREST CONTRACT 	 SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT
FRIDAY-MONDAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONDAY-TUESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-THURSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOL I DAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
93	 80
	
-0.00085	 -0.00009
	
0.00654	 0.00558
	
0.02494	 0.01982
	
-0.02138	 -0.02194
	
-0.07868	 -0.00724
101	 101
	
-0.00077	 -0.00058
	
0.00627	 0.00618
	
0.01438	 0 .01477
	
-0.01977	
-0.02298
	
-0.07785	 -0.05907
101	 101
	
-0.00309	 -0.00050
	
0.00559	 0.0058 1
	
0.01371	 0 .01390
	
-0.01647	 -0 .01670
	
-0 .03933	 -0 .05006
101	 101
	
-0.00007	 -0.000 13
	
0.00559	 0.00534
	
0.01611	 0 .01432
	
-0.01450	 -0.01434
	
-0.00683	 -0.01310
112
	
112
	
-0.00940	 -0.00041
	
0.09400	 -0.00606
	
0 .02247	 0 .01310
	
-0. 99999	 -0 .02006
	
-1.05272	 -0.04575
12
	
12
	
0 .00071	 0.00156
	
0.01040	 0.00602
	
0.01283
	
0.00934
	
-0.02086	 -0.00887
	
0.00868	 0.06871
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TABLE 7.3 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: STERLING:DOLLAR CONTRACT
DAY
	
NEAREST CONTRACT
	
SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT
FR IDAY-MOtIJAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONDAY-TUESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-THURSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOLIDAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
102	 102
	
-0.00137	 -0.00147
	
0.00637	 0.00646
	
0.01440	 0.01310
	
-0.01865	
-0.01999
	
-0. 13926	 -0.14965
92	 66
	
0.00043	 0. 00 102
	
0.00762	 0 .00789
	
0.02863	 0.02795
	
-0 .0 1700	
-0 .01535
	
0.04002	 0.06704
103	 76
	
-0.00074	 -0.00081
	
0 .00599	 0.00596
	
0.01398	 0 .01420
	
-0.0 1861	 -0.02 125
	
-0.07574	 -0.06134
105	 79
	
0 .00025	 0 .00047
	
0. 00498	 0.00477
	
0.01548	 0.01178
	
-0.01227	 -0. 00996
	
0 .02629	 0. 03728
103	 77
	
-0 .00064	 0.000 19
	
0 .00579	 O .00891
	
0.01921	 0. 06 158
	
-0.01285	 -0.01254
	
-0 .06615	 0.01444
12	 12
	
-0.00 161	 -0.00189
	
0.00894	 0 .00897
	
0.01093	 0 .01055
	
-0.0 1627	 -0.0 1599
	
-0.01828	 0.0
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TABLE 7.4 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: SWISS FRANC:DOLLAR CONTRACT
DAY	 NEAREST CONTRACT	 SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT
FRIDAY-MONDAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONOAY-TUESOAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-THURSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOLIDAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
93	 67
	
-0.00 153	 -0.00275
	
0.00641	 0 .0 1032
	
0 .0 1657	 0.01588
	
-0 .02 106	 -0.06764
	
-0.14245	 -0.18454
99	 99
	
0.00062	 -0.00094
	
0.00749	 0.00673
	
0 .02344	 0. 02030
	
-0.02860	 -0 .01349
	
0.06 181	 0.09099
109	 100
	
-0.00044	 -0.000 18
	
0.00620	 0 .00639
	
0. 02294	 0.02353
	
-0 .0 1250	 -0.0 1352
	
-0.04820	 -0.0 1820
112
	 109
	
0. 00073	 0 .00037
	
0. 0059 1	 0.00571
	
0. 0 1919	 0.01694
	
-0.0 1378	 -0.01462
	
0.08223	 0.04019
111	 110
	
-0.00079	 -0.00046
	
0.00672	 0.00633
	
0.02066	 0.02043
	
-0.02898	 -0 .01253
	
-0.08802	 -0 .05100
12	 12
	
-0.00348	 -0 .00366
	
0.00974	 0.0099 1
	
0.01091	 0.01491
	
-0.02405	 -0.02374
	
-0.04181	 -0.04387
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TASLE 7.5 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: DEUTSCHEMARK : DOLLAR CONTRACT
DAY	 NEAREST CONTRACT	 SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT
FRIDAY-MONDAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONDAY-TUESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-THURSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOLIDAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
101	 100
	
-0.00 147	 -0.00203
	
0.00644	 0.00643
	
0.01520	 0 .0 1498
	
-0.01743	 -.0 .01913
	
0.14847	 -0.20300
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TABLE 7.6 DAY-OF-THE-WEEK EFFECT: GILT CONTRACT
DAY	 NEAREST	 SECOND	 THIRD
CONTRACT	 NEAREST CONTRACT NEAREST CONTRACT
FR IDAY-MOt'IOAY
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
MONDAY-TUESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Oeviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
WEDNESDAY-THURSDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
THURSDAY-FRIDAY:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
HOL bAYS:
Observations:
Mean Return:
Standard Deviation:
Maximum Return:
Minimum Return:
Sum of Returns:
107
-0.00093
0.00665
0.01218
-0 .02343
-0.09922
106
0.00024
0.00651
0.02007
-0.02542
0.02564
115
-0.00126
0.00948
0.02384
-0.07555
-0. 14501
117
0.00 121
0.01012
0.07862
-0.02680
0.14163
118
0.00050
0 .00627
0 .0 1762
-0.01142
0.05956
13
O .00013
0.00642
0.01521
-0.01040
0.000171
107
-0.00090
0.00676
0.0 1755
-0.02266
-0.09640
105
0.00039
0.00654
0.0 1993
-0.02399
0.04066
114
-0.00037
0.00587
0.02196
-0 .0 1547
-0.04182
116
0.00011
0 .00565
0.0 1599
-0.02604
0 .01298
118
0 .00055
0.00618
0.01743
-0.01124
0.06520
13
-0.00030
0.006 12
0.01371
-0.00991
-0.00393
90
-0.00031
0.00703
0.01703
-0.03146
-0.02799
90
-0 .00006
0.00584
0.02007
-0.01225
-0.005 18
97
-0.00020
0 .00523
0.01767
-0.01542
-0 .01983
97
0.00039
0 .00522
0.01574
-0.01807
0.03785
98
0.00111
0.00644
0.02 162
-0.01131
0.10869
10
-0.00153
0.00490
0 .00350
-0 .00994
-0 .01528
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TABLE 7.7: TESTING IPIBIASEONESS DEUTSCHEMAflK :OOLLAR CONTRACT
in S(t) - a + b in F(t-i) , for i'l to 20.
standard errors in parantheses
lagged futures	 a	 b	 R1	 OW
rate
F(T-1)
F (T-2)
F (T-3)
F(T-4)
F ( T-5)
F C T-6)
F(T-7)
F(T-8)
F (1-9)
F(T-1O)
F(T-1 1)
F(T-12)
F(T-13)
F(T-14)
F(T-15)
F(T-16)
F(T-17)
F(T-18)
F (1-19)
F(T-20)
0.07714
(0.0554)
0.10166
(0.1243)
0.11372
(0.1660)
0.17158
(0.2035)
0.17029
(0. 2547)
0.01760
(0.1972)
0.00449
(0. 2264)
-0.21286
(0.1813)
-0.23825
(0.1937)
-0.12026
(0.2212)
-0.11985
(0.1976)
-0.18138
(0.2303)
-0 .09206
(0.2793)
0.025 17
(0.3350)
0.24598
(0.3983)
0 .04755
(0.4255)
0.05680
(0.4249)
0 .03395
(0.3829)
-0.10973
(0.3591)
-0.13687
(0.4234)
1 .07958
(0.5618)
I . 10641
(0.1263)
1.12121
(0.1690)
1 . 18365
(0.2079)
1. 17203
(0. 2580)
1.02118
(0. 2004)
1.01610
(0.2320)
0. 80558
(0. 1855)
0 .78261
(0.1990)
0.91125
(0.2218)
0.90970
(0.2043)
0.84464
(0.2377)
0 .94506
(0.2909)
1.07013
(0.3499)
1.29985
(0.4159)
1.09381
(0.4448)
1. 10538
(0.4449)
1.07013
(0. 3967)
0.92996
(0.3860)
0 .90927
(0.4466)
0.9814
0.9164
0.8627
0.8224
0.7467
0.7877
0.7327
0.7586
0.7206
0.7429
0.7677
0.6779
0.6376
0.6092
0 .6195
0.5019
0.5071
0.5481
0.4917
0.4085
1.8664
2.3486
1 .5265
1.5714
2. 1304
2 .0650
2. 1028
2.420 1
2.3413
2.3203
2.2034
1 .9573
1.8939
1.7615
1.7131
1.5084
1.4218
1 .4648
1. 5138
1.4850
0.9506
0. 6558
0. 6399
0. 5264
0 .4681
0. 6819
0. 6227
0.4197
0.7735
0.6067
0 .4324
0.1132
0.1181
0.0518
0 .0277
0.0012
0.0004
0 .0028
0.0008
0.0234
1.7258
2.8085
2. 2676
2.3235
1.8771
2 .7400
2.72 13
1 .9254
2.2658
2.3073
1 .5739
1.2689
1.1622
1.1530
1.0421
1 .081
1 .084
1.058
1.0903
0.8443
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TABLE 7.8: TESTING UNBIASEONESS YEN:OOLLAR CONTRACT
in 5(t) - a + b in F(t-i) , for i'1 to 20.
standard errors in parentheses
iaaoed futures	 a	 b	 R2	 OW
rate
F(T-1)
F ( T-2)
F (1-3)
F(T-4)
F(T-5)
F ( T-6)
F(T-7)
F (1-8)
F(T-9)
F(T-10)
F(T-1 1)
F(T-12)
F(T-13)
F(T-14)
F(T-15)
F(T-16)
F(T-17)
F(T-18)
F(T-19)
F(T-20)
-0.09488
(0.07 19)
0.03304
(0. 2662)
0 .04925
(0.2807)
0.062 12
(0.3598)
-0 .05518
(0.3533)
-0.04182
(0.230 1)
-0.07302
(0. 2523)
-0.28010
(0. 2814)
-0.17578
(0.1528)
-0.04546
(0.2701)
-0.14812
(0 .3363)
-0 .53205
(0.3827)
-0.59099 *
(0.3079)
-0.69655 *
(0.2976)
-0. 65955
(0.5540)
-0.81681
(0. 6691)
-0.8380 1
(0.6460)
-0.92672
(0.4937)
-0.83517
(0.5130)
-0.69077
(0.5804)
0.89155
(0.0830)
1.04129
(0 .3079)
1 .06485
(0 .3261)
1.08124
(0 .4187)
0 .93820
(0.4083)
0. 957 18
(0.2669)
0 .92604
(0.2943)
0.68959
(0.3310)
0.81508
(0. 1801)
0.96431
(0.3169)
0.83991
(0 .3929)
0. 39009
(0.4458)
0.23181 *
(0.3591)
0. 19851 *
(0.3468)
0. 24526
(0.6500)
0.06104
(0.7891)
0.03604
(0 .7624)
-0.06842
(0.5804)
0. 03941
(0. 6065)
0.21354
(0.6905)
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TABLE 7.9: TESTING UNBIAS0NESS DOLLAR:STERLING CONTRACT
in 5(t) - a + b in F(t-i) , for i-i to 20.
standard errors in paranttieses
iaooed futures	 a	 b	 R	 OW
rate
F(T-1)
F (1-2)
F (1-3)
F(T-4)
F(T-5)
F(T-6)
F(T-7)
F(T-8)
F(T-9)
F CT-i 0)
F CT-. 11)
F(T-12)
F(T-13)
F (1-14)
F (1-15)
F (1-16)
F (1-17)
F CT-ia)
F CT- 19)
F(T-20)
-0 .01059
(0.01082)
-0.01971
(0.0257)
-O .04390
(0 .0243)
-0 .05953
(0.0310)
-0.03884
(0.0435)
0.00311
(0.0315)
-0.00363
(0.0435)
0.02095
(0.0393)
0.01363
(0.0550)
-0.01617
(0.0909)
-0 .0 1423
(0.0897)
-0 .03787
(0 .0828)
-0.07913
(0.1122)
-0 .08147
(0.1099)
-0.15438
(0.1100)
-0.15423
(0.0864)
-0. 11939
(0.1036)
-0.05348
(0.1073)
-0.04791
(0.0974)
-0.06787
(0.1109)
1.02246
(0.02873)
1.04283
(0.0681)
1 .10262
(0.0642)
1 .11388
(0.0799)
1 .07422
(0.1136)
0. 96750
(0.0822)
0 .96685
(0.1114)
0.90478
(0.1005)
0.91511
(0.1384)
0.99509
(0.2437)
0.98770
(0.2399)
1 .03584
(0.2183)
1. 12628
(0. 2921)
1.05430
(0.2792)
1.27961
(0.2772)
1 .2749 1
(0.2168)
1 .17133
(0 .2565)
1 .02560
(0.2702)
0.99731
(0.2415)
1.02751
(0.2702)
0 .9945
O .9719
0.9768
0.9652
0 .9274
0.95 19
O .9149
0 .9203
0.8820
0 .7353
O .7386
0.7895
0.7125
0.7232
0.7802
0.8521
0.7765
0.7060
0.7397
0.7068
2 .0723
2.2922
2.6279
1.7969
.8300
2.3534
2.3807
2.4204
2.6638
2.4825
2.4055
2 .4935
2. 1836
2.3981
2.7177
2.7284
2.1839
2.1893
2.2527
1.9698
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TABLE 7. 10: TEST ING UNB IASEONESS SWISS FRANC: DOLLAR CONTRACT
in S(t) - a + b in F(t-i) , for i-i to 20.
standard errors in parantheses
iaqqed futures	 a	 b	 R2	 OW
rate
F ( T- 1)
F C 1-2)
F (1-3)
F(T-4)
F(T-5)
F(T-6)
F(T-7)
F C 1-8)
F(T-9)
F ( T- 10)
FCT-11)
F(T-12)
F(T-13)
F(T-14)
F(T-15)
F(T-16)
F(T-17)
F(T-18)
F(T-19)
F(T-20)
0.03357
(0 .0667)
0.05138
(0.1020)
-0.02736
(0.0925)
0.05941
(0.1140)
0.080 15
(0.1560)
-0.04748
(0.1009)
-0.04651
(0.1008)
-0.14280
(0.0933)
-0.11536
(0.1095)
0 .00656
(0.1303)
0 .02675
(0.1118)
0.03120
(0.1649)
0.07066
(0.2129)
0.04033
(0.2664)
0.28328
(0.2440)
0.05543
(0.2104)
0.08957
(0.1807)
-0.03136
(0.1853)
-0.07464
(0.2114)
-0.07346
(0. 1982)
1.04450
(0.0828)
1.07330
(0.1275)
1.01384
(0.1166)
1 .09860
(13.1447)
1 .11287
(0.1958)
0 .95716
(0.1272)
0.96969
(0.1285)
0.85151
(0.1195)
0.88854
(0.1406)
1.05016
(0.1683)
1.07691
(0.1444)
1.137894
(0.2124)
1.13849
(0.2764)
1 .11568
(0.3459)
1 .43745
(0.31 83)
I . 14942
(0.2765)
1.19963
(0.2385)
1.03469
(0 .2419)
0 .98225
(0.2772)
0.99484
(0.2742)
0 .9636
0 .9219
0.9264
0.9058
0.8434
0.9042
0.9047
0.8944
0.8693
0.8665
0. 9026
0.8113
0.7387
0. 6754
0. 8031
0.7756
0.8349
0.8206
0.7584
0.7058
2.2855
3.2573
2. 1732
2.1465
2. t 879
2.4129
2.6091
2.7727
2.7340
3.01346
2 .6639
2.2300
1 .9620
1 . 6339
1.6259
1.6792
1.8394
1.6430
1.9760
2.1261
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TABLE 7.11: CORRELATIONS ACROSS CONTRACTS. n 8.
1. One Week from Delivery.
OH	 ST	 SW	 YE
OM	 1.0000
ST	 0.90661 1.0000
SW	 0.97262 0.95235 1.0000
YE	 0.53390 0.37987 0.53693 1.0000
2. Two Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
CM	 1.0000
ST	 0.93354 1.0000
SW	 0.97854 0.96968 1.0000
YE	 0.54765 0.46086 0.54149 1.0000
3. Three Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
CM	 1.0000
ST	 0.93985 1.0000
SW	 0.98916 0.96708 1.0000
YE	 0.60312 0.54907 0.60741 1.0000
4. Four Weeks.
OH	 ST	 SW	 YE
CM	 1.0000
ST	 0.94603 1.0000
SW	 0.98239 0.97856 1.0000
YE	 0.46497 0.41323 0.43947 1.0000
5. Five Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
CM	 1.0000
ST	 0.93885 1.0000
SW	 0.96653 0.95184 1.0000
YE	 0.08203 0.05549 0.08094 1.0000
6. Six Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
OH	 1.0000
ST	 0.94706 1.0000
SW	 0.97313 0.96367 1.0000
YE	 0.44197 0.45352 0.49671 1.0000
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7. Seven Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
	
CM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.95138 1.0000
	
SW	 0.95613 0.96893 1.0000
	
YE	 0.38729 0.40109 0.46896 1.0000
8. Eight Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
	
CM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.96006 1.0000
	
SW	 0.97306 0.98242 1.0000
	
YE	 0.46364 0.44061 0.45754 1.0000
9. Nine Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
	
CM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.94373 1.0000
	
SW	 0.96844 0.98830 1.0000
	
YE	 0.46923 0.51891 0.56995 1.0000
10. Ten Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
	
DM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.89699 1.0000
	
SW	 0.95762 0.95599 1.0000
	
YE	 0.34215 0.41527 0.47421 1.0000
11. Eleven Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
	
CM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.89488 1.0000
	
SW	 0.95757 0.96797 1.0000
	
YE	 0.15731 0.19554 0.24932 1.0000
12. Twelve Weeks.
CM	 ST	 SW	 YE
CM	 1.0000
	
ST	 0.90220 1.0000
	
9W	 0.96051 0.94185 1.0000
	
YE	 0.05381 -0.07604 0.15208 1.0000
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TABLE 7.12
SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
DEUTSCHEMARK	 SWISS FRANC
with
V	 V
S(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 5(t) - a + bf(t-i)
2.	 2.Maturity	 a	 b	 A	 a	 b	 R
1	 0.05286	 1.05653	 0.03123	 1.04156
(0.04923) (0.04937) 0.9803 (0.05392) (0.06696) 0.9636
2	 0.06070	 1.07014	 0.06813	 1.09429
(0.06665) (0.08737) 0.9375 (0.08106) (0.1013)
	 0.09215
3	 0.06982	 1.08431	 0.00399	 1.02231
(0.1084)	 (0.1099)	 0.9179 (0.0787)	 (0.09919) 0.9264
4	 0.15524	 1.17474	 0.08270	 1.12825
(0.1395)	 (0.1418)	 0.8686 (0.0919)	 (0.1165)	 0.9051
5	 0.08000	 1.08639	 0.02340	 1.04142
(0.2090)	 (0.2103)	 0.7330 (0.1235)	 (0.1549)	 0.8399
6	 -0.02924	 0.97998	 -0.06958	 0.92921
(0.1595)	 (0.1610)	 0.7962 (0.08287)	 (0.1044)	 0.9034
7	 -0.05396	 0.96270	 -0.08586	 0.91931
(0.1775)	 (0.1806)	 0.7321 (0.07916) 	 (0.1008)	 0.9022
8	 -0.19301	 0.62596	 -0.16560	 0.82213
(0.1475)	 (0.1508)	 0.7582 (0.07623) (0.09756) 0.8933
9	 -0.19529	 0.82690	 -0.13918	 0.85729
(0.1522)	 (0.1562)	 0.7182 (0.08611) (o.1rn4) 	 0.8683
10	 -0. 16139	 0.86853	 -0.06123	 0.96229
(0.1683)	 (0.1743)	 0.7413	 0.8605
11	 -0.15237	 0.87559	 -0.02719	 1.00696
(0.1595)	 (0.1647)	 0.7667 (0.09179) (0.1185)	 0.8988
12	 -0.25285	 0.77066	 -0.05568	 0.96652
(0.1711)	 (0.1763)	 0.6727 (0.1243)	 (0.1600)	 0.8025
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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TABLE 7.13
SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
0EUTScHERK	 YEN
with
V	 V
8(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 8(t) - a + bf(t-j)
Maturity	 a	 b	 a	 b
1	 -0.02469	 0.97852	 -0.04257	 0.95196
(0.02885) (0.02870) 0.9751 (0.03156) (0.03635) 0.9483
2	 0.00925	 1.01809	 0.05792	 1.07008
(0.07940) (0.08001) 0.9373 (0.1931)	 (0.2234)	 0.6553
3	 0.02685	 1.04064	 -0.17978	 0.79851
(0.06422) (0.06476) 0.9182 (0.1485)	 (0.1725)	 0.5999
4	 0.04779	 1.06523	 -0.13294	 0.85420
(0.06427) (0.06472) 0.8694 (0.1355)	 (0.1575)	 0.5031
5	 -0.10090	 0.90398	 -0.18023	 0.79365
(0.1013)	 (0.1011)	 0.7115 (0.1293)	 (0.1492)	 0.4570
6	 -0.06278	 0.94604	 _0.25785* 0.70653*
(0.08937) (0.8959)	 0.7967 (0.1123)	 (0.1300)	 0.6351
7	 -0.07299	 0.94347	 _0.27321* 0.69249*
(0.09703) (0.09796) 0.7324 (0.1115)	 (0.1299)	 0.5831
8	 _0.22186* 0.79634* 	 _0.37090* 0.58377*
(0.08812) (0.08942) 0.7586 (0.1369)	 (0.1609)	 0.4098
9	 -0.15901	 0.86431	 _0.30077* 0.66742*
(0.09576) (0.09755) 0.7127 (0.07813) (0.09195) 0.7481
10	 -0.14972	 0.88065	 -0.24420	 0.73097
(0.08154) (0.08346) 0.7421 (0.1075)	 (0.1259)	 0.5712
11	 _0.20464* 0.78032*	 _0.20597* 0.77230*
(0.05916) (0.05967) 0.7522 (0.09561) (0.1114)	 0.4296
12	 _0.27671*	 0.74596*	 _0.37926* 0.56815*
(0.08211) (0.08340) 0.6687 (0.6344)	 (0.1562)	 0.2896
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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TABLE 7.14
SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
DEUTScHEMARK	 STEAL DIG
with
V	 V
5(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 S(t)	 a + bf(t-i)
Maturity	 a	 b	 A2	 a	 b	 A2
0.04326	 1.04512	 -0.00359	 1.00330
(0.03757) (0.03800) 0.9804 (0.00752) (0.01953) 0.9942
2	 0.09134	 1.09590	 -0.01564	 1.03174
(0.1007)	 (0.1022)	 0.9163 (0.02094) (0.05518) 0.9709
3	 0.10452	 1.11181	 -0.03849	 1.08795
(0.1441)	 (0.1467)	 0.8627 (0.02118) (0.05591) 0.9767
4	 0.16944	 1.18135	 -0.59129	 1.11282
(0.1795)	 (0.1834)	 0.8224 (0.02735) (0.070459 0.9652
5	 0.068610	 1.06884	 -0.018213	 1.01911
(0.2177)	 (0.2205)	 0.7409 (0.3748)	 (0.0958)	 0.9250
6	 -0.013156 0.98985	 0.01164	 0.9446
(0.1716)	 (0.1744)	 0.7869 (0.02757) (0.07177) 0.9514
7	 -0.04125	 0.96912	 0.01240	 0.94775
(0.1952)	 (0.2000)	 0.7311 (0.03786) (0.1073)	 0.9131
8	 -0.20542	 0.81322	 0.94775	 0.94775
(0.1543)	 (0.1578)	 0.7586 (0.1073)	 (0.1073)	 0.9070
9	 -0.26025	 0.75993	 0.02309	 0.89125
(0.1660)	 (0.1705)	 0.7200 (0.05701) (0.1525)	 0.8201
10	 -0.14965	 0.88072	 -0.00285	 0.95864
(0.1824)	 (0.1890)	 0.7421 (0.07853) (0.2106)	 0.7343
11	 -0.13413	 0.89490	 -0.009 16	 0.97387
(0.1711)	 (0.1768)	 0.7675 (0.0776) 	 (0.2076)	 0.7385
12	 -0.20706	 0.81806	 -0.02837	 1.01010
(0.1992)	 (0.2055)	 0.6772 (0.07163) (Q.1888)	 0.7890
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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TABLE 7.15
SYSTEMS EST IMAT ION
STERLING	 YEN
with
	
V	 V
S(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 5(t) - a + bf(t-i)
Maturity	 a	 b	 RZ	 a	 b	 R2
1	 0.00013	 0.99130	 0.00465	 1.00651
(0.00419) (0.00913) 0.9922 (0.02056) (0.02354) 0.9348
2	 -0.00726	 1.00039	 0.041811	 1.05144
	
(0.02189) (0.06003) 0.9720 (0.2303) 	 (0.2664)	 0.6558
3	 -0.03320	 1.06728	 0.08937	 1.11149
	
(0.02190) (0.05991) 0.9752 (0.2422) 	 (0.2815)	 0.6380
4	 -0.07804	 1.17168	 -0.0987	 0.89405
	
(0.02771) (0.0747) 	 0.9656 (0.2993)	 (0.3483)	 0.5101
5	 -0.04843	 1.11167	 -0.23238	 0.73337
	
(0.03039) (0.08215) 0.9278 (0.2170) 	 (0.2507)	 0.4458
6	 -0.01506	 1.02583	 -0.08062	 0.91216
	
(0.02648) (0.07230) 0.9482 (0.1698) 	 (0.1969)	 0.6804
7	 -0.01871	 1.01432	 -0.12709	 0.86295
	
(0.03955) (0.1062)	 0.8985 (0.1912)	 (0.2229)	 0.6199
8	 0.00503	 0.95316	 -0. 15658	 0.83607
	
(0.03225) (0.08621) 0.9071 (0.1957) 	 (0.2302)	 0.4007
9	 -0.00950	 0.98081	 -0.16210	 0.83122
(0.0494)	 (0.1310)	 0.8196 (0.1123)	 (0.1323)	 0.7732
10	 -0.00546	 0.96578	 -0.01203	 1.00355
	
(0.06957) (0.1854)	 0.7347 (0.2055)	 (0.2412)	 0.6057
11	 0.011172	 0.91833	 -0.13525	 0.85496
	
(0.07576) (0.2024) 	 0.7350 (0.2817)	 (0.3290)	 0.4323
12	 -0.01432	 0.97234	 -0.55876	 0.35897
	
(0.06964) (0.1833)	 0.7866 (0.3193)	 (0.3719)	 0.1125
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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TABLE 7.16
SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
STERLING	 SWISS FRANC
with
V	 V
5(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 S(t)	 a + bf(t-i)
2.	 2.Maturity	 a	 b	 R	 a	 b	 R
1	 -0.00203	 0.99747	 -0.00014	 1.00242
	
(0.00935) (0.0256)	 0.9925 (0.04823) (0.05981) 0.9621
2	 -0.00534	 0.g9499	 0.03743	 1.05576
	
(0.02161) (0.05923) 0.9720 (0.08711) (0.1089) 	 0.9217
3	 -0.032613	 1.06561	 -0.00405	 1.01214
	
(0.02199) (0.06017) 0.9752 (0.08007) (0.1009) 	 0.9264
4	 -0.08016	 1.17752	 0.05606	 1.09435
	
(0.02898) (0.07827) 0.9657 (0.09792) (0.1242) 	 0.9058
5	 -0.05787	 1.13818	 0.02087	 1.03823
	
(0.03750) (0.1028) 	 0.9304 (0.1213)	 (0.1522)	 0.8396
6	 -0.00983	 1.01102	 -0.05751	 0.94447
	
(0.03010) (0.08287) 0.9478 (0.08503) (0.1071) 	 0.9041
7	 -0.01628	 1.00760	 -0.060B6	 0.95132
(0.0436)	 (0.1177)	 0.8983 (0.08439) (0.1075)	 0.9044
8	 0.00432	 0.95793	 -0. 13902	 0.85638
	
(0.03941) (0.1069) 	 0.9072 (0.07922) (0.1014)	 0.8943
9	 0.01744	 0.90678	 -0.13453	 0.86379
	
(0.05715) (0.1530)	 0.821	 (0.09453) (0.1214) 	 0.869
10	 0.00477	 0.93779	 -0.0329 12 0.9990
	
(0.07828) (0.2098) 	 0.7329 (0.1126)	 (0.1453)	 0.8645
11	 -0.00449	 0.96109	 -0.00245	 1.03905
	
(0.07727) (0.2067) 	 0.7381 (0.09677) (0.1250)	 0.9015
12	 -0.02579	 1.00316	 -0.00067	 1.03788
	
(0.07156) (0.1886)	 0.7887 (0.1426)	 (0.1837)	 0.8102
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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TABLE 7.17
SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
SWISS FRANC
	
	
YEN
with
V	 V
5(t) - a + bf(t-i)	 s(t) - a + bf(t-i)
Maturity	 a	 b	 AZ.	 a	 b
1	 -0.03329	 0.96107	 -0.02440	 0.97295
(0.02522) (0.0307)	 0.9575 (0.02672) (0.03072) 0.9427
2	 0.04642	 1.0670	 0.20572	 1.24112
	
(0.05869) (0.07306) 0.9219 (0.1578)	 (0.1824)	 0.6317
3	 0.00730	 1.02650	 0.02749	 1.03955
	
(0.05776) (0.07253) 0.9263 (0.1745)	 (0.2027)	 0.6395
4	 0.02427	 1.0539	 -0.02978	 0.9743
	
(0.05367) (0.06749) 0.9043 (0.1676)	 (0.1949)	 0.5212
5	 -0.06510	 0.92999	 -0.12302	 0.85978
(0.09007) (0.1125)	 0.8206 (0.1904)	 (0.2200)	 0.4648
6	 -0.06211	 0.9386	 -0.12883	 0.85624
(0.0627)	 (0.07863) 0.9039 (0.1438)	 (0.1666)	 0.6743
7	 -0.07024	 0.93931	 -0.17066	 0.81212
	
(0.05805) (0.07358) 0.9038 (0.1457)	 (0.1698)	 0.6133
8	 -0.16705	 0.8276	 -0.02439	 0.73326
(0.05289) (0.0777)	 0.8932 (0.1577)	 (0.1854)	 0.4180
9	 -0.07942	 0.93492	 -0.18428	 0.80505
(0.06098) (0.0777)	 0.8659 (0.1478)	 (0.09863) 0.7734
10	 -0.01622	 1.0206	 0.00682	 1.02568
	
(0.07166) (0.09201) 0.8659 (0.1478)	 (0.1734)	 0.6043
11	 -0.06244	 0.96125	 -0.00261	 1.00997
(0.0633)	 (0.08129) 0.8922 (0.1828)	 (0.2134)	 0.4147
12	 -0.06913	 0.94941	 -0.15384	 0.83086
	
(0.07653) (0.09770) 0.7990 (0.1843)	 (0.2145)	 0.0313
(Standard errors in parantheses)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EXAMINATION OF NEWS EFFECTS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter seven examined hypothesis Cc) that was outlined in
chapter one. Under the assumption of risk neutrality,
futures rates should be unbiased predictors of the futures
rates at maturity, the Exchange Delivery Settlement Price
(EDSP). If there is any deviation between the futures price
and the EDSP then efficiency would imply that this should be
accounted for by new informati that differs from the
market's expectation. This is termed 'news.
The first section of this chapter addresses the important
question of testing for such news effects. The way the news
term has been examined has not received adequate attention.
The approach adopted here focusses on ensuring that the
news term was white noise and then testing for the news
effects in a systems estimation. The last point is
essential for two reasons: (a) to ensure that potential
information contained in the off-diagonal elements of the
system estimation is used efficiently; (b) to ensure that
there is consistency between the parameters used to generate
the news terms and the parameters obtained from the systems
estimation of the news generation functions. This involves
non-linear cross equation restrictions.	 Point (b) has not
b.t.., applied in the literature but is essential.
In addition, the prices quoted in the market should react
ininediately to such news and should NOT react with a lag.
The second half of this chapter examines this important
point in terms of sterling related futures contracts.
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8.2 CONSIDERATION OF NEWS
In chapter seven the unbiasedness of futures rates was
considered. In equation (8.1) the EMH would imply that
(ab)-(0,1) and that e(t) was white noise.
in s(t) -a + b in f(t-i) + e(t) 	 .. .(8.1)
where s(t) is the spot rate in the FEM or the EDSP in the
FFM and f(t-i) is, respectively the forward rate or the
futures rate at time (t-i).
From (8.1) one can see	 that there exists an error,
s(t)-f(t-.1). Any such error could be explained by the
variables that determine the spot rate. Consider these
variables:
s(t)-ax(t)+u(t)	 . . .(8.2)
Decornpsing this x(t) one can separate out the information
set available. Errors in the forecasts of these exogenous
variables should imply errors in the exchange rate
forecasts.
Now:
x(t) - b z(t) + v(t)	 • (8.3)
Thus:
s(t) - f(t-1) - s(t) - E( s(t) : Itt-i) ]
ax(t)+u(t) - E( ax(t)+u(t) : Itt-i)]
- a( x(t)-E(x(t) : Itt-I]] + u(t)
as Et u(t) : I(t-1)]-0
- a(x(t)-bz(t)] + u(t)	 . . .(8.4)
from (8.3).
So the variables, x(t), that actually affect s(t) will also
affect f(t-i) as well. Thus, any differentials in forecasts
of the exogenous variables will account for some, if not
all, of the forecast error. Any differentials in these
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forecasts of x(t) will come through deviations between the
actual and expected value of x(t) that obtains.
The apparant lack of efficiency in this market has led to a
consideration of news effects. In other words, the idea
that deviations between the the reali5ed spot or EDSP and
the previous period's forward or futures rate depend upon
surprises in variables such as the money supply. News
should thus help to explain any forecast errors that arise.
News has subsequently been incorporated into the analysis,
and the significance of the news terms has been considered:
ln s(t) - a + b In f(t-1) + c(NEWS) + e(t)
	
. ..(8.5)
Thus, in equation (8.5), the news term should help to
explain any forecast error. That is, if c does not equal
zero then news would help to explain the forecast error.
The correct way of testing or news effects is examined in
terms of the FEM over the period 1978-1983. Most previous
research on news effects had been carried out on the FEM
(See, for example, Frenkel(1979), Edwards(1984)). News is
being examined in terms of monthly sterling M3 figures (M3)
and consequently it is examined here in terms of the FEM as
this market allowed a sufficiently lengthy period of
observation, and hence a large data sample in which to carry
out the analysis. As trading only began in September 1982
on the LIFFE there were not enough available observations on
which to carry out the systems estimation in this analysis.
The speed of reaction of three sterling related instruments
to news in the £M3 figures is then examined.
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8.3	 TESTING FOR NEWS EFFECTS IN A SYSTEM'S ESTIMATION
USING CROSS EQUATION PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS:
DATA ArID SAMPLE PERICO
The sample period under consideration is from 1978(ian) to
1983(Sept). Institutional reasons have meant that the
period since 1978 represents a structurally distinct era on
the world's FEM. Developments on the New York FEM have led
to increased volume on world markets. Of particular
interest being the fact that the US has standardi:ed on the
European quotation of currencies rather than on the American
basis. This change meant that exchange rates were quoted in
terms of deutschemarks per dollar rather than cents per
deutschemark. For example, the old system was cents/CM.
Assume the rate was 100/2.5800. If the absolute change was
in units of 0.0005 then the move upwards would be
100/2.5805. Under the new system, the corresponding rate to
100/2.5800 is CM 1/ $O.3875. The absolute change under the
new system would be worth less. Thus volume would have to
increase to maintain profitability.
Such continued use of absolute spreads on contracts meant
that the use of the European basis had the effect of
narrowing the spread between bid and offer on rates.
Consequently profitability was reduced for any given volume
of transactions and so volume was increased simply to
maintain the previous position.
A futher factor underlying 1978 as a benchmark year was that
the New York market opened up to Europe, as money brokers
were allowed to quote prices from overseas sources. This
growth of the New York market underpinned the global
integration of the world's foreign exchange markets. Prior
to floating rates there was a need f or exchange controls to
stop speculative capital flows from threatening parity
positions. After 1973, there was no need for such controls.
Added to this, computers, increased sophistication and large
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amounts of speculative funds led to the prominance of the
capital account and the integration of the world markets.
Also, as news is concerned with money supplies here,
monetary targets only began to receive importance in Britain
following the IMF's 'Letter of Intent' in December 1976.
Worldwide, the money supply has grown in importance in the
late 1970s.
The data consisted of the end of month spot, with
corresponding forward rate, from the London close. The
exchange rates were obtained from the Henley Centre for
Forecasting's database. Monetary figures are the seasonally
unad j usted Ml data for each of the six countries under
consideration. The first observation available from the
OECD Main Economic Indicators was used. Updated figures
were not used as it is the first observation about which
agents will react.
Exchange rates against the Dollar were considered for
Sterling, Canadian Dollar, Yen, Swiss Franc and the
Deutschemark.
8.4 PROBLEMS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
The time period under consideration, and hence the data
used, pose questions for taking account of news effects.
Should one, for instance, work with weekly spot rate data
but monthly forward rates? One could work with the whole
series or take every fourth observation of the weekly data
such that the data frequencies are similar. With the whole
series the error terms will be serially correlated ,
following a third order moving average.. The EMIl implies
that E( u(t):I(t-1)]-O but this is not so here. A solution
is to remove the serial correlation by taking account of
every fourth observation. However, this removes a lot of
data and so the power of the results are reduced.
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One problem with the overlapping data is noted by
Frenkel( 1979). Using all the observations, a two-step
procedure had been employed. The residuals from the first
stage OLS regression were estimated and then the data
was transformed to obtain efficient estimations. However,
the correlation between the transformed forward rate and
the u(t) term would give an inconsistent procedure unless
E(f(t)u(t)]-O and f(t) was exogenous. This latter
assumption does not appear to be valid. Hansen and
Hodrick(1980) overcame this problem by using consistent OLS
with appropriate adjustments of the covariance matrix to
take account of the autocorrelation.
Whilst one may be able to support the E*I if one uses the
sample frequency of the data such that it exactly matches
the maturity of the forward contract, this may not be the
case if one used data sampled more frequently. Infrequent,
nonoverlapping data samples will omit large 1 often
interesting periods and the tests will have much lower power
than is necessary because of the size of the information
set.
Short lived periods of turbulence are common, as is
speculative action. These short turbulent periods that
characterise FEM are often the most interesting to consider
and yet they will often be missed. However, it can prove
difficult to modify this as quite often such changes occur
during a day's trading and some are lost for a few hours as
trading occurs.
	 Thus, even if one used daily rates this
could miss interesting periods.
Another consideration is the so-called Peso problem. If the
error term includes the possibility of a discontinuously
large event, the sample size may be too small, and the
distribution significantly non-normal. If there exists a
particular event such as a discrete devaluation this could
bias the sampling distribution. Indeed, possible regime
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shifts could be a source of disequilibrium exchange rates.
If agents strongly believe that a policy course will not be
followed they may imply that it is impossible to follow that
course. To avoid such a problem, and in order to make a
valid test, one should use as long a sample period as
possible.
Trading is also continuous within the FEM and yet one does
not take into account the number of trades that occur when
one tests the EMH. Yet a thick market, that is one in which
a lot of trades occur, must indicate that there is a lot of
news floating around the market. A thin market, which is of
few trades, would seem to imply that people expect little to
occur that differs from their expectations.
8.5 TESTING FOR NEWS
In order to consider the role of news and the question of
efficiency, one must first decide on the correct model of
exchange rate determination. Thus one must explicitly take
into account the theory of the exchange rate. Despite a
large recent literature in the areas of efficiency and
exchange rate determination there has been minimal overlap
between the two sets of work. There is thus room for
greater combination of the two theories in consideration of
the EMIl. By considering the economic models within which
the exchange rate is determined, one can see the fundamental
variables to which the exchange rate is expected to respond.
Thus to improve one's tests of efficiency one can take into
account the actual and expected values of these variables
New information regarding these variables will affect
exchange rate behaviour. Model selection techniques are an
important first step in taking account of news effects.
Whilst such effects can occur with respect to any variable
in the information set, one would expect the significant
effects to occur surrounding the important variables.
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In this paper, attention has focussed on news regarding the
money supplies. Most previous work with monetary data has
tended to consider surprises surrounding unanticipated
increases in monetary growth. However, it is not
appropriate to use differences unless one has white noise
monetary growth. Two explanations exist as to the effect of
unanticipated increases in monetary growth on the exchange
rate. One is that this increase should lead, via an
inflationary expectations effect, to an an exchange rate
depreciation. The other argues that market agents
anticipate a subsequent tightening of monetary policy.
Consequently interest rates rise and the exchange rate
appreciates -- a policy anticipations effect. See Goodhart
and Smith (1984) and Murf in (1984) for a fuller discussion.
A general. to specific approach was used to derive the
significant news terms from an autoregressive scheme.
Previously news terms had not been described in this way, so
this overcomes any preliminary test problems in the news
term.
Current money supply was regressed on its previous twelve
lagged values and the significant variables were obtained.
The money supplies were then filtered to obtain a flat
correlogram using Box-Jenkins screening. These filters are
shown in Table 8.1. Logged values of the money supply were
used. The filters for five of the six countries involved
taking the tweith-difference of the money supply. For the
I.E the filter was the tweith difference of the change in the
money supply.
Lagrange Multiplier(LM) and Box-Pierce tests were then
conducted on the chosen autoregressions of the money supply
to ensure that there was no autocorrelation of the
residuals. The LM test considers the independence of the
disturbances against an AR(p) scheme, where p is the number
of lagged values under consideration. 	 Here LM(12) tests,
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look at the autocorrelation of the residuals over twelve
periods. The critical chi-squared value is 21. AU filters
pass the LM(12) test which suggests that correct filters
have been used. The Box-Pierce portmanteau statistic is
another diagnostic test. This is based on the whole plot of
the residuals. It is also a chi-squared statistic, with m
degrees of freedom, where m is the number of lags. 	 The
filters pass this test also.
News was generated, M(t) - M(t), for all countries under
consideration; where M(t) and M(t) are, respectively, the
actual and expected money supplies. This is the correct
procedure, rather than relative money supplies. News was
tested for white noise. Having tested for the best filter
for the money supply terms, one sees that the specified
relationships for the money supply from which one obtains
the news term is different for the various countries under
consideration. In the absence of data on agents'
expectations, one can use the procedure here by deriving
expectations from an appropriate filter of past values of
the relevant variable.
Consider now the standard regression equation used for the
EMH, reported in Table 8.2. This shows that in terms of
equation 8.1 above the EMH, that a-O, b-I and the error term
is white noise, is rejected for Canada/USA, iapan/USA and
Switzerland/USA.	 In terms of the dynamic specification,
this regression appears adequate. However, t-tests show
rejection of the coefficient restictions for these three
currencies.
News regarding the money supplies was subsequently
incorporated into the analysis, for reasons listed above.
The consideration of news might help to explain this
inefficiency in the market. That is, unexpected movements
in the money supply will cause unexpected movements in the
exchange rate. Now when the classical assumptions are met
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the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator.
However, when an equation is part of a system then a better
estimator can be obtained by combining information across
the system.
Indeed models of the exchange rate are bilateral and do not
explicitly take into account take into account actions that
take place outside the two countries under consideration.
Various theoretical reasons suggest that currencies are
linked. For example, risk premia indicates portfolio
diversification across countries, with the curencies being
linked as the agents actions can affect more than one
currency.	 Accepting that exchange rates are integrated
means that one can combine information across currencies.
Consider the standard relationship with news incorporated on
the right-hand-side (equation (8.5) above). One can use
Zeliner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression procedure (SURE) to
combine the equations. SURE incorporates the covariance
structure across the currencies considered and can thus be
exploited in the empirical analysis. As the information set
contains information on the spot and forward rates across
currencies one should be able to improve the fit of the
specification and test for multimarket efficiency. The
relative efficiency of the SURE estimator should increase
with the number of equations.
It can thus be posssible to test the hypothesis that a(i)-O
and b(i).'l in the following regression
s(i)(t)	 a(i) + b(i) f(i)(t-i) + e(i)(t) 	 .. . (8.6)
2.
where (i) relates to the currency. If 	 (ij) - 0 for i not
equal to i then this implies contemporaneous correlation
of premiums across currencies. Thus, one can test
simultaneously for efficiency across currencies.
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Edwards(1983) has carried out analysis using SURE.
Comparing the results from such multicurrency tests with the
estimates from OLS he found that OLS rejected efficiency for
only two currencies, Franc/Dollar and Lira/Dollar, whilst
SURE only did so marginally for the latter. The idea of
testing several currencies simultaneously has been
considered before, although not always by SURE. Geweke and
Fiege's(1979) tests relied on looking at the realiSed rate
of exchange gain whilst Hansen and Hodrick(1980) looked at
lagged forecast errors for five countries. That proved more
powerful as they were able to reject the efficiency
hypothesis for two other countries.
Baille,Lippens and McMahon(1983) have used time series
theory to develop their test of the standard EMH. Using a
jointly dependent unrestricted autoregressive process they
reject the hypothesis of zero bias. Using such techniques
one could consider the time series properties of
exchange rates from past forward rates.
	 They use
statistical techniques, such as Aikiake's information
criterion, t determine the optimal lag length p, such that
the AR(p) process they use to determine the spot/forward
relationship results in the residuals being a good
approximation to a vector white noise process.
Problems do exist with vector autoregressive processes.
Concentrating on the relevant variables it is possible to
estimate a large number of parameters with low degrees of
freedom, or to impose arbitrary restrictions on when to
terminate lag lengths. The information set considered may
prove to be large but arbitrary. The problem with arbitrary
information sets is that one could omit important values
thus leading to higher order autocorrelatlon, and hence
inconsistent parameter estimates. Here, the derivation of
the news generation functions avoids such problems. The
significant lagged values were retained and Box-Pierce and
Lagrange Multiplier tests ensured that there were no higher
order autocorrelation.
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As mentioned above, news effects were treated in a systems
estimation. Not only is potential information contained in
the off-diagonal elements of the system covarianc. matrix
used efficiently but also the data is allowed to be of more
assistance in the exchange rate equation 8.7 by allowing the
actual and expected values of each country's money supply,
rather than the error term as such, to enter this equation.
Money supply is generated for both countries under
consideration in 8.8 and 8.9. Actual minus expected money
is then substituted into 8.7. Non-linear cross equation
restrictions ensure that there is consistency between the
parameters used to generate the news terms and those
obtained from the systems estimation of the news generation
functions.
The system of equations here, involved one relating the spot
rate with the lagged forward rate and news terms for the two
countries under consideration (no 8.7), and two equations
representing news generation functions for each of the
countries under consideration (nos 8.8 & 8.9).
in s(t)	 a + b in f(t-1) + cE in M(t) - g in M(t-i)]
+ dE in M*(t) -h in M"(t-.i)]	 . . . (8.7)
in P4(t)	 g ln M(t-i) + u(t)
	 .. . (8.8)
in M*(t)	 h in M"(t-i) + u*(t) 	 . . . (8.9)
where P4 refers to the money supply of the U5A and * refers
to the foreign country against the dollar
The systems estimation then involves estimating (8.7), (8.8)
and (8.9) together as a system . Thus extra information is
used as mentioned above . One is also ensuring consistency
between the parameters obtained from the news generation
functions, (8.8) and (8.9), and the exchange rate
equation,(8.7), through the use of non-linear cross equation
restrictions.
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If one was just to rely on using OLS then one would conduct
OLS on (6.8) and (8.9) and plug for the residuals from (8.8)
and (8.9) into (8.7),
s(t) - a + b f(t-i) + c u(t) + d u*(t) + e(t) 	 . . .(8..10)
where
u(t) - M(t) - g M(t-i)
	 . . .(6.11)
u(t)*_ M(t)*_ h M'(t-i) 	 • .(8. 12)
However, this is relying only on information available in
8.12 whilst assuming that the g and h parameters obtained
from the news generation functions,8.8 and 8.9, will obtain
the same values in 8.10. Consistent parameter estimates will
obtain although, by assuming no uncertainty regarding g and
h this can provide inconsistent estimates of the standard
estimates. Hence, inference regarding significance of these
news terms may not be correct.
More efficient estimates of the parameters can be obtained
by use of SURE on all three equations. Thus, one is making
use of information from all three equations in the
estimation process. The technique adopted here estimates
8.7, 8.8 and 8.9 as a system of equations. Not only is
extra information used, as stated above, but also one is
ensuring consistency between the parameters obtained from
the news generation functions regarding the money supplies
and the exchange rate equation containing news terms.
	 Thus
in the system g and h were constrained in 8.7 to equal the
values obtained from 8.8 and 89. Thus, non-linear
cross-equation restrictions are used. Thus approach is thus
equivalent to non-linear seemingly unrelated regression.
In the news generation function for the money supplies,
money supply from period t has been regressed on its lagged
values.	 An appropriate forecasting equation should rely
only on lagged explanatory variables.
	 However, if
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contemporaneous variables were used as explanatory variables
in the forecasting equation then it Would not be certain
that the market had complete knowledge of that variable,
say, in period (t-1). Thus, it would not produce a genuine
white noise news term. For instance, if the news
generation function was
M(t) - g P1(t-i) + v X(t) + u(t) 	 ...(8.13)
where X(t) was, say, Gf'P growth, then the unanticipated term
about this money supply equation would be
M(t)-M(t)aM(t)-g( M(t-i)+vX(t) )
-M(t)-gM(t-i)-vX(t)+v(X(t)-E(X(t) :ICt-i)]))
-uCt) + v(X(t) - E(X(t):I(t-1)])	 .. .(8.14)
However, this would not constitute a true, unanticipated
news term.
If ,say, one had 	 s(t) - a X(t) + u(t) 	 .. .(8.15)
where	 X(t) a b Z(t-1) + v(t)	 ...(8.16)
Here one can decompose X(t) into its relevant components by
use of a forecasting equation. Let,
X(t)	 f Z(1)(t-1) + g Z(2)(t-1) + u(t)	 ...(8.17)
Now, Z(1) is known by everyone. Thus a weak-form test would
focus on the forecsting equation
X(t) - f Z(1)(t-1) + w(t) 	 ...(8.18)
News terms would focus on Z(1), the variables known by
everyone. If Z(2) represented specialist information, not
known by everyone, then these variables would not be
incorporated into efficiency tests. Consideration of Z(2)
would thus represent strong-form tests.
Given that news effects focus on Z(1) and not on Z(2) then,
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on the face of it, consideration of news effects appears to
represent a weak-form test. However, if one correctly tests
for news terms, one may be able to separate out the
influence of Z(1) and of Z(2). News terms focus on Z(1),
say, yet f(t-1) will encompass the effects of all the
relevant variables, even those that we do not posess
information on. So, if having obtained the news term, one
could regress this news term on f(t-1), and obtain the error
term, which should be a genuine' news term. That is,
having obtained orthogonality between the lagged forward
rate and the unanticipated component of the money supply one
has a news term.
The residuals from the systems estimation were retreived and
Box-Jenkins screening was carried out to test for white
noise residuals. The errors were white noise. The
coefficients on the news terms were identified. Table 8.4
shows the final results from the systems estisiations. Joint
estimation of the above three equations in the system
estimation shows that there is evidence of inefficiency.
The 1K/USA currency is the only one to pass the coefficients
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test; that is, the forward rate is an unbiased predictor.
However, UK news is significant. No other news terms are
significant yet the forward rate is significantly different
from its hypothesised value for Canada/USA, Japan/USA and
Germany/USA. The coefficients deviate from the hypotesised
value for three countries, Canada, Japan and Switzerland.
Risk premiums could account for this.
Consequently correct systems estimation of news effects
suggests inefficiency in the PEM. However, it appears that
a correctly specified monetary surprise model does not
account for such apparant inefficiencies. One may therefore
need to consider a different information set and use the
above procedure to look elsewhere to explain inefficiencies
in the FEM.
It is interesting that a plausible example of a news term,
news in the UK money supply, is shown to be significant.
That is, to reduce significantly the variance in s(t) that
f(t-1) cannot explain. A further consideration is whether
one can detect any correlation of the news term with the
lagged forward rate. This is shown in Table 8.5. The news
terms are regressed on the lagged forward rate, the
residuals are retreived and then tested as news using OLS in
the standard exchange rate equation. This would provide a
news term that is independent of the lagged forward rate.
However, as Table 8.5 shows, there is little change in the
results (*1)
Here attention has focussed on news regarding the money
supplies. However, there exists a lot of day-to-day noise
and news in the market, and thus the market's reaction to
any one item of news is likely to be weak. Indeed, the
existing results obtained here do not seem to suggest that
news surrounding the money supplies is the major factor
determining the market forecasting errors. It actually
appears that they have minimal explanatory power despite the
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fact that an accurate and reliable proxy for expectations,
as opposed to survey(panel) results of expectations, has
been derived here.
8.6 TESTING FOR THE SPEED OF REACTION TO NEWS EFFECTS
A second implication of the EMH with regard to news effects
is that announcements of variables that coincide with the
market's expectation should have no effect on the contract's
price. Thus, in equation 8.19 the term on the expected money
supply should be zero. That is, c-fl in
s(t) - a +b f(t-i)+ c M(t-i)+e(t) 	 . ..(8.i9)
where M(t-i) is the expected money supply at (t-i). In
addition, the contract's price should only react to
announcements if they differ from what the market expects.
Thus, in equation 8.20 efficiency would imply that r does
not equal zero and that q equals zero.
That is, the contract's price would ONLY react to news,
s(t) - a + b f(t-i) + r( M(t-i) - M(t-i))
+ q M(t-i) + e(t)	 . . .(8.20)
If the market did not satisfy these two efficiency
constraints then it would be inefficient.
If the announcements differ from what the market expects
then, in an efficient market, the contract's price should
react IV4IEOIATELY to this news. The market should NOT react
with a lag. Hence the speed of reaction to the announcement
should be very quick. This question is tested here with
respect to three sterling related instruments traded on
LIFFE. In terms of equation 8.21 if b does not equal
zero then this implies that the futures price reacts to news
DP(t) - a + b C OH - 0M) 	 . . .(8.21)
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where DP(t) is the change in the futures price from day(t-1)
to day (t); day (t) being the day of the announement. CM is
the actual change in the money supply announced on day t and
0M is the expected change over this same period. Equation
8.21 should be analy$ed for the days following the
announcement. Hence the reaction of the contract's price to
news can be analysed. If the news term is still significant
on the days following the announement, rather than on the
day of the announcement, then one can infer that the market
is inefficient. In addition, one can analyse the change in
the futures price with respect to expectations. In equation
8.22 the E4-1 implies that b-O
DP(0) • a + b CM	 • (8.22)
Expectations should not have a significant impact on the
change in the futures price.
The implications of news with respect to money supply
announcements are explained below. As explained above, news
has been examined in the FEM before but not on the financial
futures markets. The speed of reaction of three sterling
related instruments on the LIFFE with respect to
announcements in £M3 is examined below.
8.7 DATA AND SAtPLE PERIOO
News effects with respect to money supply announcements are
examined for the sterling/dollar currency futures
instrument, the three month sterling futures instrument(ST3)
and the long gilt futures instrument. These three contracts
are examined as it is thought that they are the contracts
most likely to react to announcements in sterling 143.
The sterling 143 figures used in this test are those that
were announced by the Bank of England. They are NOT the
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updated figures. Hence these figures are the onei to which
the market will react. These figures were obtained from the
Bank of England press releases. The announecment dates can
be found in 'Economic Trends', and were usually the second
Tuesday of each month.
Given that the actual money supply data used was that to
which the market will react it is important to have an
expectations term that is consistent with the date of the
announcement. That is, the data used for expected money
supply should coincide with the date of the actual money
supply announcement in order for a correct news term to be
constructed. News represents the difference between the
actual and the expected money supply. In theory it is white
noise. If it is not then the market is inefficient.
One way of constructing expected money supply is to use an
autoregressive scheme, as in section one above. An
alternative is to use survey data of the markets'
participants. This latter approach is adopted in this
section. Smith and Goodhart(1984) used survey data to find
that unanticipated monetary changes in the IJ( and the USA
significantly affect the £:$ exchange rate.
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The expected money supply series used in this paper
represents the average of the expectations of the market's
participants.	 It can thus be said to represent 'the
market's expectation of M3. It is constructed by P4essells
to coincide with the announcement of the money supply
figures.
Having obtained the actual and expected money supplies the
futures rates are then determined seperately. The futures
rates that are used are those that coincide with the
announcement of the money supply. The money supply is
announced on day (t) each month and the futures rate quoted
for that day each month is used. The change in the futures
rate from day (t-1) to day Ct) is then constructed, IDP(t),
as well as the changes over the three subsequent days;
DP(t+1) is the change from (t) to (t+1), DP(t+2) represents
the change over (t+1) to (t+2), whilst DP(t+3) is the change
over (t+2) to (t+3).
Equation (8.21) was estimated using OP(t), CP(t+1), DP(t+2)
and DP(t+3) in turn as the dependant variable. This was to
take account of the speed of reaction to the news effect.
Equation (6.22) was also estimated using these different
dependant variables. The results from these equations are
presented in tables 8.6 to 8.15 for the contracts of varying
distances from maturity for the three instruments under
consideration.
For the three instruments under considration equations 8.21
and 8.22 were examined for the contracts in relation to
their time to maturity. The sterling/dollar futures
instrument and the long gilt futures were examined for the
nearest contract(O to 3 months from maturity), second
nearest contract (3 to 6 months from maturity) and the third
nearest contract(6 to 9 months from maturity). The sterling
interest rate futures was, in addition, examined over the
fourth nearest contract (9 to 12 months from maturity) due
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to the increased liquidity in this instrument. This allows
an examination of news effects not only for different types
of futures instruments but also for different contracts
within these instruments. It can thus be examined whether
contracts of varying horizons from maturity react in the
same way to news effects. Due to the increased volume in
the nearest contracts it may be that they react in a more
significant way to news.
8.8 APPLICATION
Tables 8.6 to 8.15 show how the money supplies react to the
money supply announcements. Efficiency is examined jointly
in terms of the significance of the expected monetary growth
and in terms of the speed of reaction to the money supply
announcement. The former should not prove significant whilst
the latter should not have a lasting effect on any change in
the futures price.
The results from applying equations (8.21) and (8.22) to the
contracts under consideration are examined. In addition, the
news and the expected money terms are examined in one
regression,
DP - a + b (ON - 0M) + c 0M	 .. .(8.23)
The reaction of futures prices is examined for up to four
days following the announcement. Closing prices are used
throughout.
The results for the gilt futures are shown in tables 8.6 to
8.8. The expected money supply does not appear significant
in any of the regressions for any of the three gilt futures
considered. The results regarding the news term are more
interesting. For the contract nearest to delivery (table
8.6) the news term is significantly on the day of the
announcement but NOT on any of the subsequent days. This is
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as one would expect in an efficient market. In terms of the
contract second nearest to delivery the news term is ONLY
significant in the regression,
DP(0) - a + b (CM - 0M) + c 0M 	 . . .(8.24)
The significance of the news term diminishes on the days
following the announcement. The contract third closest to
delivery (table 8.7) exhibits results that are exactly
similar to those in table 8.6
The results from the sterling/dollar futures are represented
in tables 8.8 to 8.11. Results are similar across the
contracts. Only for the contract third closest to delivery
is there evidence of the expected money supply being
significant, in the regression of DP(2) on 0M. However,
nothing conclusive can be drawn from this. News proves not
to have a significant effect.
The sterling interest rate futures contracts are shown in
tables 8.12 to 8.15. It is odd to find that the expected
growth of 143 is significant on the price change two days
after the announcement, CP(2), for the three contracts
closest to delivery. This contravenes the notion of
efficiency(*2).
It is also interesting to note the the significance of the
news term diminishes on the days following the money supply
announcement, with the news term having a significant effect
on the day of the announcement. This is as one would expect
in an efficient market.
On the basis of these results the three futures instruments
considered here appear to be efficient. Expected money
supplies do not appear to significant on a systematic basis
whilst the news terms are quickly incorporated into the
prices quoted.
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8.9 CONCLUSIONS
Part one of this chapter shows the correct use of systems
estimation provides a powerful test of the standard
efficiency relationship in the FEM. The results appear
different from those obtained in the standard relationship.
Hence, if one was to consider the standard relationship, one
may have a biased interpretation of the constant term and
the lagged forward rate.
News regarding the money supply does not appear to explain
such inefficiencies. Perhaps news regarding other important
variables could explain any deviations between the spot rate
and the lagged forward rate. The significance of correctly
specified news, whose conditional expectation is zero,
should not affect the significance of f(t-1).
One thus needs to look to other areas to explain
inefficiency in the FEM. Risk premium is an alternative
explanation of any deviation between sCt) and f(t-l).
Greater consideration of this area is necessary.
Greater attention should be foccussed on the information
set. By increasing this it may be found that there exists a
variable, that has not yet been considered, which is
significant at Ct-i). This would provide evidence against
the efficiency of f(t-i). As discussed in chapter six
use of recursive estimation techniques could account for
correct use of the available information set in estimation.
Here, correct estimation of monetary news terms suggests
that explanations for the inefficiency of the foreign
exchange market must be found elsewhere. The approach
adopted here for examining news effects can be directly
applied to financial futures markets Lack of sufficient
data in these markets has prevented application of this
procedure to financial futures markets in this analysis.
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The second aspect of news effects examined here concerns the
speed of reaction of prices to such news effects. The
efficiency of three financial futures instruments with
respect to this are considered in the second part of this
chapter. News effects regarding the growth of the money
supply are examined, inclusively, over the period
1982(October) to 1985(May). These futures contracts appear
to be efficient.
Having determined that the contracts appear to be priced
efficiently a further, independent question can be posed.
That is, in what direction do the prices of the futures
contracts move after the release of the actual money supply?
This would be an important question if a speculative or
trading position was being taken in the market.
In terms of £M3 a further consideration would be where the
actual money supply would be in relation to its target
range. If the growth in £M3 was greater than expected, but
£M3 was in the middle of its target band then a different
outcome might be expected than if this growth had led to £M3
overshooting its target range.
If £M3 is greater than expected then people might expect a
subsequent tightening of policy thus leading to a rise in
interest rates. this would be reflected in a fall in the
sterling interest rate futures price, or a rise in the
sterling/dollar futures price as agents expect an exchange
rate appreciation. In addition, gilt prices may be boosted
as agents expect a rise in gilt sales to meet the monetary
targets.	 To sell, these there must be the expectation of a
capital gain. Consequently the yield curve would be
downward sloping. Hence, the same announcement could have a
different effect across the contracts' maturities, with
interest rate futures nine months fromn maturity rising in
expectation of lower interest rates, but falling for near
term contracts.
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Obviously, the way contract prices react to announcements
depends on peoples' expectations. Different scenarios can
be drawn, with different outcomes being the result. Whilst
this does not immediately enter into the discussion of
efficiency, it is an interesting area to consider. However,
if the market reacts in a predictable way following the same
type of news effect then one may be able to infer from this
what positions to take when a similar event happens in the
future.
For the contracts under consideration here, the impact of
any news term was in a downward direction. Given that actual
£M3 figures both exceeded, and were below expectations
it is difficult to make an overall judgement about the
causation process from the news term to the contracts'
prices. Rather, it would be necessary to analy5e each
individual contract's price change in the light of other
statistics available at that time.
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FOOTNOTES:
It has been suggested that one must implicitly assume free
floating to avoid feedback from exchange-rates to the money
supply within the month. The systems estimation should take
this into account across the equations. Bean(1983) points
out that wrong signs on news variables will occur if there
exists feedback from exchange-rate innovations to, for
example, monetary policy. 'Since most European countries
direct their monetary policy at least partially to external
factors, such feedback is almost certain to occur within a
monthly time frame.'
*2:
An explanation by be found in the fact that the regression
of news on lagged actual £143 figures showed significant
positive correlation with the fourth lag, (standard errors
in brackets):
NEWS 0.848 - 0.360 M(t-1) + 0.033 M(t-2) - 0.152 14(t-3)
	
(0.859) (0.320)
	 (0.299)	 (0.292)
- 0.152 M(t-4) + 0.084 M(t-5)
	
(0.295)	 (0.326)
295
TABLE 8.1:
Filters chosen:
GERMANY
USA
SW ITZERLAtD:
CANADA
JAPAN
IJ(
LM - 0.8 LM (-12)
LM - 0.3 LM (-12)
LM - 0.6 LM (-12)
LM - 0.7 LM (-12)
LM - 0.7 LM (-12)
DLM - 0.5 DLM (-12)
	
where :
	
LM - Log of the money supply of the
particular country;
	
and :	 DLM a LM - LM (-.1)
Chose significant lagged values:
Let HF a Chosen filter from above for the
particular country;
LM(12) a Lagrange Multiplier test for 12 th
order autocorrelation
C t- statistics in brackets)
GERMANY	 : HF - 0.03223 + 0.9729 MF(-1)
(0.5344) (18.30)
LM(12)a14.02 A 0.8839
USA	 : HF - 0.06578 + 0.9857 MF(-1)
(0.4043) (25.93)
2.
LM(12)a19.49 R -0.9387
SWITZERLA: HF - 0.1241 + 0.9240 MF(-1)
(1.255)	 (15.07)
LM(12)-7.89 R0.8408
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CANADA	 : MF - 0.6097 + 0.7867 MF(-1) - 0.3964 MF(-11)
(3.664)	 (9.435)	 (-3.137)
z
LM(12)"11.72 A -0.7402,
JAPAN	 : MF - 0.5147 + 0.5438 1.f(-1) +0.3037 MF(-3)
(1.398) (4.401)	 (2.451)
t
LM(12)-12.47 A -0.5888,
LJ(	 : MF - 0.00681 - 0.2310 MF(-1) - 0.2523 MF(-4)
(2.261) (-1.575)	 (-1.788)
2.
LM(12)-17.22 A -0.111,
TABLE 8.2:
OLS On in s(t) - a + b in f(t-1)
(standard errors in brackets)
Currency of specified country against the US Dollar
2.
Country	 a	 b	 R	 1?	 LM(12)
GERMANY	 0.0265	 0.9792	 0.951	 1.812	 16.95
(0.0229) (0.0297)
CANADA	 0.0269	 0.8536 0.738 2.010 13.72
(0.0126) (0.0686)
SWITZERLAND 0.0595	 0.9318 0.883	 1.791	 17.03
(0.0283) (0.0456)
JAPAN	 1.1601	 0.7888	 0.5981 1.677	 10.37
(0.4738) (0.0872)
UK	 0.0080	 1.0056 0.954
	 1.7058 14.61
(0.0205) (0.0297)
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TABLE 8.3:
OLS REGRESSIONS; EFFECTS OF ACTUAL AND EXPECTED MONEY
(a) in s(t) - a + b in f(t-1) + c N* + d N
where N" and N are ,respectiveiy, the monetary news for the
country indicated and the USA. (standard errors in brackets)
a	 b	 c	 d	 R	 OW
GERMANY	 0.0586 0.9431 0.2834 -0.2352 0.9427 1.696
(0.0296) (0.0370) (0.3517) (0.2967)
JAPAN	 1.1957	 0.7823	 0.3138 -0.3150 0.5281 1.712
(0.6367) (0.1169) (0.3680) (0.4994)
CANADA	 0.0294 0.8476 0.1344 -0.2810 0.7605 2.166
(0.0142) (0.0752) (0.0800) (0.1198)
SWITZERLAND 0.0722 0.9083 -0.0496 -0.2688 0.8635 1.509
(0.0371) (0.0569) (0.2201) (0.3315)
	
0.0101	 1.0020	 0.3636 -0.2490 0.9671 1.712
(0.0195) (0.0290) (0.25629 (0.2818)
(b) in s(t)	 a + b in f(t-1) + c N" + d in M"'(t)
where M"' is expected money of specified country
L
a	 b	 c	 d	 R	 OW
GERMANY
	
	 -0.0586 0.9345 0.2669 0.0225 0.9419 1.7421
(0.6078) (0.0474) (0.3552) (0.1144)
JAPAN	 0.2579 0.7311	 0.2666 0.1089 0.5269 1.7302
(1.9150) (0.1417) (0.3676) (0.2013)
CANADA
	
	 -0.0694 0.7772 0.1240 0.0348 0.7314 2.0702
(0.1508) (0.1046) (0.0857) (0.0501)
SWITZERLAND -0.3301 0.8881 0.0144 0.1027 0.8615 1.5583
(0.5115) (0.0589) (0.2281) (0.1286)
I.E	 -2.9739	 0.7865 0.2719
	 0.2733 0.9705 1.6674
(1.2610) (0.0940) (0.2408) (0.1155)
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(ci in s(t)	 a + b in f(t-1) +c in M(t) + d in M'(t)
where M and P4' are,respectiveiy, actual and expected
money of USA
ow
1.6404
1.6627
1.9730
1.4638
1.7426
a	 b	 C	 d
GERMANY	 -0.9759 0.8478 -0.1831	 0.1822 0.945
(0.6630) (0.0733) (0.2917) (0.1171)
JAPAN
	
	
0.7552 0.7316 -0.2647 0.1176 0.5340
(0.7381) (0.1253) (0.4926) (0.1048)
CANADA	 -0.4348 0.6512 -0.2553 0.0823 0.7763
(0.1916) (0.1083) (0.1162) (0.0339)
SWITZERLAND -0.6136 0.8256 -0.3334 0.1214 0.8880
(0.5676) (0.0888) (0.3258) (0.1001)
UK	 -1.9406 0.8542 -0.0972 0.3045 0.9693
(0.8576) (0.0709) (0.1339) (0.1389)
(di in s(t) - a + b in f(t-1) + c in r4*(t) + d in M*f(t)
where P4* and p4*' are,respectively, actual and expected
money of specified country.
OW
1.7420
1.7302
2.0702
1.5583
1.6674
a	 b	 c	 d
GERMANY
	
	
-0.0585 0.9345 0.2269 -0.2442 0.9419
(0.6078) (0.0474) (0.3552) (0.3822)
JAPAN	 0.2580 0.7311	 0.2666 -0.1576 0.5269
(1.9150) (0.1417) (0.3676) (0.4360)
CANADA
	
	
-0.0694 0.7772 0.1240 -0.0896 0.7314
(0.1508) (0.1046) (0.0857) (0.1057)
SWITZERLAND -0.3301 0.8881 	 0.0144 0.0883 0.8615
(0.5115) (0.0589) (0.2281) (0.2325)
UK
	
	
-2.9739 0.7865 0.2719 0.0014 0.9705
(1.2610) (0.0940) (0.2408) (0.2772)
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TASLE 8.4: TESTING FOR NEWS EFFECTS WITH SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
AND CROSS EQUATION PARAMETER 	 RESTRICTIONS
S(t) - a + b F(t-1) + c N* + d N
where N* and N are , respectively, the monetary news
for the country indicated and the USA.
Currency of specified country against US Dollar
(standard errors in brackets)
Country	 a	 b
CANADA	 0.0309	 0.8394
(0.1390) (0.0735)
JAPAN	 1.2238	 0.7771
(0.6104) (0.1120)
SWITZERLAND 0.0731	 0.9069
(0.0355) (0.0545)
GERMANY	 0.0508	 0.9530
(0.0283) (0.0353)
UK	 0.0143	 1.0053
(0.0186) (0.0276)
C	 d
0.00366	 0.000786
(0.0753)	 (0.1134)
0.001199 -0.000125
(0.3502)	 (0.4753)
-0.001288 0.000476
(0.2096)	 (0.3152)
0.1150	 -0.054838
(0.3364)	 (0.2071)
-0.5381	 0.3519
(0.1744)	 (0.2876)
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TABLE 8.5:
Regress news of both countries on f(t-1);
retreive the residuals 	 (P and p*) and
regress s(t) on these and f(t-1); where *
refers to the USA. Currency of specified
country against US Dollar. (standard errors in brackets)
CANADA:
	
N	 0.0018 - 0.0096 F(t-1)
(0.0269) (0.1420)
	
5(t)	 0.0340 + 0.8231 F(t-1) + 0.1329 R'
(0.0149) (0.0784)	 (0.0842)
N - -0.0158 + 0.0831 F(t-1)
(0.0179) (0.0949)
	
5(t)	 0.0340 + 0.8231 F(t-1) - 0.2794 P
(0.0144) (0.076t) 	 (0.1223)
Rt	 OW
0.0001 2.3060
0.7283 2.124
0.0175 2.288
0.744 2.08
JAPAN:
R	 OW
N'- -0.0640 + 0.01 17 F(t-1)	 0.0014 1.9128
(0.2642) (0.0485)
s(t) - 1.218 + 0.7782 F(t-1) + 0.28497 R* 0.5235 1.7123
(0.6284) (0.1153) 	 (0.3627)
N - -0.0134 + 0.0247 F(t-1) 	 0.0110 2.2996
(0.1947) (0.0357)
5(t) - 1.218 + 0.7782 F(t-1) - 0.2639 P
	 0.5197 1.6604
(0.5309) (0.1158)	 (0.4942)
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SWI TZERLANO:
•2.
R	 OW
	
N'a -0.0213 + 0.0330 F(t-1)	 0.0164 2.0487
(0.0254) (0.0389)
8(t)	 0.0779 + 0.8994 F(t-1) - 0.0307 R" 0.8593 1.5504
	
(0.0366) (0.0562)	 (0.2201)
	
N a -0.0213 + 0.0197 F(t-1)	 0.0133 2.3047
(0.0169) (0.0258)
8(t) - 0.0755 + 0.9032 F(t-1) - 0.3363 R
	 0.8627 1.5136
	
(0.0363) (0.0556)
	 (0.3278)
GERMANY:
OW
	
N*a -0.0123 + 0.0155 F(t-1) 	 0.0220 1.9425
(0.0126) (0.0158)
s(t) - 0.0574 + 0.9446 F(t-t) + 0.2728 R* 0.9418 1.7359
	
(0.0290) (0.0362) 	 (0.3498)
	
N a -0.0097 + 0.0123 F(t-1)	 0.0100 2.3032
(0.0150) (0.0187)
5(t) a 0.0574 + 0.9446 F(t- . 1) - 0.2261 P	 0.9418 1.7127
	
(0.0290) (0.0363) 	 (0.2953)
UK:
2.
P	 OW
	
N* 0.0018 + 0.0027 F(t-1)	 0.0006 1.9363
(0.0117) (0.0174)
8(t) a 0.0089 + 1.0002 F(t-1) + 0.3281 * 0.9665 1.6846
	
(0.0193) (0.0288)	 (0.2524)
	
N - 0.0073 + 0.0112 F(t-1) 	 0.0115 2.3098
(0.0061) (0.0158)
8(t) - 0.0089 + 1.0002 F(t-1) - 0.1862 R
	 0.9655 1.7222
	
(0.0196) (0.0292)	 (0.2816)
OP (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
	-0.01875	 2.3524 0.00001
(0.3721)
	
0.03773	 2.1173 0.00008
(0.2565)
	
-0.47884	 1.9181 0.1216
(0.2432)
	
0.00007	 2.2745 0
(0.3175)
-0.01310
(0.3193)
-0.2 1356
(0.2200)
0.33422
(0.2086)
0. 31557
(0.2724)
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TABLE 8.6: LONG TERM GILT CONTRACT REACTION TO NEWS EFFECTS
NEAREST CONTRACT TO DELIVERY
Ct-statistics in parentheses; n.30)
DEPENDENT	 C	 NEWS	 R 2.
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 -0.00875	 -0.31882	 2.2369 0.1489
	
(0.1485)	 (0.1441)
DP(1) -0.18159	 -0.06666	 2.1193 0.0137
	
(0.1082)	 (0.1069)
DP(2) -0.02946	 0.11386	 1.95	 0.0391
	
(0.1080)	 (0.1067)
DP(3) 0.31550	 0.00222	 2.2752 0
	
(0.1348)	 (0.1332)
OP (0)
OP (1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
	
0.49526	 -0.4768	 -0.66358	 2.1902 0.2259
	
(0.3386)	 (0.1699)	 (0.4050)
	
-0.12287	 -0.08507	 -0.07732	 2.1087 0.0159
	
(0.2639)	 (0.1321)	 (0.3148)
	
0.33443	 -0.00020	 -0.47911	 1.9198 0.1216
	
(0.2515)	 (0.1262)	 (0.3008)
	
0.31205	 0.00330	 0.00454	 2.2738 0
	
(0.3283)	 (0.1648)	 (0.3927)
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TABLE 8.7: LONG TERM GILT CONTRACT REACTION TO NEWS EFFECTS
SECOND NEAREST CONTRACT TO DELIVERY
Ct-statistics in parentheses; n-30)
DEPENDENT	 C	 NEWS	 M	 OW	 R
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 0.013497 -0.22893	 2.264 0.0833
	
(0.1452)	 (0.1435)
DP(1) -0.209006 -0.157146	 2.1344 0.0601
	
(0.1189)	 (0.1175)
DP(2) -0.04618	 0.09659	 1.9435 0.0291
	
(0.1067)	 (0.10553)
DP(3) 0.32103	 -0.00348	 2.3316 0
	
(0.1333)	 (0.1318)
DP(0)	 0.11544	 -0.15433	 2.477 0.0067
	
(0.3055)	 (0.3561)
DP(1) -0.28073	 0.08405	 2.0489 0.003
	
(0.2474)	 (0.2884)
DP(2) 0.29411	 -0.44881	 1.9287 0.1105
	
(0.2064)	 (0.2406)
DP(3) 0.30664	 0.01904	 2.3257 0.0001
	
(0.2694)	 (0.3140)
DP(o)	 0.53321	 -0.39184	 -0.68425	 2.2064 0.1721
	
(0.3362)	 (0.7687)	 (0.4021)
DNI)	 -0.06509	 -0.20226	 -0.18948	 2.1253 0.0703
	
(0.2880)	 (0.1445)	 (0.3444)
DP(2) 0.31025	 -0.01513	 -0.46928	 1.9302 0.111
	
(0.2487)	 (0.1248)	 (0.2975)
DP(3) 0.30499	 0.00155	 0.02133	 2.3254 0.0001
	
(0.3247)	 (0.1629)	 (0.3884)
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TABLE 8.8: LONG TERM GILT CONTRACT REACTION TO NEWS EFFECTS
THIRD NEAREST CONTRACT TO DELIVERY
Ct-statistics in parentheses; n30)
2
DEPENDENT	 C	 NEWS	 M	 OW	 R
VARIABLE
DP(o)	 0.03a401	 -0.25104	 2.2459 0.1004
(0.2511)	 (-1.703)
DP(1)	 -0.15933	 -0.19717	 2.4071 0.1083
(-0.387)	 (-1.781)
DP(2)	 -0.01749	 0.09128	 1.8495 0.0275
(-0.1584)	 (0.8580)
OP(3)	 0.33535	 -0.00567	 2.3086 0.0001
(0.1426)	 (0.1374)
OP(0)	 0.12967	 -0.15399	 2.4723 0.0068
(0.411)	 (-0.4222)
DP(1) -0.24117	 0.08499	 2.1853 0.0036
(-1.011)	 (0.3083)
DP(2) 0.32513	 -0.44808	 1.8949 0.1197
(0.2062)	 (0.2384)
DP(3) 0.32038	 0.01936
(0.2799)	 (0.3236)
DP(0)	 0.60368	 -0.43036	 -0.73566	 2.2129 0.2046
(1.750)	 (-2.493)	 (-1.810)
DP(1)	 0.048666 -0.2632	 -0.27069	 2.4104 0.1338
(0.1790)	 (-1.935)	 (-0.8454)
CP(2)	 0.3546	 -0.02676	 -0.4842	 1.9068 0.1212
(0.2518)	 (0.1260)	 (0.2966)
DP(3)	 0.32195	 -0.00142	 0.01744	 2.3205 0.0003
(0.3421)	 (0.1711)	 (0.4030)
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TABLE 8.9: STERLING INTEREST RATE CONTRACT
NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n-30)
DEPEMDENT	 C	 NEWS	 DW
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 0.00176	 0.06851	 2.3470 0.1779
	
(0.02847)	 (0.02734)
OP(i)	 0.05761	 -0.04258	 2.0547 0.0182
	
(0.06048)	 (0.05809)
DP(2) -0.00400	 0.01868	 2.2B9 0.0129
	
(0.03158)	 (0.03033)
DP(3) 0.02735	 0.00062	 1.6287 0
OP (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
OP (0)
OP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
(0.02363)	 (0.02270)
-0.06317	 0.07948	 2.4451 0.0427
(0.05895)	 (0.06985)
0.03281	 0.02784	 2.0799 0.0014
(0.1170)	 (0.1387)
0.08228	 -0.11667	 2.1328 0.0898
(0.0582)	 (0.06896)
0.02146	 0.00826	 1.63T2 0.0008
(0.04533)	 (0.05371)
0.02355	 -0.07591	 -0.02905	 2.3438 0.1816
(0.08827)	 (0.03483) (0.08246)
0.09660	 -0.05584 -0.05199
	 2.0507 0.0213
(0.1451)	 (0.07404) (0.1753)
0.10220	 -0.01744 -0.14160
	 2.1246 0.097
(0.07260)	 (0.03704) (0.08770)
0.01655	 0.00429	 0.01440	 1.6366 0.0016
(0.05675)	 (0.02895) (0.66855)
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TABLE 8.10: STERLING INTEREST RATE CONTRACT
SECOND NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; na3O)
DEPENOENT	 C	 NEWS	 M
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 -0.01671	 -0.05024
	
(0.02831)	 (0.02719)
DP(1) -0.00832	 -0.01518
	
(0.02146)	 (0.02061)
DP(2) -0.00127	 0.02027
	
(0.02618)	 (0.02514)
OP(3)	 0.00749	 0.01394
	
(0.03544)	 (0.03404)
DP(0)	 -0.05885	 0.05069
	
(0.05688)	 (0.06740)
DP(1) 0.00796	 -0.02488
	
(0.04138)	 (0.04903)
DP(2) 0.09111	 -0.12489
	
(0.04687)	 (0.05553)
DP(3) 0.05997	 -0.07057
	
(0.06731)	 (0.07975)
DP(0)	 0.00822	 -0.5871	 -0.33240
	
(0.06784)	 (0.03461) (0.08195)
DP(1) 0.04666	 -0.03388 -0.07332
	
(0.05028)	 (0.02565) (0.06074)
DP(2) 0.11194	 -0.01824	 0.15096
	
(0.0583)	 (0.02975) (0.07043)
oP(3)	 0.06726	 -0.00638 -0.07969
	
(0.08426)	 (0.04299) (0.1018)
OW	 R2
2.4504 0.1053
2.7889 0.0184
1.9563 0.0219
2.1302 0.0058
2.4735 0.0191
2.7865 0.0088
1.8698 0.1485
2.145 0.0263
2.4422 0.1105
2.6442 0.0669
1.9166 0.1598
2.1612 0.0271
307
TABLE 8.11: STERLING INTEREST RATE CONTRACT
THIRD NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n-30)
DEP€M)ENT	 C	 NEWS	 OW
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 -0.00122	 -0.05443	 2.5017 0.1233
	
(0.02848)	 (0.02793)
OP(1)	 -0.00806	 -0.03083	 2.7482 0.0772
	
(0.02092)	 (0.02057)
DP(2) 0.01241	 0.02829	 2.2075 0.0374
	
(0.02817)	 (0.02762)
DP(3) 0.04182	 0.01904	 1.8598 0.0240
op
 (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
oP (0)
cP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
	
(0.02383)	 (0.02337)
	
-0.03619	 0.04068	 2.6126 0.0124
	
(0.06019)	 (0.04068)
	
-0.00722	 -0.00466	 2.7094 0.0003
	
(0.04334)	 (-0.0925)
	
0.12196	 -0.14367	 2.2769 0.1736
	
(0.05196)	 (0.06033)
	
0.06258	 -0.02566	 1.8753 0.0078
	
(0.04784)	 (0.05554)
	
0.03637	 -0.06636 -0.04903	 2.5125 0.1354
	
(0.06868)	 (0.03451) (0.08133)
	
0.04486	 -0.04763 -0.06905
	 2.5906 0.1240
	
(0.04948)	 (0.02486) (0.05859)
	
0.13283	 -0.00994	 -0.15711	 2.3177 0.1767
	
(0.06325)	 (0.3178)	 (0.07491)
	
0.04173	 0.01907	 0.00012	 1.8597 0.0240
	
(0.05786)	 (0.02907) (0.06852)
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TABLE 8.12: STERLING INTEREST CONTRACT
FOURTH NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n-3D)
DEPEM)ENT	 C	 NEWS	 M	 IYl
VARIABLE
DP(0)	 -0.01927	 -0.03293	 2.1941 0.0601
	
(0.02857)	 (0.02657)
DP(1)	 -0.00635	 -0.01668	 2.9201 0.0187
	
(0.02655	 (0.02469)
OP(2)	 0.01072	 0.02275	 1.6817 0.0353
	
(0.02610)	 (0.02427)
DP(3)	 0.00247	 0.04286	 1.4876 0.0421
OP (0)
OP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
OP (0)
OP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
(0.04485)	 (0.04171)
-0.05015	 0.03569	 2.2392 0.0121
(0.05836)	 (0.06573)
0.00257	 -0.01387	 2.9539 0.0022
(0.05334)	 (0.06002)
0.09658	 -0.10855	 1.7619 0.1381
(0.04915)	 (0.05535)
0.00247	 0.04286	 1.4876 0.0421
(0.04485)	 (0.04171)
-0.00545	 -0.03719 -0.01740
	 2.1927 0.0620
(0.07078)	 (0.03363) (0.08115)
0.03972	 -0.03089 -0.05797	 2.7679 0.0438
(0.06498)	 (0.03088) (0.07451)
0.10373	 -0.00595	 -0.11705	 1.7986 0.1397
(0.061 10)	 (0.02904) (0.07006)
0.08386	 0.01775 -0.10241	 1.4985 0.0690
(0.1096)	 (0.05211) (0.1257)
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TABLE 8.13: STERLING:DOLLAR CONTRACT
NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n-30)
DEPEICENT	 C	 NEWS
VARIABLE
•2.
OW	 R
DP(0)	 -0.00662	 0.00211	 2.2367 0.0195
	
(0.00316)	 (0.00300)
DP(1) 0.00338	 _O.00014	 2.1131 0
	
(0.00485)	 (0.00459)
DP(2) -0.00011	 0.00214	 1.6901 0.0878
(0.00146)	 (0.00138)
DP(3) 0.00038	 0.00040	 2.1754 0.0023
DP (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
oP (3)
OP (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
oP (3)
(0.00177)	 (0.00168)
-0.00023	 -0.00812	 2.3435 0.0495
(0.00630)	 (0.00712)
-0.00557	 0.01770	 2.1172 0.0446
(0.00952)	 (0.01083)
0.00211	 -0.00265	 1.5454 0.0231
(0.00303)	 (0.00345)
-0.00147	 0.00247	 2.0935 0.0149
(0.00353)	 (0.00402)
-0.00048	 0.00021 -0.00782	 2.3397 0.0496
(0.00773)	 (0.00371) (0.00896)
-0.01039	 0.00412	 0.01752	 2.2131 0.0658
(0.01163)	 (0.00560) (0.01348)
-0.00056	 0.00228	 0.00057	 1.6955 0.0886
(0.00362)	 (0.00174) (0.00420)
-0.00325	 0.00152	 0.00462	 2.1543 0.0365
(0.00432)	 (0.00207) (0.00500)
310
TABLE 8.14: STERLING: DOLLAR CONTRACT SECOND
NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n*30)
DEPENDENT	 C	 NEWS	 M
VAR IABLE
OW	 R
DP(0)	 -0.00342	 -0.00115	 1.6955 0.0060
	
(0.00278)	 (0.00271)
DP(1) -0.00019	 0.00108	 2.1007 0.0237
	
(0.00130)	 (0.00127)
DP(2) -0.00088	 0.00168	 1.7242 0.0505
	
(0.00137)	 (0.00133)
DP(3) 0.00086	 0.00025	 2.244	 0.0009
DP (0)
DP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
OP (0)
OP(1)
OP (2)
OP (3)
(0.00156)	 (0.00152)
-0.00329	 -0.00037	 1.7695 0.0001
(0.00541)	 (0.00643)
-0.00186	 0.00249	 2.0879 0.0222
(0.00253)	 (0.00301)
0.00005	 -0.00101	 1.5909 0.0032
(0.00292)	 (0.00323)
-0.00070	 0.00217	 2.1910 0.0124
(0.00301)	 (0.00358)
-0.00105	 -0.00195	 -0.00315	 1.6970 0.0111
(0.00675)	 (0.00344) (0.00815)
-0.00497	 0.00270	 0.00634	 2.3313 0.1157
(0.00303)	 (0.00154) (0.00365)
-0.00252	 0.00224	 0.00219	 1.7586 0.0602
(0.00331)	 (0.00169) (0.00400)
-0.00216	 0.00127	 0.00401
(0.00375)	 (0.00191) (0.00482)
OW
1.9428 0.0635
1.7341 0.0307
2.3130 0.0002
2.2655 0.0001
1.4475 0.0564
1.6440 0.0038
2.192	 0.0223
2.1091 0.2001
1.9195 0.2885
1.6895 0.0333
2.2425 0.0303
1.7681 0.3021
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TABLE 8.15: STERLING:DOLLAR CONTRACT THIRO
NEAREST TO DELIVERY
(Standard errors in parentheses; n-SO)
DEPENDENT	 C	 NEWS
VAR tABLE
DP(0)	 -0.00147	 -0.00187
	
(0.00185)	 (0.00179)
DP(1) -0.00076	 0.00089
	
(0.00129)	 (0.00125)
DP(2) -0.00052	 -0.00008
	
(0.00137)	 (0.00133)
DP(3) -0.00083	 0.00001
DP(0)	 0.00116	 -0.00391
	
(0.00336)	 (0.00399)
DP(1) -0.00022	 -0.00070
	
(0.00236)	 (0.00281)
DP(2) -0.00176	 0.00176
	
(0.00246)	 (0.00292)
DP(3) 0.00247	 -0.00470
	
(0.00200)	 (0.00235)
oP(o)	 0.00543	 -0.00440 -0.00926
	
(0.00358)	 (0.00199) (0.00442)
oP(1)	 -0.00126	 0.00107	 0.00070
	
(0.00285)	 (0.00159) (0.00352)
DP(2) -0.00233	 0.00059	 0.00253
	
(0.00300)	 (0.00167) (0.00370)
DP(3) 0.00428	 -0.00186 -0.00713
	
(0.00227)	 (0.00126) (0.00280)
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